20 Questions for Calvinists

Braxton Hunter posted a video today where he, Leighton Flowers, Jonathan Pritchett, and Tim Stratton took turns asking questions of Calvinists. I was interested enough that I transcribed the whole thing so I could respond to it on my blog. I could've made a video, but I just prefer the written word to the spoken word.

As a disclaimer, I'm not a theologian, and all of these guys are smarter and probably more educated than I am. I responded to these questions because I'm interested in the topic and had something to say about the questions. I hope you find it edifying.

Question 1: Leighton Flowers

I understand as a former Calvinist the desire to give God all the glory for the gift of salvation, but why, Biblically and philosophically, do you believe that the gift has to be irresistibly given in order for the giver to be get full credit for giving the gift? Shouldn’t God get all the glory for the gifts he gives even to those who reject it?

This is an ill-conceived question. If somebody rejects the gift of salvation, then God obviously can’t have given them the gift of salvation. But I get his point.

Of course, if God gives the gift of salvation, then he gets full credit for giving that gift. But that isn’t the issue. The issue is whether God can receive full credit for accomplishing salvation if the accomplishment of salvation was a cooperative effort between God and the recipient where God had no say in whether the person would do their part or not.

If we are free, in the libertarian sense, to either accept or reject God’s offer of salvation, and God does not determine that we accept it, then the actual accomplishment of our salvation is a cooperative effort. God does his part in making the offer. We do our part in choosing to accepting it. This is a synergistic enterprise, so, by definition, it’s not entirely a work of God. God cannot take full responsibility for our being saved if our being saved depends on our freely choosing to accept the offer and God played no role in bringing it about that we would make the right choice.

Question 2: Braxton Hunter

Does God determine or decree (a) everything that happens in a person’s life, (b) only their response to the gospel, or (c) none of the above? And please explain your answer.

God determines and decrees everything that happens in a person’s life. I’m not sure what needs to be explained. Maybe Braxton is asking us to give a defense of this position. Or maybe he’s asking for the details of how God brings about his sovereign will for a person’s life. I’m not sure.

Question 3: Jonathan Pritchett

In John 6:39, Jesus says it is the will of the Father that he should lose none of them but raise them up on the last day. However, in John 17:12 Jesus says Judas was both given and lost. So why doesn’t Judas disprove the notion that merely being given by the Father to the Son [?] not lose disprove that Jesus never loses it?

In John 6:39, Jesus is talking about God giving people to Jesus for the purpose of salvation. In John 17:6-12, I get the impression Jesus is praying specifically for his apostles. If that’s correct, then Jesus isn’t talking about everybody God gave him for the purpose of salvation. Rather, he’s talking about the people God gave him for the purpose of apostleship. As verse 12 says, Judas was doomed to destruction so that scripture would be fulfilled. He was never given to Jesus for the purpose of salvation; rather, his destruction was determined before he was even born.

Question 4: Tim Stratton

Molinists like me are often accused of starting with philosophy and then imposing it upon scripture. It seems to me, however, that that shoe is on the other foot. That is to say, it seems to me that it’s Calvinists who are guilty of starting with a philosophical position and then they impose that upon scripture. So, for example, in my debate against James White I made a Biblical case for mere Molinism, which, by the way, was never addressed, but, that’s another topic. But what is the Biblical case for exhaustive divine determination, or what I call EDD or EDD? What’s the Biblical case for EDD, the idea that God determines all things about humanity from our physical actions to our mental states? I don’t see it in Scripture. Now let’s talk about what it means for something to be determined. An event is determined by definition if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate said event. So determinism, or what I refer to as exhaustive divine determination means that God’s decree provides the antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all events, including all events regarding each and every human, including the entirety of their mental actions. So it seems to me that Calvinists often start with the philosophy of determinism and then impose that upon scripture. But I see no place in the Bible that implies that God determines all things including all of our thoughts and beliefs. So here’s my question. How in the world does one infer EDD from scripture? What is the Biblical case for exhaustive divine determination?

There have been whole books dedicated to this topic. One famous one is The Sovereignty of God by Arthur W. Pink. Another one is Not A Chance by R.C. Sproul. Norman Geisler made an argument for this position in the first chapter of Chosen But Free, though he contradicted himself throughout the rest of the book.

The argument, as I understand it, is inductive. It comes by way of noticing that God exercises sovereign control over both the major things, like the crucifixion of Jesus (Acts 4:27-28) and the Assyrians attacking Israel (Isaiah 10), and the seemingly small and insignificant things you might think are just the result of chance, like the roll of a dice (Proverbs 16:33). An inductive inference is made that if God controls both the major things and the extremely minor things, that he must control everything in between, too. John Piper and Justin Taylor went into some detail on how God exercises his sovereignty in various situations, including the acts of Satan, in their book, Suffering and the Sovereignty of God.

Another argument I’ve heard is that God would have to determine everything if he is to give specific detailed prophecies. Otherwise, the butterfly effect would mess everything up. If these prophecies consisted merely of predictions, that wouldn’t necessarily mean that God determines all the events leading up to the fulfillment of the prophecy (although some Calvinists disagree with me about that). But any prophecy in which God intends for the event to take place (i.e. it’s his will that it take place), does seem to suggest that God determines all the events leading up to the fulfillment of those prophecies. The fulfillment of those prophecies requires a meticulous degree of determining events because of all the miniscule things that would have to happen for those prophecies to be fulfilled.

Question 5: Leighton Flowers

If a man is born totally depraved in the sense that they’re dead, corpse-like dead, cannot respond positively to the gospel, then why would God blind them with using parabolic language, spirit of stupor, all the language of scripture that says as judgment God blinds people or removes the light from those, he doesn’t contend with men forever. Why blind somebody born already blind. Why put a blindfold on a corpse? Make sense of that for us as non-Calvinists as to why God would need to blind somebody who is innately blind from birth?

That’s a great question, and I don’t know the answer. I can only speculate. This question seems to assume that whatever blinding God does, he does it at some point after they are born. But maybe he does it throughout their lives, from the womb, and it’s this blinding that’s precisely why they are unable to embrace the gospel. It doesn’t have to be an either/or thing. The blindness God brings about may be part of what their depravity consists of.

Question 6: Braxton Hunter

1 Corinthians 10:13 comes up a lot in these discussions. It says, “No temptation has overtaken you except something common to mankind; and God is faithful, so He will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it.” Now this passage sounds like it’s indicating that in any situation where someone might sin there is a genuine possibility genuine potential that they will take the way of escape and not sin. How is this possible if God has decreed and determined all things?

There are different senses in which we are able to act. Braxton knows about this distinction because he brought it up in the 15th question. I may have the physical ability to pick up a box, but have no desire whatsoever to do so. We can’t act without some motive or inclination, so a lack of motive or inclination would amount to a psychological inability to act. I take 1 Corinthians 10:13 to mean that in any situation, there is a way out. There is a choice available that will avoid sin. Nobody is trapped into sinning. But that doesn’t mean you will have the will, motive, or inclination to do the right thing. It is possible for you to be determined to do the wrong thing by your own desires even if there is a path available that would avoid doing the wrong thing.

Question 7: Jonathan Pritchett

In Romans 9:20, why even think that Paul grants the premise of his interlocutor in verse 19 when nowhere else throughout the book of Romans does Paul ever grant the interlocutor’s premise except in Romans 11:19-20 when the interlocutor is a gentile. What makes you think that Paul grants the premise of Romans 9:19 from the interlocutor when his very response, “Who are you, oh man, to answer back to God?” indicates he doesn’t, exposing the folly of the interlocutor’s protest?

Objection! Assuming facts not in evidence. In no way does Paul’s answer deny the premise behind the interlocutor’s question.

There are two questions his interlocuter asks: (1) Then why does God still blame us, and (2) For who is able to resist his will? The first question assumes that God does still blame us. This is not a controversial assumption. All Biblically-literate Christians agree that God holds people accountable for their sins, so we have every reason to think Paul would grant the premise behind that first question.

The second question appears to be rhetorical. The implicit claim behind it is that nobody can resist God’s will. The reason I don’t think Paul denies this claim is because (1) this objection came up precisely because Paul was teaching the absolute sovereignty of God in election. In fact, he explicitly said it does not depend on human desire or effort (verse 16) and that God hardens who he wills (verse 18). (2) Rather than deny the premise, Paul digs in his heals. He defends God’s right to make some vessels for honorable use and some for dishonorable use and denies his interlocutor’s right to object to God exercising that right.

Question 8: Tim Stratton

No Christian or anyone else on the planet is infallible and possesses a perfect set of theological beliefs. I mean, my reformed colleagues should all agree that a super Pope who never gets theology wrong does not exist. With that in mind, if God determines all things, and given the fact that every Christ follower, pastor, theologian, and Calvinists affirm at least one false theological belief if not multitudes, then it follows that God determines each one of his followers, including all Calvinists, to affirm false theological beliefs. Now, if God determines all, each and every one of his followers, to get theological beliefs wrong, how does this not relegate God into a DOD, a DOD, a Deity of Deception? What’s the relevant difference between a demon who determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs and a deity who determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs?

In the fourth question, Tim chided Calvinists for imposing their philosophy on the Bible because he seemed to be unaware of the fact that divine determinism was arrived at through Biblical exegesis. But here, Tim reveals that the shoe was on his foot after all. Tim is making a philosophical argument against divine determinism on the basis that it makes God a deity of deception. Never mind whether the Bible actually teaches that God causes people to believe false things.

He does, though. It says so explicitly in 2 Thessalonians 2:11. And, as Leighton Flowers pointed out in question number five, God blinds people so they will not believe the truth (see, for example, John 12:39-40). This objection Tim brings up applies just as much to non-Calvinists as it does to Calvinists. If God causes people to believe things that aren’t true, how can we trust him? How do we know he’s not always doing that? This is a thorny issue, whether you’re a Calvinist or not, because no matter what answer you give, it might be that it’s a lie God is causing you to believe.

The issue Tim raises is a special case of the problem of evil. If God is perfectly good (including being honest), then why does he allow or cause evil (including allowing or causing his own people to believe false things)?

The procedure for answering a question like this, if you are a Biblically faithful Christian, is not to begin with your philosophy and impose it on the Bible. Rather, it’s to begin with what the Bible teaches, then to try to figure out how it makes sense philosophically. Tim apparently denies what the Bible teaches because of his philosophy. I would rather affirm what the Bible teaches before wrestling with the philosophical implications.

I have written a lot on the problem of evil in this blog (here's a list), so I’m not going to repeat it all here. I’ll just give a short response here. Basically, I believe God is perfectly good. Since God is perfectly good, he has a morally justifiable reason for everything he does. If God creates a world in which even his own people believe false things, then it follows that he has a morally justifiable reason for doing so. I don’t have to know what that reason is to be justified in believing there’s a reason. It follows deductively that there’s a reason from the premise that God is perfectly good. The goodness of God can be arrived at ontologically from the moral argument. If God is the standard of good and evil, and if, by definition, good is to be done and evil is to be shunned, it follows that God only prefers good and never prefers evil, which in turn, means God is wholly good.

So I may not know why God, in his sovereign plan, arranges things so that his own people believe false things, but I trust that he has a good reason for it.

As far as what the difference is between God doing it and a demon doing it, the major difference is that God is sovereign and a demon is not. We can see this in 1 Kings 22:21-23 in which God put a lying spirit in the mouth of some prophets. In this case, the spirit was the immediate cause of the deception, but God was the remote cause. The demon acted on God’s order. Demons are not autonomous beings.

Another difference is that God has a good purpose in everything he does, but demons have an evil purpose in everything they do.

Question 9: Braxton Hunter

From my perspective sovereignty has to do with one’s position of authority. We know what a sovereign is. It’s a king. It’s someone who has command over his realm, and so we are familiar with sovereignty with respect to kings in this world. The thing that’s different about God is his realm is the entire cosmos. We know what a sovereign is, what a king is. He can step in at any time. He can dole out rewards or punishments. He can do as he pleases. And these are all things the Bible says God is and God does. But never before have we thought of the term sovereignty in any other context with respect to any other ruler as being, uh, something that he engages in with deterministic control. Sovereignty seems to have to do with God’s position of authority. Both Calvinists and non-Calvinists from my perspective think that God has the highest position of authority. He is as sovereign as he can be. So here’s my question. Why do you think Calvinists often speak as though determinism is a part of God’s sovereignty such that if you’re not a Calvinist you must think that God is not quite as sovereign as the Calvinist does? It seems to me that we both think God is as sovereign as he can be. The question is simply does he from that position of sovereignty choose to give man libertarian freedom or choose determinism. What are your thoughts?

This appears to me to be a question about semantics. Braxton is making the case that in most contexts, “sovereignty” just refers to authority. Why, then, do Calvinists use “sovereignty” to refer to something else? Why do we use it to refer to God determining everything?

I don’t find this to be an important question. If Braxton doesn’t like the word, “sovereignty,” then just pick a different word. Who cares what we call it? As I’ve said elsewhere, I’m a pragmatist when it comes to vocabulary. It doesn’t matter what words we use as long as we understand each other, and we can understand each other as long as we’re careful to define our terms.

Calvinists mean something in particular when they talk about God’s sovereignty. Whether Braxton thinks we’re using the word correctly or not hardly seems to matter. He need only understand what we mean by the word, and I think he does.

I don’t know the historical or etymological reason for why Calvinists use the word, “Sovereignty,” the way they do, but I can speculate. My speculation is that determinism is an extension of what we already mean by sovereignty in Braxton’s sense. If I have some authority, then I am able to command somebody else, and that person will carry out my will. So my degree of sovereignty impacts my ability to bring about my will. Calvinists say God is absolutely sovereign because his will is exhaustive, and he brings it about without fail.

Question 10:Jonathan Pritchett

In Ephesians 1, even many Calvinist commentators have noted the corporate language of the plural pronouns used throughout the exordium. In verse 4 it says, “He chose us in him before the foundation of the world.” But why think this corporate language in a collectivist culture further entails that specific individuals were chosen to be in him when nothing in the text suggests this? Rather, in verses 1:13 and 1:19 it suggests that people are joined to that “us,” the body of Christ, through believing. So why think something that is true of the corporate body applies even further to individuals?

There are a few of reasons. The first reason is because the most natural reading of Ephesians 1 is that God chose individuals to be in Christ. After all, “us” is made up of individuals. “Us” is a personal pronoun, not an abstract group. It’s not exactly like “team.” If the passage had said something like, “God chose the NY Yankees before the foundation of the world,” Jonathan would probably have a point since members of the NY Yankees can come and go. Paul, on the other hand, is writing to “God’s holy people in Ephesus,” and “us” refers to both himself and them.

Second, in verse 11-12, Paul says that “In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will, in order that we, who were the first to put our hope in Christ, might be for the praise of his glory.” Paul is speaking about individuals here. He’s not referring to an abstract group of people but to specific individuals who were the first to put their hope in Christ. It is these individuals who God predestined. Notice also that Paul says we were predestined by “him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will.” It says everything. Since Paul is connecting predestination with God’s sovereign will over everything, the implication appears to be that the reason every individual who put their hope in Christ did so because it was part of God’s sovereign plan.

Third, this reading appears to be consistent with many other passages in which it appears that God chooses individuals for salvation, including John 6, John 10, Romans 9, and Acts 13:48. In Acts 16:14, we can see an example of God opening the heart of an individual to be receptive to Paul’s message. It appears from the whole counsel of scripture that God does choose individuals for salvation and not just abstract groups whose members can be in flux.

Question 11: Tim Stratton

Along the same lines as my previous question, if God determines all things and all Christians including each and every Calvinist affirms at least one false theological belief if not multitudes then it follows that God determines all of his followers to affirm false theological beliefs. It also follows that God determines you to affirm false theological beliefs. So here’s my question. Without begging the question, how do you know that Calvinism is not one of these false theological beliefs? Let me put it this way. If a deity of deception assured you that divine determinism is true, why should you believe it?

If Tim would just take a moment to think about what he’s saying, he would surely recognize that this epistemological problem applies equally to anybody who holds false beliefs for whatever reason. He’s making an argument that proves too much. If it is true, as Tim agrees, that we all hold false beliefs, then how do we know that any of our beliefs are true? How does Tim know that Calvinism is NOT true given his acknowledgement that some of his theological beliefs are false? Couldn’t his denial of Calvinism be one of his false theological beliefs?

However fallible we may be, we do have justification for at least some of our beliefs. I think Calvinism is true because after a lot of reading, studying, and thinking, I’m persuaded by the cumulative effect of it all that Calvinism is true. I could be wrong about it, but the mere possibility of me being wrong about it isn’t an adequate reason to think I am wrong about it. I need to be shown that I’m wrong about it, not merely presented with the mere possibility.

I don’t have privileged access to God’s mind. I have nothing but the resources he has given me to judge between true and false. God has made us all fallible. We have no choice but to use our cognitive faculties to the best of our ability to make distinctions between what is true and what is false. We are, inevitably, going to get some things wrong. That’s just the reality we live in, and it’s something we have to live with. But being fallible doesn’t mean we are never justified in affirming anything. We are justified to the degree that evidence, argument, and intuition persuade us.

Question 12: Braxton Hunter

When it comes to apologetics, many Calvinists think that Christians should be presuppositionalists, and the reason for this is because the evidential production of evidence and presentation to an unbeliever is going to be ineffective on someone who is hostile toward God. Or, worse than that, it could mean that they are putting themselves as judges over God. But it’s very common for Calvinists to say that God uses means. He uses the preaching of the gospel in order to convey truth, and then he draws by the Holy Spirit. So why could God not use the production of apologetic evidence embedded in the gospel message where a preacher might use stories and illustrations along with Biblical data. Apologists might use evidence for the resurrection along with Biblical data. Why can God not use means in this way, and if he can, then why do we need to be presuppositional apologists instead of classical apologists?

I am in complete agreement with Braxton. I blogged about it here, here and here. My position on apologetic methods is that we should use sound arguments whether those arguments are evidential, classical, presuppositional, or whatever. It doesn’t matter what kind of argument it is. It only matters whether the argument is sound.

Question 13: Jonathan Pritchett

Noticeably absent in all the talk about the doctrines of grace in reformed circles is any discussion about benefaction, gift giving, and the socioeconomics of patron-client reciprocity. Why is that when this is clearly the context of grace for Paul and his audience in the ancient Mediterranean world? Can you explain Calvinism or the doctrines of Grace using these contextual terms rather than theological loaded terms? I’d love to hear it.

As far as I know, nobody in the 1500’s, 1600’s, or 1700’s, whether they were Calvinists, Wesleyans, Arminians, or whatever, talked about grace and theology in those terms. I don’t use those terms and concepts because I’m not that familiar with them. The theological terms I use are because they work. As I said in question number nine, I’m a pragmatist when it comes to vocabulary. If certain theological terms are effective in communicating theological truths, then I will use those terms. Most Christians don’t seem to have a problem understanding them. It’s really only the Mormons that cause me to get bogged down in defining terms.

Question 14: Tim Stratton

Alright, consider the deity of the deception argument. Premise 1: If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs. Two: If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive, and his word, the Bible, cannot be trusted, and Christians cannot have assurance of salvation. Three: God is not deceptive, his word can be trusted, and Christians can have assurance of salvation. Four: Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, and Five: therefore, EDD is false. So here's my question. With this argument in mind, what justifiable reasons do you have for believing what was inspired by a deity of deception? Why should you believe the Bible if it were inspired by a deity of deception? Now, be careful not to beg the question in response.

This question is not that different than the eleventh question and, again, Tim is raising an epistemological problem that applies just as well to him as it does to Calvinists. Given the fact that God causes people to believe false things (because the Bible is explicit about that), how can we trust any of the deliverances of our reasoning? How can you solve that problem without begging the question? After all, you can only appeal to what you presumably know as a basis for arguing that you have knowledge, but if all of your alleged knowledge is under question, then you have nothing reliable to appeal to. By appealing to anything, you’re assuming what you’re trying to prove, namely, that you do know something.

We don’t need to wring our hands over the mere possibility that we could be wrong about things. We have many tools with which to distinguish between true and false. We have intuition, sensory perception, inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, memory, authority, etc. If you come to your beliefs by the use of these tools, then that gives you justification for holding your beliefs. The mere possibility that you could be wrong does not remove that justification.

I believe the Bible partly because having read it from an early age, I find that I can’t help but believe it. My theological explanation for this belief is that I recognize the voice of my shepherd (compare John 10). But part of the reason I believe the Bible is because of my apologetic pursuits. I’m persuaded by historical arguments that Jesus is the messiah, that he rose from the dead, that he appointed apostles, and that those apostles either wrote or approved the books of the New Testament, etc.

Question 15: Braxton Hunter

When it comes to whether we’re morally culpable for our sins compatibilist Calvinists often speak of two different types of ability – conditional ability and categorical ability. Conditional ability has to do with whether a particular person could carry out, say, a moral obligation if he wanted to. Does he have the power to do it if he wanted to? And on this view he would not be held morally culpable if it were the case that he could not carry out some moral obligation even if he wanted to. So, for example, if a man is commanded to move a box from here to there, and this man doesn’t have arms, well, then he’s not morally culpable for not moving the box because he couldn’t do it even if he wanted to. If he does have arms, and he doesn’t move the box, then he is culpable because he has the conditional ability to move the box if he wanted to. But since determinism is true for the compatibilist determinist, and God has decreed that the man with arms will not move the box because his desires have been unchangeably determined, the man cannot want to move the box without undermining God’s decree. So in the case of the man with no arms, he’s not culpable because he doesn’t have the arms to pick up the box with. And in the case of the man with arms who has been determined not to want to pick up the box, the Calvinist can say he could do it if he wanted to, but the problem is his desires were determined by God even if through secondary causes. In either case, in one or the other senses of “can’t,” the man can’t do the thing that he is commanded to do. Why is the man morally culpable in one case but not in the other when, in both cases, there is some sense of “can’t” that means in the actual world the man can’t do what he’s commanded?

That’s a great question. Jonathan Edwards wrote a whole book on it (The Freedom of the Will), and I’ve talked about it a lot on this blog and elsewhere (here for example).

We both agree that the man with no arms is not morally culpable for his failure to lift the box since he is physically unable to lift the box.

We also agree that there is a sense in which the man with arms is also unable to lift the box. But his inability isn’t due to any physical limitation. It’s due to a psychological limitation. He simply lacks the desire to lift the box.

If we treat these two inabilities the same, we end up with some very counter-intuitive results. Let me explain.

Let’s say we require somebody to do something that’s very difficult to do, like maybe running a marathon of lifting something really heavy. If it were something very easy for the person to do, but he didn’t do it, we’d probably blame him. In fact, we often say things like, “It would have been so easy for you to do that. It wouldn’t have cost you a thing.” The fact that it was easy seems to make the person more culpable for failing to do it than they would be if it had been difficult or costly. If it was extremely difficult for somebody to pull something off, and they failed to pull it off, we would be a little more understanding. We’d still blame them since they COULD have done it if they had just tried harder. But we cut them a little slack, knowing how difficult it was. The more difficult it is, the closer it is to being impossible. It’s impossible for an ordinary person to lift a truck that weighs a ton. It’s impossible for some people to run a marathon. We don’t blame people at all when the difficulty reaches impossibility.

Notice that the more difficult it is, the less we blame somebody for not doing something. If it’s so difficult that they’re physically unable to do it, we don’t blame them at all. We attribute maximum blame for failing to do what would’ve been easy.

But what if we applied the same principle to psychological obstacles. Think about it. The stronger your desire to do something, the harder it is to resist the urge to do it. The harder it is to resist the urge to do something, the closer that desire is to determining your choice. If we apply the same principle to desires as we apply to physical limitations, then it would follow that the deeper your desire to do something, the less you can be blamed (or praised) for doing it. If the desire is so strong that you can’t help but give in to it, then you can neither be praised nor blamed for giving in to it. You are most culpable for your actions when they are not so much as influenced by desires, i.e. when you act out of indifference.

It follows that the deeper your love for somebody, and the deeper your desire is to do good for them, the less praiseworthy your acts of love are. And the deeper your hatred for somebody, and the deeper your desire is to harm them, the less blameworthy you are for harming them. After all, the deeper your desire to help or harm somebody, the harder it would be to resist doing so, and the closer those desires would be to determining your behavior.

But this is exactly backward. In reality, it is precisely BECAUSE your bad behavior arises out of bad motives and desires that you are blamable for them. If you shove an old lady because you hate old ladies, you are more blamable than if you shove her to save her from being hit by a bus. Your actions are blameworthy or praiseworthy to the degree that they are motivated by good or bad desires. The greater hand love plays in motivating your behavior, the more praiseworthy your actions, and the greater hand hate plays in motivating your behavior, the more blameworthy your actions. If your behavior arose spontaneously for no reason at all, then they would be accidents, in which case you can be worthy of neither praise nor blame. Since your actions are praiseworthy or blameworthy to the degree that they are influenced by your desires and motives, it follows that the greater hand your desires and motives have in bringing about your actions, the more praiseworthy or blameworthy they are. From that, it follows that you are maximally praiseworthy or blameworthy when your desires and motives have everything to do with your behavior, which happens when they are sufficient to determine your behavior.

This is all consistent with scripture. James said that it is evil desires that leads to sin (James 1:14-15). Jesus taught that our behavior is determined by the condition of our hearts (Matthew 12:33-35; Luke 6:43-45). In Matthew 7:18, Jesus went so far as to say, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit.” In Jeremiah, it says, “Can an Ethiopian change his skin or a leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil” (Jeremiah 13:23). We are held accountable for our actions, not in spite of the fact that they are determined by the condition of our hearts, but precisely BECAUSE they are determined by the condition of our hearts.

Question 16: Tim Stratton

According to Calvinism, God does not choose the elect based upon anything about the individual, lest any man should boast (Ephesians 2:9). So those who are passed by, the damned, and those who are elect seem to be based on luck or chance. Indeed, in Calvinism, the elect seem to have won a cosmic and infinite lottery of sorts. Moreover, those who have been determined to hell, created for the sole purpose of eternal damnation, a decision made by God prior to the birth of the damned individuals, well those guys are literally the unluckiest folks in all of creation. So it seems to me that this leaves room for one to boast about how lucky they are compared to the next guy. But here’s my question. If God does not choose the elect based on anything about the person, how is their election anything but lucky?

Tim must have a strange conception of what luck and chance mean. The fact that God chooses people is the opposite of chance or luck.

In Question 4, Tim said that he was a Molinist. It seems to me that it is under Molinism that whether we are saved or not is a matter of luck or chance. In Molinism, God doesn't choose individuals. He chooses possible worlds. He may choose a possible world in which the greatest number of people get saved or the greatest ratio of saved to lost or something along those lines. Suppose there is a possible world in which Tim gets saved, but that world happens not to be a world in which the most people get saved or that has the greatest saved-to-lost ratio, so God doesn't actualize that world. Suppose the world that does have the greatest saved-to-lost ratio or the greatest number saved happens to be a world in which Tim does not get saved. It may be that God would like to have saved Tim, but darn the luck, Tim only gets saved in possible worlds where not enough people get saved for God to justify actualizing those worlds. So God has to sacrifice Tim in order to actualize a possible world in which more people get saved. It's just bad luck that the world God chose to actualize happens to be a world in which Tim doesn't get saved. After all, Tim could have been saved if God had just actualized a different world. If God does actualize a world in which Tim gets saved, Tim is just lucky that the world God chose to actualize happens to be a world in which Tim gets saved instead of a world in which he doesn't. In Molinism, God doesn't save anybody because he loves the individual. It's just a numbers game. Whether you get saved or not is a matter of luck because it depends on the counter-factuals of human freedom, which God has no control over, and the possible worlds you happen to get saved in. Election, in Molinism, is impersonal.

Question 17: Jonathan Pritchett

Why is an increasing number of Calvinists getting big mad at Dr. James White for calling out people in reformed circles in the online community for tolerating racism, for tolerating antisemitism, for tolerating holocaust denialism, and tolerating Andrew Tate fanboyism? Why all the hate against Dr. White? He’s doing the Lord’s work here.

I’m on James’ side, so this question doesn’t apply to me.

Question 18: Braxton Hunter

Does God love every individual? Does he love them all in the same sense? If not, then how does his love differ, and why do you think that?

I do think God loves everybody, but not in the same sense and not to the same degree. After all, sending somebody to hell is not an act of love. But causing the rain to fall on the just and the unjust is an act of love.

Question 19: Tim Stratton

According to the Oxford Dictionary online, a puppet is defined as a person under the control of another person. Sorry. Alright, Miriam Webster defined “puppet” this way: “one whose acts are controlled by an outside force or influence.” Cambridge defines puppet like this: “a person whose actions are controlled by someone else”. Well, we can add to these definitions. A puppet is a created thing that is fully controlled and determined by antecedent conditions, namely, the decisions of the puppeteer. Now, if exhaustive divine determination (EDD) is true, then humans are created beings who are fully controlled and determined by antecedent conditions and another personal being, God. That is to say, according to EDD, God exhaustively determines the physical and mental actions of every human all the time. So here’s my question. If a puppet, by definition, is a created thing that is fully determined by antecedent conditions, the decisions of another personal being, how is humanity anything different than a puppet if EDD is true?

Whether the term, “puppet,” applies to somebody or not depends entirely on how you define the word. I’m not that interested in an argument over semantics. If you want to define “puppet” as something that is determined, then sure, we’re all puppets. But shouldn’t the real issue be the question of whether we are, in fact, determined? Who cares what label that entails?

The puppet Tim showed us in his video was an inanimate object. That puppet does not act out of any desire. It has no mind at all. We are obviously not puppets in that sense.

People often call others puppets because they are acting on behalf of somebody else who makes all their decisions. We sometimes call politicians puppets because they’re acting out of the desires of their donors.

I readily admit that there is some sense in which we are all puppets, but who cares? I don’t care what you call me; I care whether determinism is true.

Any of us can influence another’s behavior. We do it all the time. You can just say, “Hey, look at that star,” while pointing, and your buddy will inevitably look. Does that make your buddy a puppet? It depends on how you define the word.

Consider some of the things Jesus said, and ask yourself whether any of this makes Jesus a puppet.

John 14:10 -- “The words I say to you I do not speak on my own authority. Rather, it is the Father, living in me, who is doing his work.”
John 12:49 -- “For I did not speak on my own, but the Father who sent me commanded me to say all that I have spoken.”
John 5:30 -- “By myself I can do nothing; I judge only as I hear, and my judgment is just, for I seek not to please myself but him who sent me.”
John 6:38 -- “For I have come down from heaven not to do my own will but to do the will of him who sent me.”
John 7:16 -- “My teaching is not my own. It comes from the one who sent me.”

Question 20: Braxton Hunter

Which aspect of your Calvinistic beliefs are you least confident about?

That’s a hard question to answer because there are some beliefs that are Calvinistic, but they are not exclusively Calvinistic. Sola Scriptura, for example, is a Calvinistic belief, but it’s not exclusively Calvinistic.

As far as exclusively Calvinistic beliefs, I like to call myself a one-point Calvinist. I believe in the absolute sovereignty of God in salvation. I think all of the traditional five points of Calvinism follow from that one point. Since to me there’s just one belief that captures my Calvinism, I can’t compare it to a second belief and say I’m more sure of one than of the other. I suppose I could say which of the implications of absolute sovereignty I’m least confident about. I’m not sure I can pick one, though. I explained in my blog post on one-point Calvinism how I think the five points follow, and none of them jump out at me as being less likely than all the others.

I can tell you, though, that when I was going through my conversion to Calvinism, the hardest thing for me to come around on was perseverence of the saints.

I may come back and edit this response in case something occurs to me that isn’t occurring to me right now.