I debated someone who said that "No Christian should be a compatibilist." I argued that all Christians should be compatibilists because compatibilism agrees with both scripture and reason. My opponent didn't complete the debate, but I thought I said some things that were worthy of a blog post. Most of the stuff here, I've probably already said somewhere else on this blog, but maybe not as succinctly. Here's my opening statement.
Thank you for coming to tonight's debate.
I'm going to assume a shared burden of proof. That means Pro will have to defend the resolution, and I will have to defend the negation of the resolution.
Also, Pro did not define "libertarian freedom" and "compatibilism," so I better do that as well.
Libertarianism is the view that when a person acts freely, they could have done otherwise even if everything about the universe, including their internal mental states, had been exactly the same prior to and up to the moment of choice. There are no conditions inside of or outside of a person prior to and up to the moment of choice that determine what that choice will be. That is not to say that prior conditions can't influence a person's choice; just that those prior conditions are not sufficient to determine the person's choice.
Compatibilism is the view that all of our acts are determined by the sum total of our mental states prior to and up to the moment of choice. "Freedom" is defined differently in compatibilism than it is in libertarianism. Whereas in libertarianism, freedom refers to an act being free from any determining factors whatsoever, in compatibilism, freedom means acting out of your own desires, motivations, inclinations, preferences, etc.
The debate is essentially over which view is more consistent with Christianity. I'll be arguing that compatibilism is more consistent with a Christian worldview than libertarianism is.
According to compatibilism, all of our acts are determined by our strongest desires and motivations when the sum total of our mental states are taken into account. According to Jesus, all of our acts are determined by the condition of our hearts. In Matthew 7:16-18, Jesus explained that you can recognize a false prophets by their fruits, i.e. their actions. A person's actions reveal what is in their hearts. Jesus went on to say that "a good tree cannot produce bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot produce good fruit." This only makes sense under compatibilism. If people were free in the libertarian sense, then their goodness or badness would not determine their actions. A good tree could produce bad fruit if it had libertarian freedom.
Jesus elaborated on these same points in Matthew 12:33-35. He made the point that "the mouth speaks out of that which fills the heart," which was in answer to his rhetorical question: "How can you being evil speak what is good?" They can't because they can only speak what is in their hearts. Again, our actions are determined by what is in our hearts.
Luke records essentially the same points made by Jesus in Luke 6:43. There, he says that no good tree bears bad fruit, no does a bad tree bear good fruit, and the reason is because "The good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth what is good; and the evil man out of the evil treasure brings forth what is evil"
These passages are inconsistent with libertarian freedom since under libertarianism, the condition of your heart does not determine whether your actions are good or bad.
Jesus also said in John 6:44 that "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him." This passage is also inconsistent with libertarianism. If people were free in the libertarian sense, then they could choose to come to Jesus without the Father drawing them.
Finally, Jeremiah 13:23 says, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? Then you also can do good who are accustomed to doing evil.” The implication is clear. Whatever a person is accustomed to determines their actions, so Jeremiah teaches compatibilism, too.
Contrary to the resolution, all Christians should be compatibilsts because that's the Biblical view. But I want to also argue that Christians should be compatibilists because it is more agreeable to reason and common sense than libertarianism.
Libertarian freedom violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). According to the PSR, for everything that happens, there is a sufficient reason for why it happens. But under libertarianism, there is never a sufficient reason for why a person acted one way rather than not since no matter what the prior circumstances, the person still could have done otherwise.
In this regard, libertarians frequently speak as if they were compatibilists. If you ask a person, "Why did you eat that donut?" they will respond, "Because I wanted to." That answer makes sense under compatibilism because a desire to eat donuts is a sufficient explanation for why the person ate them. Whenever people state a reason for why they acted as they did, they are speaking like compatibilists.
Under libertarianism, no prior reason, motive, desire, etc. is sufficient to explain why a person acted as they did since they could have done otherwise even given those reasons, motives, desires, etc. What libertarians ought to say is, "I acted partly because I had a motive and partly for no reason at all." But libertarians never say that because they are inconsistent, and they are inconsistent because, contrary to Pro's claim, there is no innate knowledge of libertarian freedom. We are all compatibilists in our day to day lives because we all think and speak like compatibilists.
It is agreeable to our common notions that any act for which we are responsible must be an act that is done on purpose rather than on accident. To act on purpose is to act out of some prior inclination. To act on accident is to act apart from or contrary to any prior inclination. Libertarian acts are essentially accidents since they can be made apart from all prior inclinations. Compatibilist acts are the very essence of acts done on purpose since they are determined by a person's own prior inclinations, desires, motives, etc.
It is also agreeable to our common notions that a person who does exactly what he wants is acting freely whereas a person who acts spontaneously apart from their desires is not acting freely. A person whose legs and arms spontaneously move apart from the person's own desires is said to have an involuntary reflex. The very act of volition requires that a person's own mental faculties be engaged, and any deviation from the person's own mental inclinations is an involuntary act. So choice is only possible under compatibilism, not libertarianism.
So Pro is quite wrong in saying that knowledge of libertarianism is innate.
Pro also claims that libertarian freedom is the only solution to the problem of evil. But that is not so. The problem of evil can be solved by the mere possibility that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing or causing evil to happen. And we see Biblical examples where this is the case. Although it was an evil thing for Joseph's brothers to sell him into slavery, God nevertheless meant for it to happen because he had a morally good purpose in it (Genesis 50:20). So there is some evil that God intends to happen because it serves a good purpose. I could cite other examples if there were room.
Finally, Pro claims that libertarian freedom is necessary for us to reason and believe. That claim is mistaken for two reasons. First, because our beliefs are not under the direct control of the will. You can't simply by an act of volition decide to believe one thing rather than another. Just try it. Choose to believe right now that there's a pink elephant flying around outside above you. Even if I offered you a million dollars, you couldn't simply choose to believe it. Our beliefs are caused.
And the fact that our beliefs are caused is precisely what makes them reasonable. Our beliefs can only be reasonable to the degree that they are determined by arguments and evidence. The more hand evidence has in bringing about our beliefs, the more rational those beliefs are, and the less hand evidence has in bringing about our beliefs, then less rational we are. It follows that we are most rational when evidence determines our beliefs, and we are least rational when are beliefs are arrived at apart from evidence.
Thank you.
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