For those not familiar, Alvin Plantinga's free will defense can be found in his book, God, Freedom, and Evil. The free will defense differs from the free will theodicy in the fact that whereas the theodicy is an attempt to say what God's reason is for allowing evil, the free will defense merely offers free will as a possible scenario under which God had a good reason for creating a world containing evil.
Compatibilists are people who think free will and determinism are compatible. Since libertarian free will is an indeterministic model of free will, compatibilists obviously aren't claiming that libertarian free will is compatibible with determinism. They have a different understanding of free will.
According to compatibilists, our choices are determined by our psychological states (e.g. our beliefs, desires, plans, motives, biases, preferences, etc.) Our actions are free so long as we are not being forced, through coersion, physical causation, or brute force, to act contrary to our desires, motives, etc. Compatibilists are determinists. They're just not hard determinists since they aren't claiming that our choices are determined by the laws of nature plus initial conditions in a blind mechanistic way. We do things for reasons rather than because of physical causes.
Plantinga's argument works by implementing what, in logic, is called "Giving a model of S." S is a set of sentences, statements, propositions, or whatever. Giving a model of S is an attempt to show that the set is internally consistent. To do that, you come up with another sentence or set of sentences that, if true, would render all the members of S true. This shows that all the members of S are logically consistent.
The sentence or set of sentences describing the model need not actually be true. They are just a model - a hypothetical scenario - that if true would render all the members of S true.
In the case of the free will defense, S is a set of statements that include (1) Evil exists, and (2) A God exists that is all-knowing, all-powerful, and wholly good. Obviously, if the first statement were the explicit negation of the second statement, they could not both be true because there would be an explicit contradiction. So we just want to know if there's an implicit contradiction between the two statements or if they are consistent with each other.
To do that, we want to create a model of S, i.e. a scenario that, if true, would entail the truth of both sentences in S. Plantinga suggests the proposition that "God created a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so." Nevermind whether the statement is true or not. The important thing is that if it were true, then it would entail the truth of the two sentences in S. That means the sentences in S are logically consistent.
But before we can use Plantinga's model, we first have to know whether the model itself is even possible. Could it be that God created a world containing evil and had a good reason for doing so? If that's not even possible, then it can't serve as a model of S.
To answer the question, Plantina comes up with a hypothetical scenario in which God does have a good reason for creating a world containing evil. The hypothetical scenario is basically libertarian free will combined with Molinism.
According to Molinism, there are certain counterfactuals of human freedom that limit the possible worlds God can actualize. For example, consider this counterfactual:
If Jim meets Bob, Jim will shake Bob's hand
Now, consider two possible worlds in which Jim and Bob meet.
World 1: Jim and Bob meet, and Jim freely chooses to shake Bob's hand.
World 2: Jim and Bob meet, and Jim freely chooses not to shake Bob's hand.
According to Molinism, the counter-factuals of human freedom are truths about what people would or wouldn't do in given situations, and these truths are logically prior to these people even existing. God's omniscience includes his knowledge of these counter-factuals, so God takes them into account when he decides which possible world to make actual.
If the counter-factual about Jim is true, then any world God actualizes in which Jim and Bob meet will be a world in which Jim freely chooses to shake Bob's hand. That means that even though World 2 is a possible world, it is not a world God is able to actualize.
This is not a blow against God's omnipotence because omnipotence does not include the ability to engage in logical absurdity. While World 2 is logically possible, it is not logically possible for God to actualize World 2 because World 2 is inconsistent with the counterfactual of Jim's freedom. Molinists call such worlds "infeasible." A feasible world is a possible world that God could actualize because it's consistent with the counter-factuals of human freedom. An infeasible world is a possible world that God cannot actualize because it's inconsistent with the counter-factuals of human freedom.
So far, we've talked about a situation in which the counter-factual of Jim's freedom entails that there is a possible world that is not feasible for God to actualize. Suppose, now, that we consider a morally significant choice, like whether to be kind to somebody, whether to steal, etc. It could be that there are counter-factuals such that if God actualizes certain worlds, sin will happen. Suppose, though, that all the counter-factuals of Jim's freedom entail that no matter what world God actualizes in which Jim exists, that Jim will sin in that world. Plantinga calls this "transworld depravity." That means there is no possible world that is feasible for God to actualize in which Jim does not sin. Plantinga further suggests the possibility that trans-world depravity is something that everybody suffers from.
If that were the case, then it would be impossible for God to actualize any possible world containing free creatures but that does not contain moral evil. There may be all sorts of worlds containing free creatures that never do anything wrong, but if everybody suffers from trans-world depravity, then none of those possible worlds are feasible for God to actualize.
But, you might say, what about natural evil? What about suffering that is not the result of human free will decisions? Easy, says, Plantinga. Natural evil could be the result of the free will decisions of evil spirits. Remember, Plantinga is not claiming that any of this is true. He's just giving a model of S, i.e. a scenario that, if true, would entail the truth of the two sentences in S, namely (1) that evil exists, and (2) that God is all knowing, all powerful, and wholly good.
Remember, the model of S is that God created a world containing evil and had a good reason to do so. The good reason is that there are no feasible worlds containing free creatures that do not sin.
But, you might say, God didn't have to create a world containing free creatures. So even if we grant that there are no feasible worlds containing free creatures that do not contain evil, there still might be worlds without free creatures that do not contain evil. The question, then, would be whether those worlds are better or not.
Those who subscribe to libertarian free will cite multiple reasons for why a world containing free creatures is better than a world without free creatures, even if it means there will be moral evil. Here's a few of them:
1. Libertarian free will is necessary for moral good or evil, so if there were no free creatures, you might be able to eliminate moral evil, but at the same time, you'd be eliminating moral good. As long as the moral good that results from libertarian freedom outweighs the moral bad, a world containing free creatures is better than a world without, even if a world containing free creatures also contains evil and a world without free creatures doesn't.
2. Libertarian freedom is necessary for life to have any meaning. If we are mere puppets on strings and don't make any choices, there's no reason for us to even be sentient. We might as well be philosophical zombies.
3. Libertarian freedom is necessary for love. Love isn't genuine if it's pre-programmed, hard-wired, or causally determined. It's only genuine if people freely love each other.
4. Libertarian freedom is necessary for reasoning. If everything you believe is just the end result of a blind mechanistic series of physical cause and effect, then there's no sense in which those beliefs could be the result of affirming a truth for good reasons. Reasons are irrelevant because, given a set of initial conditions, plus the laws of nature, your current beliefs would be determined to emerge whether there were good reasons for them or not. If you happen to deny free will, that's just because you are being caused by how the chemistry in your brain happens to be fizzing at the moment to deny free will, and the fizzing of your brain is just part of a long causal chain that stretches indefinitely into the past and into the future.
Now we come to the question of whether a compatibilist can use Plantinga's free will defense. After all, compatibilists do not subscribe to libertarian free will. It seems to me there are two things for a compatibilist to consider: (1) Is libertarian freedom even possible, and (2) Is a world with libertarian freedom better than a world without?
Since Plantinga's free will defense isn't offering the free will scenario as the actual answer to why there is evil in the world, and is only offering it as a possibility that, if true, would render S logically consistent, it would appear that a compatibilist need not affirm libertarian free will in order to use Plantinga's argument. Even though a compatibilist may think the free will scenario is false, as long as they grant it as a possible state of affairs, they should be able to use it. If they use it, they are only offering a Model of S to show that the members of S are logically consistent.
Some compatibilists think libertarian free will is at least possible. It's something God could bring about if he wanted to. But there are some compatibilists who think libertarian free will is incoherent. It does not describe a possible state of affairs. For those compatibilists, it would be inconsistent of them to use Plantinga's free will defense. Unless libertarian free will is possible, it cannot serve as a Model of S.
For those compatibilists who think libertarian free will is at least coherent, they have to consider the additional question of whether the world would be better with or without libertarian freedom. If we look at the four reasons above for why a libertarian sees the good in libertarian free will, a compatibilist will probably disagree with all four points. Compatibliists deny libertarian free will but still affirm the reality of good and evil, that life has meaning, that people genuinely love each other, and that we are reasoning creatures capable of having justified beliefs.
Of course it's possible libertarian freedom serves some other good purpose, and a compatibilist could be open to that. It seems to me, though, that a compatibilist should be very skeptical that there is such a purpose (or at least a sufficient one) since the reality of the matter is that God chose to actualize a world without libertarian freedom. The fact that God actualized this world rather than one containing libertarian free will seems to suggest that whatever goods might accompany libertarian free will, they weren't good enough to justify God actualizing a world with libertarian freedom.
One route a compatibilist might take is to grant the epistemological possibility that they are just wrong in all their compatibilist beliefs. Maybe they're wrong to reject the four reasons for why libertarian freedom serves a good purpose. Maybe they're wrong to think libertarianism is incoherent. Maybe they're wrong to think a world without libertarian freedom is better than a world with it. I'm not sure this kind of epistemological possibility is sufficient to justify using Plantinga's free will defense, though. If libertarian free will is incoherent, but the compatibilist just doesn't know it, then libertarian freedom still can't serve as a Model of S. It is not consistent to think libertarian freedom is incoherent while, at the same time, offering it as a Model of S. I'm curious if anybody reading this disagrees with me about that.
A compatibilist may reject libertarian free will and still use Alvin Plantinga's argument. Remember, Plantinga's Model of S consisted of the statement, "God created a world containing evil and had a good reason for doing so." Libertarian free will was only offered as a hypothetical example to show that such a thing is possible. It's possible, because of libertarian freedom, that God could have a good reason for creating a world containing evil. Even though a compatibilist might reject the idea that libertarian freedom serves as a good reason for God creating a world containing evil, they could come up with some other scenario that does the same thing. And, again, the scenario need not be true. It need only be possible.
Here is one possibility.
God himself is the greatest possible good. Everything about him is good. For any good attribute God has, a world in which that attribute gets expressed is better than a world in which it doesn't get expressed. An active good is better than a dormant good. A world where all of God's attributes gets expressed is better than a world in which some of them, though good, never get expressed.
Now, consider some of the attributes God has, like mercy, a willingness to forgive, and wrath against sin. None of these attributes can be expressed if there is nothing to forgive, no occasion to show mercy, and no sin to punish. People may have a hard time wrapping their minds around the idea that punishing sin is a good thing or that it wouldn't be better if there were no sin to punish. But if you accept that everything about God is good, and that God does have wrath against sin, then you have to accept that it is good for God to express wrath against sin.
Under this hypothetical scenario, God's goodness actually entails that evil exist. Evil is necessary for God to give full expression to all his attributes. Expressing his attributes is how God glorifies himself. We glorify God by giving rise to the expression of those attributes. God is glorified in the expression of his mercy towards some, and he is also glorified in the expression of his wrath toward others. If this scenario is possible, then it's possible that God created a world containing evil and has a good reason for doing so. That, then, can be a Model of S showing that the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of an all-knowing, all powerful, and wholly good God.
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