Wednesday, November 25, 2020

An inductive argument against disembodied minds

There is an argument against disembodied minds that goes something like this: Every example in our experience of minds is an embodied mind. Therefore, we have a good inductive argument that all minds are embodied.

Setting aside whatever philsophical arguments there might be for disembodied souls, spirits, ghosts, or gods that might outweigh this argument, I'm not sure this argument is sound even when taken in isolation. Suppose I had never left the state of Texas, and I argued like so: Every oak tree I've ever seen was planted in Texas soil. Therefore, I have a good inductive argument that all oak trees are planted in Texas soil. Obviously there's a flaw in this argument.

The reason that's not a good argument is because there is an observer selection effect. If there were oak trees growing in other parts of the world, I would not have experienced them since I've only lived in Texas. The fact that I haven't experienced them is because I haven't been in a position to experience them. It has nothing to do with whether they exist or not.

In the same way, if all we are able to experience are physical people, and we couldn't get in touch with disembodied minds even if they were real, then the fact that all the minds we know of are embodied minds doesn't give us any inductive reason to think minds must always be embodied. The fact that we only experience embodied minds is due to the fact that we ourselves are embodied minds, and our sensory organs are designed to only detect other physical things. It has nothing to do with whether there are disembodied minds or not.

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