It’s impossible to reason with anybody unless you already agree with them about something. Before any argument can have any effect on another person, they must agree with the premises. If they don’t already agree with the premises, then you have to begin with more basic premises that they do agree with.
Sadducees only accepted the first five books as scripture. They did not recognize the writings and the prophets as scripture. Since resurrection was not in the Torah (the first five books), they rejected resurrection. There are three explicit references to resurrection in the Old Testament—Daniel 12, Isaiah 26, and Ezekiel 37. When Jesus debated with the Sadducees about the resurrection, he didn’t quote any of these passages. Instead, he quoted from the Torah. Jesus began with something the Sadducees already agreed with, and he made his case from that premise.
Paul did the same thing when speaking at the Areopogus. Since the Greeks he was speaking to didn’t accept any of the Bible as scripture, Paul didn’t begin with the Bible. Rather, he began with an idea they already accepted. He pointed to a statue dedicated to an unknown god, and argued from there to the true God.
This procedure makes all the sense in the world. If a person doesn’t accept the authority of the Bible (or some part of the Bible), then it doesn’t make sense to appeal to the Bible (or that part of the Bible) in order to make your case to that person. You have to do it some other way.
It’s a good idea, when you’re arguing with somebody, to find out a little about what they believe and why they believe it. Rather than come out swinging with your arguments, ask them questions instead. Feel them out a little. Not only will this put you in a better position to reason with them, but it’s also a lot less off-putting than mowing them down with your arguments from the get-go. Of course when you're asking the questions, you have to be careful not to turn it into an interrogation. That's also off-putting. Once people are on the defensive, all listening has stopped.
Tuesday, May 31, 2005
Monday, May 30, 2005
Is Jesus a compatibalist?
Compatibalism is the view that we always act according to our strongest motivation. All of the choices we make are determined by our character and the dispositions, and inclinations of the heart.
Libertarianism is the view that there are no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws that determine what our choice will be. Our choices arise spontaneously out of the self-determination of the will.
Compatibalists and libertarians both use the term "free will," but they both mean something different by it, as you can see from the definitions above. There are a few things Jesus said which seem to indicate that Jesus was a compatibalist. Here are some things he said:
Matthew 7:17-18 "Even so, every good tree bears good fruit; but the bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot produce bad fruit, nor can a bad tree produce good fruit."
Matthew 12:33-35 "Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit. You brood of vipers, how can you being evil, speak what is good? For the mouth speaks out of that which fills the heart. The good man out of his good treasure brings forth what is good; and the evil man out of his evil treasure brings forth what is evil."
Luke 6:43 "For there is no good tree which produces bad fruit; nor, on the other hand, a bad tree which produces good fruit. For each tree is known by its own fruit. For men do not gather figs from thorns, nor do they pick grapes from a briar bush. The good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth what is good; and the evil man out of the evil treasure brings forth what is evil; for his mouth speaks from that which fills his heart."
Libertarianism is the view that there are no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws that determine what our choice will be. Our choices arise spontaneously out of the self-determination of the will.
Compatibalists and libertarians both use the term "free will," but they both mean something different by it, as you can see from the definitions above. There are a few things Jesus said which seem to indicate that Jesus was a compatibalist. Here are some things he said:
Matthew 7:17-18 "Even so, every good tree bears good fruit; but the bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot produce bad fruit, nor can a bad tree produce good fruit."
Matthew 12:33-35 "Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit. You brood of vipers, how can you being evil, speak what is good? For the mouth speaks out of that which fills the heart. The good man out of his good treasure brings forth what is good; and the evil man out of his evil treasure brings forth what is evil."
Luke 6:43 "For there is no good tree which produces bad fruit; nor, on the other hand, a bad tree which produces good fruit. For each tree is known by its own fruit. For men do not gather figs from thorns, nor do they pick grapes from a briar bush. The good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth what is good; and the evil man out of the evil treasure brings forth what is evil; for his mouth speaks from that which fills his heart."
Wednesday, May 25, 2005
when will i post again?
In case anybody checks here often, I thought I ought to let you know that I don't plan to post again until Monday. I'm on vacation right now, and I'm endulging in my obsession of making bows. Also, I got a couple of kittens, and I'm spending a lot of time with them. Here's a picture of them. Their names are Psyche and Aristotle.
Friday, May 20, 2005
Argument against morality from determinism, part 9
Edwards argues that it is agreeable to the common notions people have about morality, praise, and blame, that moral necessity is consistent with praise and blame. The common meaning of faultiness is simply a person having his heart wrong and doing wrong from his heart. Most people don’t form their concept of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness from an in depth study of metaphysics and philosophical subtleties. If they did, then the majority of us would never have any notion of moral praise or blame. These are some of the first notions children have. They form their notion of desert from experience and a natural sense of right and wrong which we call conscience.
Common people and children think any faulty deed is a person’s own act, and it’s the person’s own act if it was done by choice. They have no notion that an action begins accidentally without cause or reason, because that goes against the common sense notion that nothing begins to be without a cause or reason.
Everybody thinks a faulty or praiseworthy deed is done out of liberty, but liberty consists in doing what you please, not in doing in a state of indifference with no preference at all. The common notion is that when a person proceeds with the fullest inclination, he does so with the greatest freedom.
If common sense dictated that praise and blame are inconsistent with moral necessity, then the closer we are to necessity because of a strong propensity or inclination, the less worthy we are of praise or blame. Common sense would dictate that the stronger you desire to do something, the less commendable or blamable you are for doing it.
But just the reverse is true. The stronger the love of virtue and inclination to do good, the more commendable. The stronger the malice, the more blamable the acts are that come from that malice.
If mankind’s common notion of a blameworthy act is an act not determined by any antecedent bias or motive, then the greater hand these motives have in determining the acts, the less blameworthy, and the less hand, the more blameworthy. But people commonly think the more influence a motive has in determining an act, the more blameworthy.
The end.
Common people and children think any faulty deed is a person’s own act, and it’s the person’s own act if it was done by choice. They have no notion that an action begins accidentally without cause or reason, because that goes against the common sense notion that nothing begins to be without a cause or reason.
Everybody thinks a faulty or praiseworthy deed is done out of liberty, but liberty consists in doing what you please, not in doing in a state of indifference with no preference at all. The common notion is that when a person proceeds with the fullest inclination, he does so with the greatest freedom.
If common sense dictated that praise and blame are inconsistent with moral necessity, then the closer we are to necessity because of a strong propensity or inclination, the less worthy we are of praise or blame. Common sense would dictate that the stronger you desire to do something, the less commendable or blamable you are for doing it.
But just the reverse is true. The stronger the love of virtue and inclination to do good, the more commendable. The stronger the malice, the more blamable the acts are that come from that malice.
If mankind’s common notion of a blameworthy act is an act not determined by any antecedent bias or motive, then the greater hand these motives have in determining the acts, the less blameworthy, and the less hand, the more blameworthy. But people commonly think the more influence a motive has in determining an act, the more blameworthy.
The end.
Thursday, May 19, 2005
Argument against morality from determinism, part 8
According to the argument from determinism, all of our actions are determined by our motives and inclinations, and since they are determined, we aren’t free, and since we aren’t free, we can have no moral obligations. But most people, even if they reject determinism, will agree that it’s possible for a motive to be so strong that the mind cannot help but yield to it, and liberty is destroyed in that case. If so, then half the strength goes half way in destroying liberty. Any degree at all in the motivation destroys liberty in proportion to the strength of that motive. If one degree doesn’t destroy liberty at all, then neither does two degrees, because nothing doubled is nothing. If there is nothing in the nature of motive that is at all opposite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if any amount of motive hurts liberty, then the least amount hurts liberty (and therefore virtue) to some degree. Therefore, the stronger the motive, the less virtue, and no motive is best of all.
Part 9
Part 9
Wednesday, May 18, 2005
Argument against morality from determinism, part 7
Liberty is inconsistent with virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions, because to have a habitual bias is to not be indifferent. If necessity is inconsistent with praise and blame, and if some inclination is so strong, the will follows necessarily, then when the will acts, it’s not blameworthy or praiseworthy.
But every bias brings a degree of moral inability. The stronger the bias, the more difficult it is to resist it. If moral inability is inconsistent with virtue or vice, then the more evil a disposition is, the less blameworthy a person is, or the more excellent the disposition, the less praiseworthy.
The more humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, and benevolence a person has, the less praiseworthy they are. The more ungrateful, profane, treacherous, envious, cruel, and prideful a person is, the less blameworthy they are. All of these dispositions bias the will and throw it out of equilibrium, destroying indifference and moral accountability with it.
There can really be no such thing as virtue or vice in God, angels, or men, because no propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous or vicious. The reason they cannot be virtuous or vicious is because they destroy indifference, which is supposedly necessary for virtue and vice. If habits can be neither virtuous nor vicious, then the exercise of them can’t be virtuous or vicious either.
Part 8
But every bias brings a degree of moral inability. The stronger the bias, the more difficult it is to resist it. If moral inability is inconsistent with virtue or vice, then the more evil a disposition is, the less blameworthy a person is, or the more excellent the disposition, the less praiseworthy.
The more humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, and benevolence a person has, the less praiseworthy they are. The more ungrateful, profane, treacherous, envious, cruel, and prideful a person is, the less blameworthy they are. All of these dispositions bias the will and throw it out of equilibrium, destroying indifference and moral accountability with it.
There can really be no such thing as virtue or vice in God, angels, or men, because no propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous or vicious. The reason they cannot be virtuous or vicious is because they destroy indifference, which is supposedly necessary for virtue and vice. If habits can be neither virtuous nor vicious, then the exercise of them can’t be virtuous or vicious either.
Part 8
Tuesday, May 17, 2005
Argument against morality from determism, part 6
If the liberty of the will consists in indifference, and if an action can only be virtuous if performed in a state of liberty, then an action can only be virtuous if performed in a state of indifference. The more indifferent, the more virtuous, because the more indifferent, the more liberty in the will.
But this is against common sense, which dictates that virtue lies in what is contrary to indifference. The stronger the inclination to do good, the further from indifference; the more virtuous the heart, the more praiseworthy the action that comes from it. Edwards writes that “To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it” (Part III, Sec IV).
In fact, Edwards argues that in some cases indifference can be vicious. For example, if I were indifferent about helping a loved one in deep distress, and did not have any inclination to help, then my indifference would be a vice. Also, if I were indifferent about any suggestion that I kill my father, my indifference would be a vice.
Moreover, indifference is next door to committing a crime, because the next step is preponderation, and the slightest preponderation is choice. If a person is in perfect equilibrium, he is just as likely to do as to not do, and if we are always in equilibrium, then it would inevitably fall out that we would commit the crime as much as avoid it. Where’s the blame in that?
Part 7
But this is against common sense, which dictates that virtue lies in what is contrary to indifference. The stronger the inclination to do good, the further from indifference; the more virtuous the heart, the more praiseworthy the action that comes from it. Edwards writes that “To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favours virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it” (Part III, Sec IV).
In fact, Edwards argues that in some cases indifference can be vicious. For example, if I were indifferent about helping a loved one in deep distress, and did not have any inclination to help, then my indifference would be a vice. Also, if I were indifferent about any suggestion that I kill my father, my indifference would be a vice.
Moreover, indifference is next door to committing a crime, because the next step is preponderation, and the slightest preponderation is choice. If a person is in perfect equilibrium, he is just as likely to do as to not do, and if we are always in equilibrium, then it would inevitably fall out that we would commit the crime as much as avoid it. Where’s the blame in that?
Part 7
Monday, May 16, 2005
Argument against morality from determinism, part 5
Indifference is inconsistent with commands, because commands bias the will, throwing it out of its state of indifference. Commands prescribe what people ought and ought not to do. They only work if they give the person some motivation to act. That motive may be a sense of duty or obligation. If that sense of duty or obligation motivates the person to act, then the person is not acting out of indifference.
If commands do not bias the will, then they become superfluous. If we act out of indifference, then we are not motivated by any inclination to do right or wrong, and since we lack any intention of doing right or wrong, we cannot be worthy of praise or blame if we do them. If we do any of the requirements of commands at all, it is merely by a fluke, and therefore cannot really be called obedience. Nor can it be called disobedience if we happen not to do them. It would be superfluous, then, to require anything of people who remain in a state of indifference.
A command may require something of the will which the will is not inclined to do. If the will is not inclined to obey, then it has a moral inability to obey due to a lack of inclination. If evil inclinations excuse us from doing evil, then the stronger our desire to do evil, the less responsible we are for doing it. The more wicked a person is, the less we should blame him for doing wicked things.
This is contrary to common sense. Whenever we are injured because of what somebody else did, we always want to know if they meant to do it. Never do we accept the excuse that “It’s not my fault; I wanted to do it!” as if they are blamable if they did not mean to do it, and excused if they did mean to do it. The reason we want to know whether they meant us any harm is because we blame them if they acted out of an intention to harm, and we excuse them if they had no intention to harm us. Moral inability consists in disinclination and never excuses a person from disobedience.
Moral rules can only work if they produce motive to excite and determine the will. The stronger the conscience, the stronger the motive to do good, and the more inclined the will is to act morally. If moral rules did not incline the will to act morally, then moral rules could have no effect. They would be pointless. It follows that morality is incompatible with a liberty consisting of indifference.
Part 6
If commands do not bias the will, then they become superfluous. If we act out of indifference, then we are not motivated by any inclination to do right or wrong, and since we lack any intention of doing right or wrong, we cannot be worthy of praise or blame if we do them. If we do any of the requirements of commands at all, it is merely by a fluke, and therefore cannot really be called obedience. Nor can it be called disobedience if we happen not to do them. It would be superfluous, then, to require anything of people who remain in a state of indifference.
A command may require something of the will which the will is not inclined to do. If the will is not inclined to obey, then it has a moral inability to obey due to a lack of inclination. If evil inclinations excuse us from doing evil, then the stronger our desire to do evil, the less responsible we are for doing it. The more wicked a person is, the less we should blame him for doing wicked things.
This is contrary to common sense. Whenever we are injured because of what somebody else did, we always want to know if they meant to do it. Never do we accept the excuse that “It’s not my fault; I wanted to do it!” as if they are blamable if they did not mean to do it, and excused if they did mean to do it. The reason we want to know whether they meant us any harm is because we blame them if they acted out of an intention to harm, and we excuse them if they had no intention to harm us. Moral inability consists in disinclination and never excuses a person from disobedience.
Moral rules can only work if they produce motive to excite and determine the will. The stronger the conscience, the stronger the motive to do good, and the more inclined the will is to act morally. If moral rules did not incline the will to act morally, then moral rules could have no effect. They would be pointless. It follows that morality is incompatible with a liberty consisting of indifference.
Part 6
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)