Can a compatibilist use Plantinga's free will defense?

For those not familiar, Alvin Plantinga's free will defense can be found in his book, God, Freedom, and Evil. The free will defense differs from the free will theodicy in the fact that whereas the theodicy is an attempt to say what God's reason is for allowing evil, the free will defense merely offers free will as a possible scenario under which God had a good reason for creating a world containing evil.

Compatibilists are people who think free will and determinism are compatible. Since libertarian free will is an indeterministic model of free will, compatibilists obviously aren't claiming that libertarian free will is compatibible with determinism. They have a different understanding of free will.

According to compatibilists, our choices are determined by our psychological states (e.g. our beliefs, desires, plans, motives, biases, preferences, etc.) Our actions are free so long as we are not being forced, through coersion, physical causation, or brute force, to act contrary to our desires, motives, etc. Compatibilists are determinists. They're just not hard determinists since they aren't claiming that our choices are determined by the laws of nature plus initial conditions in a blind mechanistic way. We do things for reasons rather than because of physical causes.

Plantinga's argument works by implementing what, in logic, is called "Giving a model of S." S is a set of sentences, statements, propositions, or whatever. Giving a model of S is an attempt to show that the set is internally consistent. To do that, you come up with another sentence or set of sentences that, if true, would render all the members of S true. This shows that all the members of S are logically consistent.

The sentence or set of sentences describing the model need not actually be true. They are just a model - a hypothetical scenario - that if true would render all the members of S true.

In the case of the free will defense, S is a set of statements that include (1) Evil exists, and (2) A God exists that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and wholly good. Obviously, if the first statement were the explicit negation of the second statement, they could not both be true because there would be an explicit contradiction. So we just want to know if there's an implicit contradiction between the two statements or if they are consistent with each other.

To do that, we want to create a model of S, i.e. a scenario that, if true, would entail the truth of both sentences in S. Plantinga suggests the proposition that "God created a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so." Nevermind whether the statement is true or not. The important thing is that if it were true, then it would entail the truth of the two sentences in S. That means the sentences in S are logically consistent.

But before we can use Plantinga's model, we first have to know whether the model itself is even possible. Could it be that God created a world containing evil and had a good reason for doing so? If that's not even possible, then it can't serve as a model of S.

To answer the question, Plantina comes up with a hypothetical scenario in which God does have a good reason for creating a world containing evil. The hypothetical scenario is basically libertarian free will combined with Molinism.

According to Molinism, there are certain counterfactuals of human freedom that limit the possible worlds God can actualize. For example, consider this counterfactual:

If Jim meets Bob, Jim will shake Bob's hand

Now, consider two possible worlds in which Jim and Bob meet.

World 1: Jim and Bob meet, and Jim freely chooses to shake Bob's hand.

World 2: Jim and Bob meet, and Jim freely chooses not to shake Bob's hand.

According to Molinism, the counter-factuals of human freedom are truths about what people would or wouldn't do in given situations, and these truths are logically prior to these people even existing. God's omniscience includes his knowledge of these counter-factuals, so God takes them into account when he decides which possible world to make actual.

If the counter-factual about Jim is true, then any world God actualizes in which Jim and Bob meet will be a world in which Jim freely chooses to shake Bob's hand. That means that even though World 2 is a possible world, it is not a world God is able to actualize.

This is not a blow against God's omnipotence because omnipotence does not include the ability to engage in logical absurdity. While World 2 is logically possible, it is not logically possible for God to actualize World 2 because World 2 is inconsistent with the counterfactual of Jim's freedom. Molinists call such worlds "infeasible." A feasible world is a possible world that God could actualize because it's consistent with the counter-factuals of human freedom. An infeasible world is a possible world that God cannot actualize because it's inconsistent with the counter-factuals of human freedom.

So far, we've talked about a situation in which the counter-factual of Jim's freedom entails that there is a possible world that is not feasible for God to actualize. Suppose, now, that we consider a morally significant choice, like whether to be kind to somebody, whether to steal, etc. It could be that there are counter-factuals such that if God actualizes certain worlds, sin will happen. Suppose, though, that all the counter-factuals of Jim's freedom entail that no matter what world God actualizes in which Jim exists, that Jim will sin in that world. Plantinga calls Jim's condition "transworld depravity." That means given the counter-factuals of Jim's freedom, there is no possible world that is feasible for God to actualize in which Jim does not sin. Plantinga further suggests the possibility that trans-world depravity is something that everybody suffers from.

If that were the case, then it would be impossible for God to actualize any possible world containing free creatures but that does not contain moral evil. There may be all sorts of worlds containing free creatures that never do anything wrong, but if everybody suffers from trans-world depravity, then none of those possible worlds are feasible for God to actualize.

But, you might say, what about natural evil? What about suffering that is not the result of human free will decisions? Easy, says, Plantinga. Natural evil could be the result of the free will decisions of evil spirits. Remember, Plantinga is not claiming that any of this is true. He's just giving a model of S, i.e. a scenario that, if true, would entail the truth of the two sentences in S, namely (1) that evil exists, and (2) that God is all knowing, all powerful, and wholly good.

Remember, the model of S is that God created a world containing evil and had a good reason to do so. The good reason is that there are no feasible worlds containing free creatures that do not sin.

But, you might say, God didn't have to create a world containing free creatures. So even if we grant that there are no feasible worlds containing free creatures that do not contain evil, there still might be worlds without free creatures that do not contain evil. The question, then, would be whether those worlds are better or not.

Those who subscribe to libertarian free will cite multiple reasons for why a world containing free creatures is better than a world without free creatures, even if it means there will be moral evil. Here's a few of them:

1. Libertarian free will is necessary for moral good or evil, so if there were no free creatures, you might be able to eliminate moral evil, but at the same time, you'd be eliminating moral good. As long as the moral good that results from libertarian freedom outweighs the moral bad, a world containing free creatures is better than a world without, even if a world containing free creatures also contains evil and a world without free creatures doesn't.

2. Libertarian freedom is necessary for life to have any meaning. If we are mere puppets on strings and don't make any choices, there's no reason for us to even be sentient. We might as well be philosophical zombies.

3. Libertarian freedom is necessary for love. Love isn't genuine if it's pre-programmed, hard-wired, or causally determined. It's only genuine if people freely love each other.

4. Libertarian freedom is necessary for reasoning. If everything you believe is just the end result of a blind mechanistic series of physical cause and effect, then there's no sense in which those beliefs could be the result of affirming a truth for good reasons. Reasons are irrelevant because, given a set of initial conditions, plus the laws of nature, your current beliefs would be determined to emerge whether there were good reasons for them or not. If you happen to deny free will, that's just because you are being caused by how the chemistry in your brain happens to be fizzing at the moment to deny free will, and the fizzing of your brain is just part of a long causal chain that stretches indefinitely into the past and into the future.

Now we come to the question of whether a compatibilist can use Plantinga's free will defense. After all, compatibilists do not subscribe to libertarian free will. It seems to me there are two things for a compatibilist to consider: (1) Is libertarian freedom even possible, and (2) Is a world with libertarian freedom better than a world without?

Since Plantinga's free will defense isn't offering the free will scenario as the actual answer to why there is evil in the world, and is only offering it as a possibility that, if true, would render S logically consistent, it would appear that a compatibilist need not affirm libertarian free will in order to use Plantinga's argument. Even though a compatibilist may think the free will scenario is false, as long as they grant it as a possible state of affairs, they should be able to use it. If they use it, they are only offering a Model of S to show that the members of S are logically consistent.

Some compatibilists think libertarian free will is at least possible. It's something God could bring about if he wanted to. But there are some compatibilists who think libertarian free will is incoherent. It does not describe a possible state of affairs. For those compatibilists, it would be inconsistent of them to use Plantinga's free will defense. Unless libertarian free will is possible, it cannot serve as a Model of S.

For those compatibilists who think libertarian free will is at least coherent, they have to consider the additional question of whether the world would be better with or without libertarian freedom. If we look at the four reasons above for why a libertarian sees the good in libertarian free will, a compatibilist will probably disagree with all four points. Compatibliists deny libertarian free will but still affirm the reality of good and evil, that life has meaning, that people genuinely love each other, and that we are reasoning creatures capable of having justified beliefs.

Of course it's possible libertarian freedom serves some other good purpose, and a compatibilist could be open to that. It seems to me, though, that a compatibilist should be very skeptical that there is such a purpose (or at least a sufficient one) since the reality of the matter is that God chose to actualize a world without libertarian freedom. The fact that God actualized this world rather than one containing libertarian free will seems to suggest that whatever goods might accompany libertarian free will, they weren't good enough to justify God actualizing a world with libertarian freedom.

One route a compatibilist might take is to grant the epistemological possibility that they are just wrong in all their compatibilist beliefs. Maybe they're wrong to reject the four reasons for why libertarian freedom serves a good purpose. Maybe they're wrong to think libertarianism is incoherent. Maybe they're wrong to think a world without libertarian freedom is better than a world with it. I'm not sure this kind of epistemological possibility is sufficient to justify using Plantinga's free will defense, though. If libertarian free will is incoherent, but the compatibilist just doesn't know it, then libertarian freedom still can't serve as a Model of S. It is not consistent to think libertarian freedom is incoherent while, at the same time, offering it as a Model of S. I'm curious if anybody reading this disagrees with me about that.

A compatibilist may reject libertarian free will and still use Alvin Plantinga's argument. Remember, Plantinga's Model of S consisted of the statement, "God created a world containing evil and had a good reason for doing so." Libertarian free will was only offered as a hypothetical example to show that such a thing is possible. It's possible, because of libertarian freedom, that God could have a good reason for creating a world containing evil. Even though a compatibilist might reject the idea that libertarian freedom serves as a good reason for God creating a world containing evil, they could come up with some other scenario that does the same thing. And, again, the scenario need not be true. It need only be possible.

Here is one possibility.

God himself is the greatest possible good. Everything about him is good. For any good attribute God has, a world in which that attribute gets expressed is better than a world in which it doesn't get expressed. An active good is better than a dormant good. A world where all of God's attributes gets expressed is better than a world in which some of them, though good, never get expressed.

Now, consider some of the attributes God has, like mercy, a willingness to forgive, and wrath against sin. None of these attributes can be expressed if there is nothing to forgive, no occasion to show mercy, and no sin to punish. People may have a hard time wrapping their minds around the idea that punishing sin is a good thing or that it wouldn't be better if there were no sin to punish. But if you accept that everything about God is good, and that God does have wrath against sin, then you have to accept that it is good for God to express wrath against sin.

Under this hypothetical scenario, God's goodness actually entails that evil exist. Evil is necessary for God to give full expression to all his attributes. Expressing his attributes is how God glorifies himself. We glorify God by giving rise to the expression of those attributes. God is glorified in the expression of his mercy towards some, and he is also glorified in the expression of his wrath toward others. If this scenario is possible, then it's possible that God created a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so. That, then, can be a Model of S showing that the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of an all-knowing, all powerful, and wholly good God.

How ChatGPT defines Christianity

If you ask a Calvinist and a Jehovah's Witness to define Christianity in a nutshell, you will probably get different, but related, answers. Jehovah's Witnesses will probably focus on the kingdom of God and Jesus' rulership over that kingdom. Calvinists will probably focus on the gospel of grace and how God saves people for his glory. I have attempted to define Christianity in terms of seven points that include both worldview issues and the gospel in a nutshell (see here for example).

I was thinking about that today and thought it might be interesting to ask what ChatGPT would say. Here's my question and ChatGPT's answer.

Sam: What is the most succinct definition of Christianity that you can give?

ChatGPT: Christianity is the faith centered on the life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, believing in Him as the Son of God and Savior of humanity, offering salvation through faith, grace, and love.

What do you think? How would you have answered my question? What are the core essential defining points of Christianity? What makes Chrisitianity what it is and not something else? What's the most succinct definition of Christianity you can give?

What if there were a message embedded in the digits of pi?

In his book, Contact, Carl Sagan imagined the idea that there could be a message embedded somewhere in the digits of pi. There are lots of ways a message could be embedded, though.

The circumference of a circle can be given by the equation,

\[ \normalsize C = 2 \pi r \]

So pi can be defined as,

\[ \normalsize \pi = \frac{C}{2 r} \]

Or, put another way, pi is the ratio between the circumference and the diameter.

Everybody seems to agree that if you put pi in its decimal form, there are infinitely many digits. I don't know how they figured that out, but since there doesn't seem to be any controvery about it, I'm going to take their word for it. I've always wondered, though, if there's a point at which you get a repeating pattern, and that it repeats from then on out. I don't know if anybody has ever ruled that out or not. I mean if it's an infinite string of numbers couldn't the repeating pattern be really long?

Consider the fraction, 1/3. That one gives 0.33333333. . . But the fraction, 2/7 gives 0.285714285714285714. . . There doesn't seem to be any obvious limit to how long a string of numbers there can be that repeat. It seems possible, then, that somewhere in that infinite expanse of digits, that eventually, you could get a string of numbers that repeat from then on out. That string of numbers could be a million digits long or even 10¹⁰⁰ digits long. I don't know if that's ever been ruled out, but it's something I've always wondered about.

Anyway, back to the topic.

If the digits of pi are infinite, what are the chances that a message could be embedded in there somewhere?

Imagine if pi contained a string of numbers that represented:

I am the God of Abraham Isaac and Jacob

If you convert that to binary code, it would be:

01001001 00100000 01100001 01101101 00100000 01110100 01101000 01100101 00100000 01000111 01101111 01100100 00100000 01101111 01100110 00100000 01000001 01100010 01110010 01100001 01101000 01100001 01101101 00100000 01001001 01110011 01100001 01100001 01100011 00100000 01100001 01101110 01100100 00100000 01001010 01100001 01100011 01101111 01100010

So that's one way it could be embedded in pi. I mean, it seems unlikely, but given infinite digits, and assuming there's no point at which things start to repeat, it seems at least possible that a string of numbers like that could be in there somewhere.

It doesn't have to be in binary, though. It could be in base 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 , or 10. The letter, "I," in binary is 01101001. If you convert that to base 10, it's 105. And you could do that with each letter in the string and end up with a string of numbers in base ten that represent the statement about God. You could also do it in different languages. If you consider the 10 different bases, plus the thousands of different languages there are, there are all kinds of ways for the God statement to be embedded in pi.

I don't want to make this too complicated, so let's assume the string of letters in the statement, "I am the God of Abraham Isaac and Jacob," and forget about the spaces, capitalization, or the commas that should be in there. What are the chances that you could just randomly get, "iamthegodofabrahamisaacandjacob"?

There are 31 characters in that string of letters, and there are 26 letters in the alphabet. So each character could be any of 26 letters. The probability, then, would be 1 in 26³¹. That's about 1 in 7.31 x 10⁴³. Those are slim odds.

But suppose you have 26³¹ chances for it to happen? Then it's not so unlikely that it could happen. If you suppose that there are 26¹⁰⁰⁰ chances for it to happen, it seems inevitable that it would. Since there are infinitely many digits in pi, it seems almost inevitable that somewhere in there, the statement about God would be embedded.

But given how unlikely it is, we shouldn't expect to find it within the first few digits. It may be that we'd have to look through 10⁴⁴ digits before we'd be remotely likely to find it.

What if we found it a lot earlier, though? What if we found it within the first million digits? We know we haven't, but this is just a hypothetical. If that were to be the case, it would be pretty amazing, wouldn't it? But could we draw any conclusions from it? What would the significance be?

Recently, somebody on YouTube said that if there were a message embedded in pi that it would be evidence for God. That's what got me thinking about this whole subject. I had a discussion in the comment section with some people about that because I don't think it would be evidence for God. As amazing as it would be, the reason I don't think it would point to God is because pi is a necessary number. If it happens that the statement about God occured within the first million digits of pi (or anywhere in pi), then it could not have been otherwise. The ratio between the circumference and diameter of a perfect circle is fixed and unalterable by necessity. It's just as necessary as the fact that 2+2=4. There's no possible world in which things are different. God could no more make pi different than he could make 2+2=5. So God can't be credited for embedding the statement if it were in there.

There is a way, though, that a message about God in pi could point to God's existence. So far, I've been talking about pi in an idealized way. I've been talking about a perfect circle in flat Euclidean space. But suppose we were talking about pi in nature? We know, from general relativity, that spacetime has a curvature that varies from place to place. There's more curvature near massive objects than there is when you're in some void far away from any massive objects. Astrophysicists have attempted to determine whether there's any curvature on the scale of the whole observable universe, and it appears to be flat. But they can't measure the curvature of the universe with exact precision. So although it appears to be flat, there's some uncertainty involved. It could be there's some positive curvature, but the curvature is so slight that we can't detect it.

It's similar to how it's hard to tell the earth is round just by looking at your back yard. Even if you had a swimming pool, and the water was perfectly still, you couldn't measure the curvature of the surface of the water and determine that the earth is round. It would appear flat to any measuring device you used because the earth is so big. In the same way, the universe could have some positive curvature that we can't detect within the confines of the observable universe.

Suppose we could, though. Suppose the universe has some positive curvature, be it ever so slight, that would make pi, as it exists in nature, different than the idealized Euclidean pi. And suppose that pi, as it exists in nature, contained the statement about God somewhere within the first 1000 digits.

I think that would be definite proof of God. No conceivable alien could cause the curvature of spacetime to be such that it creates the God message within the first 1000 digits of pi, and given how enormously improbable such a thing would be, the best explanation would appear to be God. I think it would be downright unreasonable to deny the existence of God at that point.

If some given curvature that makes pi spell out the God message proves God's existence, then why wouldn't perfeclty flat spacetime do the same thing? After all, if we're imagining a range of possibilities for the curvature of spacetime, perfect flatness would just be one precise possibility within that range. The universe could have positive curvature, negative curvature, or perfect flatness. Perfect flatness is just as improbable as any other curvature.

It's hard to put my finger on the reason, but I just don't think finding a message in pi given perfect flatness would point to God in the same way that finding a message in pi with some curvature would. Maybe it's because flatness is idealized in some sense. I would still find it pretty amazing if the God message were embedded in the flatness version of pi. I just wouldn't consider it evidence for God.

What would you think if the standard pi contained a message about God somewhere? Would it matter where? Would it matter what the message was? Suppose there were all kinds of words and phrases found in pi, some meaningful, and some gibberish, and one of them happened to be the God message? Would that make an impression on you?

An Aside: There are web pages where you can search for things in the digits of pi. Here's one that allows you to find your birthday (or any other string of numbers) in pi. My birthday begins at the 2,462,816th digit.

I tried searching for "Jesus is God," in a few of those pi search thingies, but none of them would find it for me. I simplified it to:

jesusisgod

In binary, that's:

01101010 01100101 01110011 01110101 01110011 01101001 01110011 01100111 01101111 01100100

In base 10, that's:

106101115117115105115103111100

If anybody else is able to find it, let me know.

EDIT: I found one! This web page found my sequence in the 7.196305715199008 x 10³⁰th position.

Let's see if that's remarkable. My sequence is 30 digits long, and there are 10 possible numbers for each digit. That means the odds are 1 in 10³⁰ that any given sequence 30 digits long would contain my sequence. So yeah, we found it about where we'd expect given the odds. Nothing remarkable about that.

Lambda-CDM vs. Timescape

A long long time ago, Albert Eistein felt like he needed to have a cosmological constant in his field equations to counter the force of gravity because without it, the universe should be collapsing or expanding. When it was discovered later on (I think by Edwin Hubble) that the universe was expanding, Einstein was all like, "The cosmological constant was the biggest blunder of my career."

Once it became widely accepted that the universe was expanding, it was always assumed that the rate at which it expands should be slowing down because of gravity. The big question was whether it was slowing down fast enough to cause the universe to recollapse or if the universe would expand forever. In 1998, some astrophycisists tried to answer this question, but what they found, instead, was that the expansion of the universe was accelerating.

The accelerating expansion of the universe gave rise to the Λ-CDM model of the universe (aka Lambda-Cold Dark Matter), which has been the prevailing view for the last two decades. Lambda is the old cosmological constant that has resurfaced. Eistein's "blunder" wasn't a blunder after all. Lambda was back. Nobody knew what was causing the expanasion of the universe to accelerate, so they called it "dark energy." Lots of ideas have been suggested for what might be causing it.

Well, recently, there has been a new plot twist. Two papers were published suggesting that the accelerating expansion might just be an illusion brought on by time dilation. You see, as the universe expands, it becomes more clumpy. Galaxies merge, while voids become bigger. Since time passes more slowly near massive objects (because of the higher gravity), and time passes more quickly in the voids, this may cause it to appear that the expansion of the universe is accelerating when it really isn't.

This other model of the universe is called Timescape, and it does away with the cosmological constant because the expansion of the universe isn't really accelerating. If Timescape turns out to be right, it would undermine the Λ-CDM model. You wouldn't need a cosmological constant.

What I find interesting about this development is that the cosmological constant is often cited as the best example of fine-tuning. They say that the cosmological constant is so fine-tuned that if it were to differ by one part in 10¹²⁰, then the universe would either have collapsed too quickly for life to have ever emerged, or it would have expanded so fast that stars and galaxies could not have formed, in which case, life would not have been possible. The cosmological constant has to be fine-tuned to an incredibly precise value for life to even be possible in the universe, they say.

But if Timescape is true, then there isn't a cosmological constant at all, much less a fine-tuned one. I find that very interesting.

Several YouTube science channels have commented on the two new papers. Two of the best videos I've seen on it were by Dr. Becky and PBS Spacetime. I recommend watching these videos because they explain the papers really well. They both express skepticism about the Timescape model and say the evidence still favours Λ-CDM.

I suppose only time will tell. It's like whenever somebody claims to have discovered some artifact that over-turns everything we thought we knew about the ancient world. You have to wait and see. Sometimes, it pans out, and sometimes it doesn't. Most of the time, it doesn't. But it's always very interesting when it does.

20 year blog anniversary

It's been 20 years today since I started this blog. It has been a great outlet. I'm glad I did it. Thanks to everybody who has left comments and engaged me in conversation, especially DagoodS, Paul Scott Pruett, Psiomniac, Dale, Jeff, Steve, and all the people who participated in the Book of Mormon discussions, including Carl, Angela, Curtis, Tracy, Fern, and Dave. A huge thanks to my old friend, Angie, for allowing me to post the Conversations With Angie series. Also thanks to Tabatha for engaging with me on your Jewish view about Jesus. Thanks to Richard, Safiyyah and everybody who left one-off comments and were never seen again. Thanks to everybody I left out. It's been 20 years, so I can't very well go through and name everybody.

In the last 20 years, there's only been one year I didn't post anything - 2016.

Does it make sense to pray for another person's salvation?

This is an issue that both Calvinists and non-Calvinist challenge each other with. The challenge is different depending on how you think God saves people.

Calvinists believe that God decides before the foundation of the world who he is going to save, and he does so for his own good pleasure. It has nothing to do with anything about the person. He doesn't look ahead and choose people based on his foreknowledge of their belief or behavior. He just makes a unilateral decision to save people. Then he disposes the world in such a way that whoever he decides to save will eventually comes to faith in Jesus.

Here's the challenge for Calvinists: If God determines who he will save and who he won't, and God always gets his way, then what's the point in praying for anybody's salvation? We can't change God's sovereign will. He decided what he was going to do before we were even born. Whether God chooses to save somebody or not, our prayer shouldn't make any difference.

My answer is basically the same as my answer to the question of why we should evangelize if God determines who will be saved. It's because God doesn't just determine the end result. He also determines how that end result will get accomplished. The reason people come to believe in Jesus is because somebody preached the gospel to them. The preaching of the gospel is part of the means through which God brings about conversion. And the fact that we evangelize is also determined by God because he's sovereign over everything that happens.

In the same way, God may determine, for his own glory, to act in answer to prayers, and he may plan to do so from the foundation of the world. The prayers themselves may be part of what God decrees to happen, and God plans before he even creates the world, that he will act in answer to those prayers. So it makes all the sense in the world to pray for people's salvation given the Calvinistic belief that God is sovereign in salvation.

Here's the challenge for non-Calvinists: If God loves all people equally, and equally wants to save them all, then we should expect that God has exhausted all effort to save them short of violating their free will. With that being the case, what is the point in praying for their salvation? God has already done all he is willing to do. If he has not done all he is willing to do, then why not if he wants to save everybody? In a syngergistic model of salvation where God does his part in offering the gift of salvation, and it remains for us to do our in accepting the gift, it doesn't seem like there would be anything left for God to do except make the person willing to accept the gospel, which God supposedly never does because that would violate our free will. If you deny irresistable grace, then God can't actually accomplish saving somebody without that person's cooperation. So God can't actually answer your prayer for somebody's salvation. He can only try.

A non-Calvinist could give a similar answer that I gave. They could say that God knows we're going to pray for somebody's salvation, so he withholds whatever effort he would otherwise have made toward getting somebody saved until we pray. Then he could be said to have exerted whatever effort toward somebody's salvation in answer to that prayer. That is a possibility, but I've never heard a non-Calvinist put it like that.

I often hear non-Calvinists say the reason God doesn't perform spectacular miracles or do whatever he can to save people is because he knows they wouldn't repent even if they saw a miracle. Only people who would repent get to see the miracles. They may be right. It seems to be implicit in this sort of statement, though, that everybody who would embrace the gospel under any circumstances, God does bring about the necessary circumstances for those people. For anybody who God knows would not embrace the gospel, there's no reason to bring about any circumstances we think might lead to their conversion. God knows it wouldn't.

On the surface, I think that's a reasonable response, but it's not without some snags. For example, Jesus said in Matthew 11:21 that if the miracles that were performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida were also performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. But the miracles were not performed, and they did not repent. This seems to cast doubt on whether God does everything that could have been done to save people.

I suppose there are a lot of responses a non-Calvinist could give to the issues raised. To a certain degree, we just have to admit we don't know why God does or doesn't do things the way we think he should or would like for him to. I don't think there's anything wrong with just saying, "I don't know," and trusting God anyway.

But I do think the problem non-Calvinists face is a little thornier than the problem Calvinists face when it comes to praying for somebody's salvation.

AN AFTERTHOUGHT: I am so disappointed! I heard a sermon a long time ago, I think by Brian Borgman, where he used Isaiah 37 as an example of where God did something in answer to prayer, yet the whole thing was planned long before the prayer was ever uttered. Hezekiah prayed that God would save Israel from Sennacherib, the king of Assyria (verses 14-20). In verse 21, God said, "Because you have prayed to me concerning Sennacherib king of Assyria. . ." then it launches into a judgment against Sennacherib in which 185,000 Assyrian soldiers die, and Sennacherib eventually dies. In verse 26, it says, "Have you not heard that I determined it long ago? I planned from days of old what now I bring to pass." The sermon I listened to said God planned the judgment against Sennacherib long ago, yet he brings it about in answer to Hezekiah's prayer. This was meant to be an example of how praying is consistent with, and included in, God's eternal decree. I was going to use this as an example until I read it more carefully.

When it says God planned the whole thing long ago, it wasn't talking about the judgment against Sennacherib and Assyria. Rather, it was talking about all the terrible things Assyria did to other nations. There is nothing in this passage that says God planned long ago to judge Assyria in answer to Hezekiah's prayer, so it's not a good proof text for that sort of thing. It is, however, a good proof text that God does decree evil, which I talked more about here.

Leighton Flowers and James White debate John 6:44

James White and Leighton Flowers debated whether John 6:44 teaches unconditional election. I've watched the debate twice now. I got more out of it the second time than the first time.

Interestingly, the debate came down to verse 45 and how it was supposed to shed light on verse 44. Here are the verses:

No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day. It is written in the Prophets, ‘And they will all be taught by God.’ Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me—

In Leighton's view, it works like this: The Father taught all the Israelites. The teaching is the drawing. But not all the Israelites learned. The ones who did learn came to the Father. The Father gave those people to Jesus, those people came to Jesus, and Jesus will raise them on the last day. So, in Leighton's view, the "all" who were taught by God are not the same people as the "all" who heard and learned from the Father. Those who heard and learned from the Father were a subset of those who were taught. Since the teaching is the drawing, and not all who taught end up coming to Jesus, it follows that not all who are drawn end up coming to Jesus.

In James' view, it works like this: The Father sovereignly chooses who will come to Jesus. He draws (i.e teaches) those people, those people hear and learn from the Father, the Father gives them to Jesus, they come to Jesus, and they are raised on the last day. So, in James' view, all those who are taught of God are the same people who hear and learn from the Father.

James and Leighton both agreed that the teaching is the drawing. They also agree that those who heard and learned from the Father do end up coming to Jesus and being raised on the last day. Where they disagree, though, is on whether all who are taught by God also hear and learn from the Father. Or, in other words, they disagree on whether all who are drawn by the Father come to Jesus.

Leighton's argument is that it is possible to teach somebody without that person learning. He offers, as a proof text, Jeremiah 32:33, which says, "And though I [the LORD - vs.26] have taught them persistently, they have not listened to receive instruction."

James's argument is that verse 45 comes after verse 44 and is an explanation of it. Also, he appears to be arguing that unless there is something in the immediate text that allows us to distinguish all who are taught from all those who hear and learn, that we should assume they are the same group of people.

Leighton agreed that if those taught by God are the same people as those who heard and learned from the Father, then TULIP would follow (1:35:05), so the debate really came down to that one point. After all, the U in TULIP is unconditional election.

Although I agree with Leighton that it is possible to teach somebody who doesn't learn, that is not what happens in John 6:44-45. I agree with James that those who are taught by God are the same people as those who hear and learn from the Father. There are a few reasons I agree with James.

One reason is because the meaning that jumps out at me when I read John 6:44 is that whoever is drawn is also raised on the last day. He ends the first part of the sentence with "draws him," and says in the second part that Jesus will "raise him." It appears that the "him" in both cases refers to the same person, so the one raised is the one who was drawn. Verse 45 looks like Paul's proof text. Paul quotes this passage in explanation of the drawing of the Father. It wouldn't make sense to quote a passage about God teaching people in this context unless the teaching is what is meant by drawing. Since those who are drawn come to Jesus and are raised up, this seems to indicate that all who are taught by God will come to Jesus and be raised on the last day.

The second reason is because Paul's comment about all those hearing and learning from the Father is his inference or explanation of the passage he quoted about all being taught by God. That is Paul's commentary on the passage, which means Paul must take it that those who hear and learn from the Father are the same people as those who were taught by God. In Paul's mind, if you are taught by God, that implies that you heard and learned from the Father.

A third reason is because if we look at the passage Paul quotes in its context, it appears to imply that all those who are taught do, in fact, hear and learn. The quote appears to come from Isaiah 54:13. This whole chapter is meant to comfort Israel. In spite of all the horrors they have been through, God is going to make everything wonderful in keeping with all his promises. It says in verse 13, "All your children shall be taught by the Lord, and great shall be the peace of your children." How would this be any comfort to Israel if the teaching didn't result in hearing and learning? If you read the whole chapter, you should be able to see that it's about God turning everything around for Israel and creating ideal conditions. It may even be eschatological. So it certainly seems to imply that by teaching the children of Israel, they will all hear and learn.

So although Leighton is right that it's possible to teach somebody without that person learning, that's not what's going on in John 6:45. James challenged him to show from the context why there is a distinction in groups, and Leighton was unable to do it. He was only able to offer a proof text showing that such a thing is possible. He needed to show that it was actual specificially in the context of John 6:44-45. Although he's right about the possibility, the actuality appears to be that all those who are taught of God are the same as all those who hear and learn from the Father, and all of those who hear and learn from the Father come to Jesus. Since teaching (as well as drawing) is something the Father does, and it results in people coming to Jesus and being raised to eternal life, that means John 6:44 teaches unconditional election.

A CHATGPT BONUS: Just for funsies, I went to Chat GPT to ask a question about John 6:44 because I was curious what Chat GPT would say. Here's what happened:

ME: Consider the following quote: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day." Does this mean he will raise up all of those who are drawn, or does it mean he will raise up all who come to him? Or does it mean both?

CHATGPT: This quote is from John 6:44, where Jesus says, "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day."

The way this can be interpreted depends on how we understand the relationship between being drawn by the Father and coming to Jesus. Let me break it down:

1. "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him" — This suggests that coming to Jesus is not something a person can do on their own. It’s God’s initiative, meaning that the Father must first draw people to Jesus. This would imply that there is a divine, sovereign action in play. Those who are "drawn" are responding to that divine invitation.

2. "And I will raise him up on the last day" — Jesus promises to raise up those who are drawn to Him. This phrase seems to indicate that those who are drawn to Jesus will experience resurrection at the end of time. So, the "raising up" refers to the final resurrection and eternal life that Jesus grants to those who come to Him through the Father's drawing.

To answer your question:

• The promise of being "raised up on the last day" is for those who come to Jesus, but they can only do so because they are drawn by the Father.
• So, it seems that Jesus is speaking about both: those who are drawn by the Father will come to Him, and those who come to Him will be raised up.

In a sense, both ideas are true, because being drawn by the Father leads to coming to Jesus, and those who come to Him (by the Father's drawing) are guaranteed resurrection on the last day. This passage emphasizes the interdependence of divine initiative (the Father drawing) and human response (coming to Jesus), with the ultimate result being eternal life for those who are drawn and come to Him.

Politics and Spin

I've mentioned before on this blog how I dislike political discourse because of the conflict, spin, dishonesty, lack of charity, etc. I wanted to point out a perfectly good example of this that happened just in the last couple of days.

For a while now, republicans (especially James Comer) have been accusing the Biden family of corruption in which Joe Biden did political favours (like having the attorney investigating Burisma fired) in exchange for money from foreign entities. Comer and others accused the Bidens of money-laundering and tax evasion.

Before Biden left office, he pardoned some members of his family, including his brother, James.

Now, Fox News and other right-wing sources are claiming that in pardoning his family, Joe Biden is implicitly admitting that they are all guilty.

I'm no fan of the Bidens, and I think they probably are guilty, but in all fairness, the pardon is not an implicit confession of guilt. The reason is because there are at least two other possibilities that don't imply guilt. Here's all three possibilities.

1. It could be that they are guilty, and Joe wants to protect them all from prosecution. If this is the case, then it does imply guilt.

2. It could be that Joe is concerned that Trump will use the justice department to go after the Biden family for political reasons, and Biden wants to protect them. This has nothing to do with whether or not anybody is guilty.

3. It's also possible that Joe wants to create the appearance that Trump is a vindictive individual who would use his political power to go after his political opponents. In other words, the pardon is meant simply to make Trump look bad. Again, this would have nothing to do with whether or not the Bidens are guilty.

So, there are three possible motives for pardening Joe's family that I can think of, and only one of them implies an admission of guilt. Notice, though, that the right wing media simply runs with the most uncharitable interpretation. This is not journalism. This is spin. And all sides do it. And the people who consume media eat this stuff up. They go on social media, repeat the uncharitable spin as if it were fact, and it never ends. They love the spin. That's why all these lying news organizations still make money. It's how dishonest politicians keep getting elected.

There is very little charity, fair-mindedness, or honesty when it comes to conversations about politics. I would just ask people to stop taking the news so seriously. Stop taking politicians so seriously. Stop taking political commentators so seriously. They're all full of it. Just slow down and think things through. Don't jump on some bandwagon just because it makes the other side look bad or makes your side look good. That is not how level-headed people behave.