Rights can be had either by individuals or by groups. When it comes to the right to marry, should we think of it as a right that a couple has, or should we think of it as a right that individuals have?
The right of individuals to marry
If we think of it as a right that individuals have, then I don't think the same-sex marriage debate is a matter of equal rights. The reason is because each individual, whether gay or straight, has the same right already. Whether you are gay or straight, you have the right to marry somebody of the opposite gender. So gay people and straight people don't differ in their individual rights; rather, they differ in their desires. Gay people don't want to marry people of the opposite gender.
But gay people could construe the right differently. Instead of being "the right to marry a person of the opposite gender," which a gay person would have to admit to sharing along with straight people, they could construe it as, "a right to marry the person of your choice," or "the right to marry the person you love." In that case, perhaps straight people do have a right that gay people don't have.
But I'm skeptical of that since not even straight people can marry just anybody they choose or anybody they love. And most gay people would agree. If we construe the right as being "the right to marry who you love," and if we wanted every individual to have that right equally, then we would have to allow incest.
Now, I know a lot of people just got up in arms about that because you think you've heard this argument before. But I can almost guarantee you that if you're feeling hot under the collar right now, you're probably just having a knee jerk reaction, not to what I actually just said, but to what you imagine I must've said. You've heard something similar that was offensive, and you've read that into what I said. But what I said is actually quite logical and nothing to be offended by it all. I'm taking the supposed right to marry who we love to its logical conclusion.
1. Each person should have the right to marry who they love.
2. A brother and a sister love each other.
3. Therefore, a brother and a sister should have the right to marry each other.
The only way to reject the conclusion is to reject the right spelled out in the first premise. So take a chill pill. I'm tired of coddling people who are unable or unwilling to think carefully and simply react in emotional outbursts like silly children. If you're still offended, I don't care. It's up to you to get a grip. I've done my part.
In summary, if the individual's right to marry is construed as a right to marry a person of the opposite gender, then gay and straight people already have equal rights. But if it's a right to marry the person you love, then gay and straight people do not have equal rights, and hardly anybody thinks they should.
The right of couples to marry
If the right to marry belongs to groups or couples rather than individuals, then it is true that gay couples do not have the same right to marry as straight couples. In that case, the debate on same sex marriage is a matter of equal rights.
However, not even same sex marriage advocate really want there to be equal rights granted to groups or couples because if there were, then it would have to be granted to every group or couple that wanted to get married. Otherwise, the right would not be equal. They would have to allow polygamy and incest marriages.
Did you just get offended again? I don't care. It follows. Deal with it.
Think about other equal rights we think of as applying to kinds of groups. Equal rights between races means that people have the same rights regardless of their race. If white people and black people had the same rights, but not Asians, then we would not have racial equality. So if the right to marry were granted to couples, the only way we could have equal rights is if the right were granted equally to every kind of couple. But hardly anybody really advocates that.
So the same sex marriage debate cannot be a matter of equal rights granted to couples or groups.
Then why construe the debate as a matter of equal rights?
I think the primary reason the same sex marriage debate is framed in terms of equal rights is that pragmatically, it's a good idea. It works. We have a strong belief in equal rights in this country because if the long hard battle for equal rights between men and women and racial equality. We have a past of inequality that we're ashamed of. So if we can frame any right in terms of "equal rights" is going to be rhetorically effective. It's effective because it's very emotionally appealing and it makes anybody who opposes it look like a bigot. That lessens the need to argue.
Maybe pro-lifers should frame the abortion debate in terms of equal rights. The unborn should have an equal right to life along with the rest of us. But I digress.
What's this debate really about?
What this debate is really about is the fact that same sex couples want to get married, and for two reasons--respect and benefits. If people want something, and there's no reason to deny it to them, then you should give it to them. It's as simple as that. That's what the same sex marriage advocates should be arguing.
1. If people want something, and there's no reason to deny it to them, then you should give it to them.
2. Same sex couples want to get married.
3. There's no reason to deny same sex couples the right to marry each other.
4. Therefore, same sex couples ought to have the right to marry each other.
Somebody who wanted to defend same sex marriage while opposing incest and polygamy could say that this argument won't work in their case since if you plug them in, there are reasons to deny the third premise. For example, polygamy leads to oppression of women as well as poverty which ends up being a burden on the state. It also makes divorce and inheritance a nightmare. Incest leads to children with birth defects. Personally, I don't think those arguments are all that great, but I won't get into that. The point is that this argument allows same sex advocates to consistently support same sex marriage while opposing polygamy and incest.
Somebody who opposes same sex marriage could attack the first or third premise, and I've heard them do both.
The first premise: If people want something, and there's no reason to deny it to them, then you should give it to them.
The first premise is attacked by claiming that it isn't enough for there to be no reason to deny something to somebody. There has to be some positive reason for why you should give it to them other than the fact that they want it. The state has to have an interest in it. The reason the government is involved in marriage at all is because marriage is the institution where families are created and the next generation comes into being. Families are necessary for societies, and regulating marriage is how the government protects families. By giving married people certain rights and benefits, it encourages people to stay together, and that's good for society.
The state has no interest in regulating same sex marriage because it is impossible for same sex couples to have children. While same sex advocates point out that it's impossible for some opposite sex couples to have children as well, opponents respond that opposite sex couples are at least the kind of relationship capable of producing children, so it's the kind of relationship that the state has an interest in regulating. I'm not going to go into the merits of either of these responses.
The third premise: There's no reason to deny same sex couples the right to marry each other.
I have heard many same sex marriage supporters say that they can't even imagine why somebody would oppose same sex marriage other than because of their religious beliefs. However, same sex marriage opponents have offered many reasons.
1. It encourages the kind of relationship that leads to early death.
2. It would entail the right to adopt children, which would result in those children being denied either a father or a mother.
3. "Same-sex marriage" is a contradiction in terms since marriage is a union between a man and a woman.
4. It will weaken the institution of marriage.
Of those three, I think the second one is the strongest, but the third one is the one I most often hear. An advocate of same sex marriage would obviously not find any of them to be an adequate reason to deny same sex couples the right to marry. Most flat out deny 4.
What about civil unions and domestic partnerships?
I used to think civil unions gave same sex couples the same rights as married couples, but just denied them the "married" label. Back in 2008 when I was on that Alaska cruise, I met this guy named Cole who was gay. When he noticed the badge I was wearing for the apologetics conference, he knew right away that I was a Christian. We ended up having a long talk about gay rights and the motivations of the gay community. I asked him why civil unions were not enough if they gave gay couples the exact same rights as married couples. He said it wasn't just the rights they wanted. They also wanted the dignity, respect, and recognition that the "married" label carries with it. They wanted public approval.
But I heard an interesting argument recently in a debate between Andrew Sullivan and Douglas Wilson.
Sullivan, the one arguing for same sex marriage, made an argument against civil unions and domestic partnerships. He said that if we have civil unions and domestic partnerships, the right would have to be extended to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals. That would create "marriage light" because it wouldn't require as much responsibility, commitment, or legal force. That would weaken marriage because many heterosexuals would prefer "marriage light" to the full commitment and responsibility involved in traditional marriage.
Notice that this argument only works if civil unions and domestic partners do not have the same rights and responsibilities as married couples. That was news to me.
He argued, on the other hand, that allowing same sex marriage would strengthen society. In general, men who are married are monogamous and men who are not married are promiscuous. That is true whether men are gay or straight. If men are not allowed to marry, they will have as many sex partners as they can, and that is bad for society. For one thing, it causes diseases to spread quicker and more widely. Allowing gay people to marry would be good for society because it would reduce the amount of promiscuity out there.
He also argued (half jokingly, I'm sure), that if homosexuality is immoral, then we ought to encourage same sex couples to marry. Why? Because marriage kills sex. I thought that was funny. Of course he doesn't think homosexuality is immoral. He was just telling people who do that they ought to support same sex marriage.
What's the real reason Christians oppose same sex marriage
In spite of all the legal and pragmatic reasons that Christians give for why we should not allow same sex marriage, I am fairly confident that the real reason they oppose it is because they think it's immoral. They don't want to have to recognize immorality, and they don't want to have to be forced to respect it.
They're also afraid that as homosexuality becomes more and more acceptable in society, Christianity will become less and less acceptable. That will make it harder for Christians to find employment because if being anti-gay is seen to be morally equivalent to being racist, then society will feel perfectly justified in marginalizing Christians for their religious beliefs and denying them employment because of it.
I think that is a legitimate concern. Of course I'm sure the homosexual community could care less. One of my friends on facebook recently posted a link to a Christian complaining about being "persecuted" because of his opposition to same-sex marriage, and he said, "They can dish it out, but they can't take it." Although I don't think things have risen to the level of persecution yet, I would not be surprised if it rises to that level within the next fifty years, and nobody will think Christians are being wronged. Christians will be regarded as haters, bigots, and the bane of society, and discriminating against them will become perfectly acceptable. We do seem to be headed in that direction.
Thursday, March 28, 2013
Sunday, January 13, 2013
Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, revisited
I thought of another objection to Plantinga's "Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism." If you'll recall, I blogged on this before.
Plantinga's argument hingest on the fact that for any kind of adaptive behavior you can think of, you can think of a combination of a false belief and a desire that will result in that behavior. Since false beliefs can result in adaptive behavior just as well as true beliefs, and since natural selection is determined by beliefs only insofar as those beliefs affect behavior, then the probability that evolution would result in reliable belief-producing cognitive faculties is low or inscrutible, provided that naturalism is true (in which case there are no gods who preordained or directed with the evolutionary process).
One of the primary objections people raise against Plantinga's argument is that while false beliefs can result in adaptive behavior just as well as true beliefs, you cannot have systematically false beliefs that will result in adaptive behavior. My objection is similar but with more detail.
All of the beliefs and desires we might imagine that could produce adaptive behavior are derived beliefs. That is, they are inferred from observation, experience, laws of inference, and foundational a priori beliefs. It does not seem possible that all of our behavior-inducing beliefs could've been built into our brains from the get go and still be adaptive since the environment is in a constant state of change. So the only way beliefs and desires could result in adaptive behavior is if they are derived (at least in part) from our interaction with our environment through some process of reasoning. The only kind of knowledge that could be built into a brain to enable it to form beliefs are a priori knowledge, including some kind of laws of inference.
Right now, it seems like we are able to learn true information about the world because our built in beliefs about the laws of inference are true. The laws of inductive and deductive reasoning are reliable guides to truth when combined with true premises and reliable observations.
But there are only a couple of ways things could have been different. One way is that we could've been born without having any built in knowledge of laws of inference. Another way is that we could've been born with completely different laws of inference.
If we were built without any laws of inference, then there would be no way for the brain to produce consistent beliefs. One day, I may see a tiger and think tigers are dangerous. Another day, I may see a tiger and think tigers are safe. All of my beliefs would be random, arbitrary, and in a constant state of change. So there is no way that I could survive. I'd be weeded out of the gene pool. I couldn't have consistently adaptive beliefs because I wouldn't have consistent beliefs at all.
If we were built with different laws of inference, then the types of beliefs we came to might be consistent, but they couldn't be consistently adaptive. The reason is because the only way to come up with combinations of desires and beliefs that are adaptive is to be random. It's easy to think of random combinations of beliefs and desires that are adaptive for any situation. But it would be a great coincidence if, given some fixed laws of fallacious inference, the beliefs we came to usually turned out to work in our favor even though they were false
It is understandable why sound laws of inference would tend to produce beliefs that are adaptive. It's because, in general, true beliefs are adaptive. But false beliefs are not adaptive in general. So if we were built with fallacious laws of inferences, they could not consistently produce adaptive beliefs, even if some of the wrong beliefs were adaptive.
Since almost all true beliefs are adaptive, and since most false beliefs are not adaptive, it stands to reason that natural selection would be more likely to produce minds with built in valid laws of inference rather than invalid laws of inference.
Plantinga's witch illustration doesn't address this objection. The witch illustration is meant to be an example of a systematically false beliefs that are nevertheless adaptive.
**Edit: Jan 13, 2013**
I came up with this today, posted it on facebook, then decided to add it here:
I was just thinking about how all animals seem to have a survival instinct. But what if, instead, we all had a suicidal instinct? You'd think our species would become extinct. We could survive if there were a variation in our species in which a few people here and there had a survival instinct. Over several generations, that instinct would become dominant, and very few people would want to commit suicide.
But I was just thinking that's not necessarily so. What if, in addition to having a suicidal instict, we also had an innate belief that (1) the best way to commit suicide is to eat poisonous food, and (2) all the food that we would ordinarily think is good for us is actually poisonous. In that case, we would instinctively be drawn to food that is good for us, thinking it was poisonous and hoping to die by eating it. But instead of dying, we'd survive and flourish. So it seems possible that we could be born with unreliable belief-producing falculties, and still survive. Natural selection wouldn't necessarily select for true beliefs or reliable brains.
Of course, you might think if that were the case that people would be able to learn from experience that their innate beliefs were false. But we could only learn that if we were also built with the innate belief that past experience can tell us what to expect in the future. As David Hume showed in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, it's not possible to prove that supposition without engaging in circular reasoning. So maybe if we were born without that belief, then our past experience of always remaining healthy after eating "poisonous" food would not be able to tell us that the food wasn't poisonous after all. So it still seems possible that natural selection might result in us having unreliable belief-producing cognitive faculties.
But I question whether it would be possible to survive without the belief that the future will resemble the past. I'm having a hard time coming up with a hypothetical scenario in which people are unable to learn from past experience, yet still survive and thrive. Any ideas?
Plantinga's argument hingest on the fact that for any kind of adaptive behavior you can think of, you can think of a combination of a false belief and a desire that will result in that behavior. Since false beliefs can result in adaptive behavior just as well as true beliefs, and since natural selection is determined by beliefs only insofar as those beliefs affect behavior, then the probability that evolution would result in reliable belief-producing cognitive faculties is low or inscrutible, provided that naturalism is true (in which case there are no gods who preordained or directed with the evolutionary process).
One of the primary objections people raise against Plantinga's argument is that while false beliefs can result in adaptive behavior just as well as true beliefs, you cannot have systematically false beliefs that will result in adaptive behavior. My objection is similar but with more detail.
All of the beliefs and desires we might imagine that could produce adaptive behavior are derived beliefs. That is, they are inferred from observation, experience, laws of inference, and foundational a priori beliefs. It does not seem possible that all of our behavior-inducing beliefs could've been built into our brains from the get go and still be adaptive since the environment is in a constant state of change. So the only way beliefs and desires could result in adaptive behavior is if they are derived (at least in part) from our interaction with our environment through some process of reasoning. The only kind of knowledge that could be built into a brain to enable it to form beliefs are a priori knowledge, including some kind of laws of inference.
Right now, it seems like we are able to learn true information about the world because our built in beliefs about the laws of inference are true. The laws of inductive and deductive reasoning are reliable guides to truth when combined with true premises and reliable observations.
But there are only a couple of ways things could have been different. One way is that we could've been born without having any built in knowledge of laws of inference. Another way is that we could've been born with completely different laws of inference.
If we were built without any laws of inference, then there would be no way for the brain to produce consistent beliefs. One day, I may see a tiger and think tigers are dangerous. Another day, I may see a tiger and think tigers are safe. All of my beliefs would be random, arbitrary, and in a constant state of change. So there is no way that I could survive. I'd be weeded out of the gene pool. I couldn't have consistently adaptive beliefs because I wouldn't have consistent beliefs at all.
If we were built with different laws of inference, then the types of beliefs we came to might be consistent, but they couldn't be consistently adaptive. The reason is because the only way to come up with combinations of desires and beliefs that are adaptive is to be random. It's easy to think of random combinations of beliefs and desires that are adaptive for any situation. But it would be a great coincidence if, given some fixed laws of fallacious inference, the beliefs we came to usually turned out to work in our favor even though they were false
It is understandable why sound laws of inference would tend to produce beliefs that are adaptive. It's because, in general, true beliefs are adaptive. But false beliefs are not adaptive in general. So if we were built with fallacious laws of inferences, they could not consistently produce adaptive beliefs, even if some of the wrong beliefs were adaptive.
Since almost all true beliefs are adaptive, and since most false beliefs are not adaptive, it stands to reason that natural selection would be more likely to produce minds with built in valid laws of inference rather than invalid laws of inference.
Plantinga's witch illustration doesn't address this objection. The witch illustration is meant to be an example of a systematically false beliefs that are nevertheless adaptive.
**Edit: Jan 13, 2013**
I came up with this today, posted it on facebook, then decided to add it here:
I was just thinking about how all animals seem to have a survival instinct. But what if, instead, we all had a suicidal instinct? You'd think our species would become extinct. We could survive if there were a variation in our species in which a few people here and there had a survival instinct. Over several generations, that instinct would become dominant, and very few people would want to commit suicide.
But I was just thinking that's not necessarily so. What if, in addition to having a suicidal instict, we also had an innate belief that (1) the best way to commit suicide is to eat poisonous food, and (2) all the food that we would ordinarily think is good for us is actually poisonous. In that case, we would instinctively be drawn to food that is good for us, thinking it was poisonous and hoping to die by eating it. But instead of dying, we'd survive and flourish. So it seems possible that we could be born with unreliable belief-producing falculties, and still survive. Natural selection wouldn't necessarily select for true beliefs or reliable brains.
Of course, you might think if that were the case that people would be able to learn from experience that their innate beliefs were false. But we could only learn that if we were also built with the innate belief that past experience can tell us what to expect in the future. As David Hume showed in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, it's not possible to prove that supposition without engaging in circular reasoning. So maybe if we were born without that belief, then our past experience of always remaining healthy after eating "poisonous" food would not be able to tell us that the food wasn't poisonous after all. So it still seems possible that natural selection might result in us having unreliable belief-producing cognitive faculties.
But I question whether it would be possible to survive without the belief that the future will resemble the past. I'm having a hard time coming up with a hypothetical scenario in which people are unable to learn from past experience, yet still survive and thrive. Any ideas?
Wednesday, November 28, 2012
my moral epistemology
STR Place used to have this deal where every Tuesday they'd post a challenge that Christians (mostly young Christians) could attempt to answer, then the following Thursday (ideally, but not actually in every case), Brett Kunkle would respond to the challenge and say what he thought of everybody else's responses.
One day, Amy Hall posted a challenge about how intuition can't prove objective moral values. The challenge came from a fellow named "Doubting Eric" who originally brought up the challenge on Twitter. Brett came along a few days later and posted his response to the challenge.
Doubting Eric and I discussed the topic in the comment section, and I just wanted to post one of my comments here because it explains some of my moral epistemology.
*****
Doubting Eric,
Thanks for your response. In the interest of making this conversation manageable, I’m going to try to keep my response short.
First let me so that of course I don’t take your disagreement with my view as a personal attack on me. That goes without saying, and I’m sure you don’t take my challenges to you to be personal attacks either. We’re debating our disagreements on the nature of morality, and that’s it.
This is all not part of the objection I made that started this whole discussion, so I don’t want to argue about how inconsistent I might be living as an atheist.
The reason I asked you all those questions about your post on homosexuality is because I think the things you said there revealed that even though you deny the existence of objective morals, you still perceive them as if they were objective. They at least APPEAR objective to you. I think that in unguarded moments, when the subject is not the existence of objective morals, you do believe in them. Your statements make no sense unless you do. For example, you hold other people to them. You expect other people to know about them and to live by them, and when they don’t, you behave as if those people have done something they ought not to have done. You think the morals you perceive actually apply to other people. But if they are merely subjective, then they do NOT apply to other people. So even though you deny that morals are objective, they at least APPEAR objective to you.
I think you are just like a person who, although they perceive an external world that appears to be real, they nevertheless think it’s all in their head. A person who denies the existence of the external world does not stop perceiving it as if it were real. They just deny that what appears to be so really IS so.
“Why should I think our moral sense is a source of a priori knowledge?”
Yes, that is the central question in this discussion. Let me explain in a little more detail why I think our moral perceptions belong in our a priori foundation of knowledge.
All a priori knowledge is knowledge we have that isn’t derived from anything else. We don’t infer it from other knowledge we have. Rather, we know it simply by reflecting inward and grasping it or “seeing” it.
But there are three kinds of a priori knowledge…
1. Things we know because of our first person awareness.
If you think of a number between one and ten, you know immediately what number you’re thinking of just because you’re thinking of it. You don’t need evidence to tell you what number you’re thinking of because you know it directly. You know that you’re thinking, feeling, and perceiving, and you know what you’re thinking, feeling, and perceiving simply because you have first person private access to the content of your own mind.
2. Things we know because they are rationally grasped.
The previous category included things we know about the content of our own minds. But this category includes what we know about reality outside of our minds. These include math, geometry, and the laws of logic. We know that 2 + 2 = 4. We know that if straight lines intersect, the opposite angles must be equal. We know that if two propositions contradict each other, they can’t both be true at the same time and in the same sense. The laws of logic are the basis upon which everything else is proved, so the laws themselves can’t be proved. To attempt proving them would be to engage in circular reasoning. But to understand them is to believe them. Likewise, with geometry, you can simply reflect on something and know with certainty that it’s true. You don’t have to test anything to discover that opposite angles of intersecting lines are equal. You don’t have to get a bunch of examples, measure each one, and discover there’s a high probability that it’s true in every case. You can just “see” that it’s universally true merely by reflecting on it and rationally grasping it. The same is true with addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
3. Things we know because that’s just the way a normally functioning mind works.
There are many things that go in this category, including the uniformity of nature, that our senses give us true information about the external world, that our memories give us true information about the past, that there are other minds, that ought implies can, that you have an enduring self, that Ockham’s razor is a valid thumb rule, that time exists, and that causation exists. None of these things can be proved. If you’re familiar with David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, you’ll know why. Take the uniformity of nature, for example. The uniformity of nature is what tells you that the future will resemble the past or that experience can tell you what the world is like. It’s what allows you to engage in inductive reasoning. It’s what allows you to learn from experience. It’s what allows you to calculate probabilities. It’s what allows you to extrapolate from what you observe to what you don’t observe. The entire scientific method depends on this principle. It’s why testing things in the lab have relevance to the way the world works outside the lab. But it can’t be proved. If you appeal to past experience to say that since it’s always worked in the past that it must be the way things really are or that we should expect it to continue to work in the future, you are begging the question since you’re using the principle to justify the principle.
What all three of these categories have in common is that they are a priori. 1 differs from 2 and 3 in the fact that it’s knowledge about the self whereas 2 and 3 are knowledge about reality outside the self. 3 differs from 1 and 2 in that it’s possible to be wrong about the items in 3, but it’s not possible to be wrong about the items in 1 and 2.
I believe morality goes in the third category because it shares certain properties in common with the items in 3, which properties are the very reason they go in that category. Those properties include:
a. None of them can be proved.
b. It’s possible to be wrong about each of them.
c. Every normally functioning mind apprehends them.
d. It’s prima facie unreasonable to deny them.
All four of these things are true about morality. Morality cannot be proved. It’s possible that there are no objective morals, even though we perceive them. Every normal person perceives them (which is why we consider sociopathy to be a mental illness). It’s prima facie unreasonable to deny them, which is evident in the fact that we all find it counter-intuitive to deny them and none of us can live consistently with the belief that they aren’t real.
Now let me respond to some of your objections.
However, since we can’t test a priori knowledge against anything to see if it is true, it could actually be untrue.
If you’ve followed me so far, you can see that this statement is true in the case of the third category of a priori knowledge, but it’s not true in the case of the first two categories. For example, it is possible that I could be wrong in thinking I’ve got a computer on my lap (I could be dreaming or plugged into the Matrix), but it’s not possible for me to be wrong that I’m at least perceiving what I take to be a computer in my lap. It is possible that I just now came into existence and all the memories of what appears to be a past that actually happened were merely built in when I came into existence. But it is not possible for the law of non-contradiction to be true.
I’ve granted that it’s possible our belief in morality is wrong. But the mere possibility of being wrong doesn’t make it a reasonable thing to deny. After all, the mere possibility that my sensory perceptions are all in my head doesn’t make it reasonable to believe there’s no external world. The mere possibility of solipsism doesn’t make solipsism reasonable. Now, I think it’s unreasonable to deny the existence of objective morality. I think we should assume the world is just as it appears to be unless we have good reason to deny that it is. This is just common sense realism. If it looks like there’s a difference between right and wrong, then you should assume there is a difference between right and wrong unless you have good reason to think otherwise. Mere possibility isn’t sufficient reason for doubt.
I want to know why I should think that moral intuition is a sort of knowledge that cannot be questioned.
I’m not saying it’s knowledge that can’t be questioned. While we can be certain about the items in 1 and 2, it’s at least possible that we’re wrong about the items in 3. What I’m saying is that it’s more reasonable to affirm them than to deny them.
Is it a source of reliable knowledge?
Yes. All of the items in category 3 are known in the same way. If you doubt one, you bring the others into question since to doubt them is to doubt the reliability of that particular way of knowing. So if you doubt morality, you throw the external world into doubt. If it’s reasonable to believe in the external world, then it’s just as reasonable to believe in morality.
Concerning the external world, you said we can justify it because we have independent attestation from our various senses. Our sense of sight, smell, feel, hearing, and taste all tell us the same thing. But that won’t do because all of these perceptions are perceptions of one and the same mind. Your perceptions agree just as much when you’re asleep as they do when you’re awake. And they would agree just as much if you were plugged into the Matrix. The are not actually independent of each other since they are all products of the same mind. All that follows from the fact that they agree with each other is that your mind is consistent.
Can the law of non-contradiction be tested independently? No, it needs itself for the idea of “testing” to have any meaning.
I hope you don’t doubt the law of non-contradiction just because it can’t be tested. I think that you not only know the law of non-contradiction is true, but you know it with such absolute certainty that it’s not even possible for you to be wrong about it.
That’s about all I have to say.
One day, Amy Hall posted a challenge about how intuition can't prove objective moral values. The challenge came from a fellow named "Doubting Eric" who originally brought up the challenge on Twitter. Brett came along a few days later and posted his response to the challenge.
Doubting Eric and I discussed the topic in the comment section, and I just wanted to post one of my comments here because it explains some of my moral epistemology.
*****
Doubting Eric,
Thanks for your response. In the interest of making this conversation manageable, I’m going to try to keep my response short.
First let me so that of course I don’t take your disagreement with my view as a personal attack on me. That goes without saying, and I’m sure you don’t take my challenges to you to be personal attacks either. We’re debating our disagreements on the nature of morality, and that’s it.
This is all not part of the objection I made that started this whole discussion, so I don’t want to argue about how inconsistent I might be living as an atheist.
The reason I asked you all those questions about your post on homosexuality is because I think the things you said there revealed that even though you deny the existence of objective morals, you still perceive them as if they were objective. They at least APPEAR objective to you. I think that in unguarded moments, when the subject is not the existence of objective morals, you do believe in them. Your statements make no sense unless you do. For example, you hold other people to them. You expect other people to know about them and to live by them, and when they don’t, you behave as if those people have done something they ought not to have done. You think the morals you perceive actually apply to other people. But if they are merely subjective, then they do NOT apply to other people. So even though you deny that morals are objective, they at least APPEAR objective to you.
I think you are just like a person who, although they perceive an external world that appears to be real, they nevertheless think it’s all in their head. A person who denies the existence of the external world does not stop perceiving it as if it were real. They just deny that what appears to be so really IS so.
“Why should I think our moral sense is a source of a priori knowledge?”
Yes, that is the central question in this discussion. Let me explain in a little more detail why I think our moral perceptions belong in our a priori foundation of knowledge.
All a priori knowledge is knowledge we have that isn’t derived from anything else. We don’t infer it from other knowledge we have. Rather, we know it simply by reflecting inward and grasping it or “seeing” it.
But there are three kinds of a priori knowledge…
1. Things we know because of our first person awareness.
If you think of a number between one and ten, you know immediately what number you’re thinking of just because you’re thinking of it. You don’t need evidence to tell you what number you’re thinking of because you know it directly. You know that you’re thinking, feeling, and perceiving, and you know what you’re thinking, feeling, and perceiving simply because you have first person private access to the content of your own mind.
2. Things we know because they are rationally grasped.
The previous category included things we know about the content of our own minds. But this category includes what we know about reality outside of our minds. These include math, geometry, and the laws of logic. We know that 2 + 2 = 4. We know that if straight lines intersect, the opposite angles must be equal. We know that if two propositions contradict each other, they can’t both be true at the same time and in the same sense. The laws of logic are the basis upon which everything else is proved, so the laws themselves can’t be proved. To attempt proving them would be to engage in circular reasoning. But to understand them is to believe them. Likewise, with geometry, you can simply reflect on something and know with certainty that it’s true. You don’t have to test anything to discover that opposite angles of intersecting lines are equal. You don’t have to get a bunch of examples, measure each one, and discover there’s a high probability that it’s true in every case. You can just “see” that it’s universally true merely by reflecting on it and rationally grasping it. The same is true with addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
3. Things we know because that’s just the way a normally functioning mind works.
There are many things that go in this category, including the uniformity of nature, that our senses give us true information about the external world, that our memories give us true information about the past, that there are other minds, that ought implies can, that you have an enduring self, that Ockham’s razor is a valid thumb rule, that time exists, and that causation exists. None of these things can be proved. If you’re familiar with David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, you’ll know why. Take the uniformity of nature, for example. The uniformity of nature is what tells you that the future will resemble the past or that experience can tell you what the world is like. It’s what allows you to engage in inductive reasoning. It’s what allows you to learn from experience. It’s what allows you to calculate probabilities. It’s what allows you to extrapolate from what you observe to what you don’t observe. The entire scientific method depends on this principle. It’s why testing things in the lab have relevance to the way the world works outside the lab. But it can’t be proved. If you appeal to past experience to say that since it’s always worked in the past that it must be the way things really are or that we should expect it to continue to work in the future, you are begging the question since you’re using the principle to justify the principle.
What all three of these categories have in common is that they are a priori. 1 differs from 2 and 3 in the fact that it’s knowledge about the self whereas 2 and 3 are knowledge about reality outside the self. 3 differs from 1 and 2 in that it’s possible to be wrong about the items in 3, but it’s not possible to be wrong about the items in 1 and 2.
I believe morality goes in the third category because it shares certain properties in common with the items in 3, which properties are the very reason they go in that category. Those properties include:
a. None of them can be proved.
b. It’s possible to be wrong about each of them.
c. Every normally functioning mind apprehends them.
d. It’s prima facie unreasonable to deny them.
All four of these things are true about morality. Morality cannot be proved. It’s possible that there are no objective morals, even though we perceive them. Every normal person perceives them (which is why we consider sociopathy to be a mental illness). It’s prima facie unreasonable to deny them, which is evident in the fact that we all find it counter-intuitive to deny them and none of us can live consistently with the belief that they aren’t real.
Now let me respond to some of your objections.
However, since we can’t test a priori knowledge against anything to see if it is true, it could actually be untrue.
If you’ve followed me so far, you can see that this statement is true in the case of the third category of a priori knowledge, but it’s not true in the case of the first two categories. For example, it is possible that I could be wrong in thinking I’ve got a computer on my lap (I could be dreaming or plugged into the Matrix), but it’s not possible for me to be wrong that I’m at least perceiving what I take to be a computer in my lap. It is possible that I just now came into existence and all the memories of what appears to be a past that actually happened were merely built in when I came into existence. But it is not possible for the law of non-contradiction to be true.
I’ve granted that it’s possible our belief in morality is wrong. But the mere possibility of being wrong doesn’t make it a reasonable thing to deny. After all, the mere possibility that my sensory perceptions are all in my head doesn’t make it reasonable to believe there’s no external world. The mere possibility of solipsism doesn’t make solipsism reasonable. Now, I think it’s unreasonable to deny the existence of objective morality. I think we should assume the world is just as it appears to be unless we have good reason to deny that it is. This is just common sense realism. If it looks like there’s a difference between right and wrong, then you should assume there is a difference between right and wrong unless you have good reason to think otherwise. Mere possibility isn’t sufficient reason for doubt.
I want to know why I should think that moral intuition is a sort of knowledge that cannot be questioned.
I’m not saying it’s knowledge that can’t be questioned. While we can be certain about the items in 1 and 2, it’s at least possible that we’re wrong about the items in 3. What I’m saying is that it’s more reasonable to affirm them than to deny them.
Is it a source of reliable knowledge?
Yes. All of the items in category 3 are known in the same way. If you doubt one, you bring the others into question since to doubt them is to doubt the reliability of that particular way of knowing. So if you doubt morality, you throw the external world into doubt. If it’s reasonable to believe in the external world, then it’s just as reasonable to believe in morality.
Concerning the external world, you said we can justify it because we have independent attestation from our various senses. Our sense of sight, smell, feel, hearing, and taste all tell us the same thing. But that won’t do because all of these perceptions are perceptions of one and the same mind. Your perceptions agree just as much when you’re asleep as they do when you’re awake. And they would agree just as much if you were plugged into the Matrix. The are not actually independent of each other since they are all products of the same mind. All that follows from the fact that they agree with each other is that your mind is consistent.
Can the law of non-contradiction be tested independently? No, it needs itself for the idea of “testing” to have any meaning.
I hope you don’t doubt the law of non-contradiction just because it can’t be tested. I think that you not only know the law of non-contradiction is true, but you know it with such absolute certainty that it’s not even possible for you to be wrong about it.
That’s about all I have to say.
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
The use of ridicule in atheistic evangelism
There was a time when people valued a good productive conversation in which ideas were exchanged, people understood each other, and arguments were challenging. Whenever these conversations turned to anger, ridicule, and vitriol, it was thought that the conversation had degenerated.
As long as I've been involved in apologetics, there have always been people who seemed to be capable of nothing more than spouting vitriol, invective, and insult. You couldn't reason with them. You couldn't have a civil or rational conversation with them. The internet is still full of people like that. YouTube is overrun by them.
But things have changed. Ridicule and emotional outbursts are no longer limited to random people on the internet. Now, even the most intelligent and educated atheists are advocating it. Here is Richard Dawkins encouraging his followers to ridicule Christians (especially Catholics):
When I first started noticing intellectuals engaging in this kind of behavior, I lost respect for them. I had a hard time taking them seriously. I automatically assumed that if somebody was acting that way that they were unsophisticated and didn't have much of value to contribute. It made me not want to read their books because I didn't value their input. I assumed they were just like the people I had run into on message boards and YouTube.
And that made me curious why they would behave that way. It seemed counter-productive. In The God Delusion, Dawkins said his purpose was to convert religious people into atheists (p. 28; my review). I couldn't understand why he would advocate ridicule if he really wanted to win Christians over. It seemed like that would just turn them off and make them not even want to read his book or hear his arguments. My suspicion was that Dawkins had been humiliated for years by people (even his fellow atheists), calling him a coward for refusing to debate William Lane Craig, and he was just lashing out. He wanted other people to join him in order to reinforce his feeling of superiority.
But then I read a couple of blog entries on Debunking Christianity by John Loftus. The first one was called "The era of the angry atheist is over." He cited Richard Dawkins as early as 2002 saying, "Let's all stop being so damned respectful." Then he called it a "strategy." The goal, apparently, was to wake people up--to get them talking and debating, to get fence-sitters to change their minds, to get atheists to be open about their atheism. Loftus, who calls himself a pragmatist, argued in this blog entry that the era of the "angry atheist" is (or ought to be) over because the strategy no longer works. It alienates Christians. But then he said there are still plenty of reasons to engage in ridicule because, as Richard Carrier argued, "it does have an effect."
The second blog entry I read by Loftus was called "Christian scholars are defending me? Now I know I'm doomed." This one was even more revealing. In this piece, Loftus cites Jeffrey Jay Lowder and Richard Carrier who disagree on the usefulness of ridicule. Lowder thinks it is counter-productive, and Carrier thinks it is productive. Loftus' own position is that it's kind of productive, but not if it's over-used. The purpose, according to Carrier, is to get people to change their minds by shaming them into it. Loftus gives a lucid explanation of how it works:
What PZ Myers and Richard Dawkins are counting on when they use the Courtier's Reply are numbers. In a society where there are more non-believers than believers, that reply would take its toll on believers because people gravitate toward the opinions of others. That is to say, people are conforming creatures, most of us. We don't want to be viewed as strange, weird, or people on the fringes of society. So if what we believe is ridiculed by a majority of people then we will seek to resolve our cognitive dissonance by reassessing what we believe because of this ridicule. Ridicule works, but only if there are large numbers of people who do it compared to the numbers of others who believe differently
Loftus himself does not advocate ridicule (at least not to the same degree as Myers, Carrier, and Dawkins), partly because it works by peer pressure rather than reason, which is a bad role model for skepticism, and partly because he thinks it doesn't work that well since atheists don't have enough people to make it effective.
I find this pragmatism very interesting. The goal is to convert people to atheism, but apparently the means aren't that important. Whatever works. It doesn't matter whether you change your mind because reason dictates that you should or if you change your mind just so you can fit in, not feel stupid, be one of the "brights," etc. The important thing is that you're an atheist. If arguments aren't enough, then use peer pressure. I'm surprised that people who pride themselves on their use of reason and their elevation of science and evidence over faith and emotional appeals would think this way.
Tom Gilson and Carson Weitnauer have this Kindle book called True Reason, which is a collection of essays by various people who argue that the New Atheists' attempt to take the intellectual high road is pretentious. I'm inclined to agree with them. If Richard Carrier is right that ridicule works in getting people to convert to atheism, then there are a lot of atheists in this movement who are atheists because they were shamed into it and not because reason is on their side. Think about that the next time you carefully lay out a multi-step logical argument, and the only response you get is, "You're an idiot!"
Friday, September 14, 2012
God doesn't make mistakes
Today on Twitter, the following conversation took place:
[random citizen] to Kristin Chenoweth: I got told I'm going to hell for being gay. This isn't true, is it?
Kristin Chenoweth to [random citizen]: Nope. He doesn't make mistakes.
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: Kristen, do you think ANYBODY goes to hell? Do you think there IS a hell? Do you think Hitler was a mistake?
Kristin Chenoweth to me: Um. Please tell me you're not comparing the two. Don't be cray cray. And try and have a nice day.
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: My point is that the mere fact that God doesn't make mistakes is no reason to think nobody goes to hell. I'm not cray cray. :-)
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: But don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that gay people go to hell; I'm just saying your rationale is fallacious.
After that last comment, she blocked me. I thought I would flesh out my argument here for a couple of reasons: (1) because this "God doesn't make mistakes" argument comes up a lot in this context, and (2) because I may get some heat from some of Kristin's fans, and since there's not enough room on twitter to explain myself, I can explain myself here and post a link there in case anybody says something to me.
Kristin is basically making this argument:
1. Whatever God does, it is not a mistake.
2. God made gay people.
3. Therefore, gay people are not a mistake.
4. If somebody is not a mistake, then they will not go to hell.
5. Therefore, gay people will not go to hell.
The problem is that this argument proves too much. If you take it to its logical conclusion, you would have to conclude either that God did not make Hitler or that Hitler is not going to hell. You can show that by taking Kristin's premises to their logical conclusions, like so:
1. Whatever God does, it is not a mistake.
2'. God made Hitler.
3'. Therefore, Hitler was not a mistake.
4. If somebody is not a mistake, then they will not go to hell.
5'. Therefore, Hitler will not go to hell.
Now, if Kristin insists that Hitler WILL go to hell, then she's either got to deny 2' or 4. She's got to deny either that God made Hitler or that if somebody is not a mistake that they will not go to hell. It is not likely that she will deny that God made Hitler. Being a Christian, Kristen believes that God made everybody. She has no choice, then, but to deny either that Hitler is going to hell or that not being a mistake is any reason to think somebody will not go to hell.
This is just simple logic. Kristen's response in suggesting that I'm "cray cray" for "comparing the two," is also a typical response. But it's not a rational response. It's an emotional response. It's a frequent one that comes up a lot in the context of same sex marriage and other issues dealing with homosexuality, so I better respond to that one, too.
It is true that I made a comparison (or at least an analogy) between gay people and Hitler. But I didn't make any comparison that anybody ought to be offended by. I did not say, for example, that gay people are bad just like Hitler is bad. The only thing I am claiming they have in common is that God created them both. If Kristin agrees with me that God created everybody, then she will have to agree with me that God created both Hitler and gay people since they are all people. There is no reason for any gay people to be offended by that. In fact, I would make the same comparison between myself and Hitler. We were both created by the same God. I am not insulting myself by making this comparison, and I am not insulting gay people by making that comparison either.
Kristin's response is the kind of silliness you get when people emote rather than think.
[random citizen] to Kristin Chenoweth: I got told I'm going to hell for being gay. This isn't true, is it?
Kristin Chenoweth to [random citizen]: Nope. He doesn't make mistakes.
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: Kristen, do you think ANYBODY goes to hell? Do you think there IS a hell? Do you think Hitler was a mistake?
Kristin Chenoweth to me: Um. Please tell me you're not comparing the two. Don't be cray cray. And try and have a nice day.
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: My point is that the mere fact that God doesn't make mistakes is no reason to think nobody goes to hell. I'm not cray cray. :-)
Me to Kristin Chenoweth: But don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that gay people go to hell; I'm just saying your rationale is fallacious.
After that last comment, she blocked me. I thought I would flesh out my argument here for a couple of reasons: (1) because this "God doesn't make mistakes" argument comes up a lot in this context, and (2) because I may get some heat from some of Kristin's fans, and since there's not enough room on twitter to explain myself, I can explain myself here and post a link there in case anybody says something to me.
Kristin is basically making this argument:
1. Whatever God does, it is not a mistake.
2. God made gay people.
3. Therefore, gay people are not a mistake.
4. If somebody is not a mistake, then they will not go to hell.
5. Therefore, gay people will not go to hell.
The problem is that this argument proves too much. If you take it to its logical conclusion, you would have to conclude either that God did not make Hitler or that Hitler is not going to hell. You can show that by taking Kristin's premises to their logical conclusions, like so:
1. Whatever God does, it is not a mistake.
2'. God made Hitler.
3'. Therefore, Hitler was not a mistake.
4. If somebody is not a mistake, then they will not go to hell.
5'. Therefore, Hitler will not go to hell.
Now, if Kristin insists that Hitler WILL go to hell, then she's either got to deny 2' or 4. She's got to deny either that God made Hitler or that if somebody is not a mistake that they will not go to hell. It is not likely that she will deny that God made Hitler. Being a Christian, Kristen believes that God made everybody. She has no choice, then, but to deny either that Hitler is going to hell or that not being a mistake is any reason to think somebody will not go to hell.
This is just simple logic. Kristen's response in suggesting that I'm "cray cray" for "comparing the two," is also a typical response. But it's not a rational response. It's an emotional response. It's a frequent one that comes up a lot in the context of same sex marriage and other issues dealing with homosexuality, so I better respond to that one, too.
It is true that I made a comparison (or at least an analogy) between gay people and Hitler. But I didn't make any comparison that anybody ought to be offended by. I did not say, for example, that gay people are bad just like Hitler is bad. The only thing I am claiming they have in common is that God created them both. If Kristin agrees with me that God created everybody, then she will have to agree with me that God created both Hitler and gay people since they are all people. There is no reason for any gay people to be offended by that. In fact, I would make the same comparison between myself and Hitler. We were both created by the same God. I am not insulting myself by making this comparison, and I am not insulting gay people by making that comparison either.
Kristin's response is the kind of silliness you get when people emote rather than think.
conscience and moral intuition
Up until today, I have thought that conscience and moral intuition were roughly the same thing. But as I was sitting here thinking about it, I noticed a difference. Of course this difference depends on how the words are actually used and what people actually mean by them. After all, words are defined by their use, and maybe people do use them interchangeably. But I don't, which I just noticed as I was reflecting on it. Lemme explain the difference.
Your conscience is what makes you feel incumbency. It makes you feel the weight of your moral obligations. It accuses you and acquits you. It makes you feel guilty when you've done wrong and it makes you feel justified when you've done right.
But your moral intuitions tell you more than that. Your moral intuitions tells you what's right and wrong, not just for you, but for everybody else.
While your conscience can make you feel like you shouldn't do something, your moral intuitions tells you that nobody else should do it either.
I think your conscience is informed by your moral intuition. The reason your conscience makes you feel guilty after an action is because your moral intuition tells you that it was wrong. The reason your conscience makes you feel like you should do something is because your moral intuitions tells you that you should.
This may be why there's this fuzzy connection between feelings and morals. Our conscience is our feeling about morals and our relationship to them, but our moral intuitions are not feelings. That's why it's possible to think something is wrong and not care. It's also why it's possible to feel guilty even when you know you're not guilty.
What do you think?
Related subject: Emotivist objection to arguments for morality
Your conscience is what makes you feel incumbency. It makes you feel the weight of your moral obligations. It accuses you and acquits you. It makes you feel guilty when you've done wrong and it makes you feel justified when you've done right.
But your moral intuitions tell you more than that. Your moral intuitions tells you what's right and wrong, not just for you, but for everybody else.
While your conscience can make you feel like you shouldn't do something, your moral intuitions tells you that nobody else should do it either.
I think your conscience is informed by your moral intuition. The reason your conscience makes you feel guilty after an action is because your moral intuition tells you that it was wrong. The reason your conscience makes you feel like you should do something is because your moral intuitions tells you that you should.
This may be why there's this fuzzy connection between feelings and morals. Our conscience is our feeling about morals and our relationship to them, but our moral intuitions are not feelings. That's why it's possible to think something is wrong and not care. It's also why it's possible to feel guilty even when you know you're not guilty.
What do you think?
Related subject: Emotivist objection to arguments for morality
Monday, August 20, 2012
Todd Akin and why I don't like political discourse
Most of us are fairly reasonable in our every day lives when it comes to every day things. But when it comes to politics, reason is out the window. And this is especially true during election season. Greg Koukl calls it "the silly season," and for good reason.
I don't like to talk about politics with friends (or even with strangers) because there is so much emotion and so little careful thought. Fair-mindedness is completely out the window. The object, it seems, is to demonize your opponent as much as possible with the use of dysphemisms, slander, ad hominem, poisoning the well, insinuation, exaggeration, misrepresentation, and every fallacy in your arsenal. If your opponent says something that could in the least way be taken in more than one way, it is expected that you take the least charitable interpretation and run with it.
That is what is going on with Todd Akin, the republican congressman from Missouri. Everybody is shocked and offended by what he said about rape, pregnancy, and abortion. But there is a slew of misinformation out there about it. For example, one of the earlier articles on CNN claims that Akin said legitimate rape rarely results in pregnancy. The CNN article substantiated their headline with quotes. But then later on, you have this article on Yahoo News claiming that Akin said that legitimate rape cannot make you pregnant. And if you hang out much on the internet, you'll see people running with this false information. It has gone viral. I attempted to correct somebody earlier today, and his response was, "Sorry, no. He says it's impossible - hence a reason abortion is not needed in rape cases. The article is very clear." Once ignorance takes hold, it is stubborn.
Many people are also offended by his use of the phrase, "legitimate rape." Apparently, they are interpreting him as if to say there is such a thing as "illegitimate rape," or that there are different kinds of rape. A more charitable interpretation is that "legitimate rape" is meant to be contrasted with a situation where somebody claims to have been raped when they in fact were not raped. And there is nothing to be offended by in this case because women do sometimes falsely accuse men of rape. I know somebody personally who has done that, and who admitted it. So "legitimate rape" is nothing to be offended by, yet people are going nuts about it.
Regardless of whether Akin said pregnancy is impossible or just rare in cases of legitimate rape, I see no reason for anybody to be offended. Akin either had his facts wrong or he did not have his facts wrong, but what on earth is there to be offended by? Where is the insult? Akin claims that he got this information from some doctors. Perhaps he considered the doctors to be authorities on the subject. Perhaps he got the mistaken impression that studies had been done on it. It is not a crime to have your facts wrong, and if you're getting medical information from doctors, you can hardly be considered a meanie for believing them. Say Akin was factually wrong if you want, but it's silly to be all up in arms as if he's said something offensive. (BTW here is an article that explains where the idea came from.)
Even Mitt Romney has jumped on the band wagon, acting as if he's appalled and offended by what Akin said. I really think Romney is just playing the game. Of course he's got to distance himself from Akin since Akin is public enemy number one right now. Romney is a politician, and he's doing what politicians do. You cannot take these people seriously.
Akin himself is playing the game! He issued an apology, saying that he "misspoke." But if you read the apology, he is not at all clear about what he is apologizing for. Does he regret his use of the term "legitimate rape"? Or does he regret his claim that rape victims rarely get pregnant? He doesn't say. If he "misspoke," then what did he mean to say? Or what should he have said? He's simply acting on political expediency. He's doing damage control. He may not even know himself why everybody is upset.
Honestly, I suspect people are not as offended as they let on. What's going on here is typical political silliness. A republican said something that could be construed in a most heinous way. Liberals are jumping at the opportunity to demonize a republican, so they're making the most out of it that they can, to the point of distorting the facts. They're pretending to be so offended that they can hardly stand themselves. And conservatives are playing along. They're acting like they're just as offended so they can distance themselves from the public enemy and not go down with the ship. It's all a game, and I absolutely hate the game.
A lot of people are offended that Akin is pro-life even in the case of rape. Now this I can understand. It does seem heartless to deny an abortion to somebody who has been raped. It seems calloused to force a rape victim to carry the offspring of her rapist. I'm surprised so much of the outrage is directed at Akin's use of the phrase "legitimate rape," and the claim that rape victims rarely get pregnant (or falsely that they can't get pregnant) rather than being directed at his position on abortion for rape victims. (And by the way, for those who are under the false impression that Akin thinks rape victims can't get pregnant, what on earth do you make of his opposition to abortion for such people? Don't you have to get pregnant before you can get an abortion?)
But this opposition to abortion, even in the case of rape, follows from the primary argument for the pro-life position:
1. It is wrong to take the life of an innocent human being.
2. Abortion takes the life of an innocent human being.
3. Therefore, it's wrong to have an abortion.
The unborn are no less human just because of how they were conceived or who their parents are, so if you are against abortion because it takes the life of an innocent human being, then you should be against abortion in the case of rape, too. Granted, rape is traumatic, and granted being forced to carry the offspring of your rapist adds insult to injury. But in what world is it morally justified to take the life of an innocent human being in order to spare another human being emotional trauma? Think about it. That is the primary justification that is being offered for why rape victims should be permitted to have abortions--because it spares them severe emotional trauma. If the unborn really are human beings just like the rest of us, then emotional trauma is not an adequate justification for having an abortion. The only reason people are offended by the suggestion that abortion should be banned even in the case of rape is because they have not fully appreciated what the pro-life position is or why people are pro-life. Even a lot of pro-life people don't seem to fully grasp it (which puzzles me). I suspect they don't really think the unborn are just as much members of the human family as the rest of us.
Try a thought experiment. Suppose a woman who got pregnant because of rape decided that, by golly, she was going to keep the child. But when the child was born and turned out to look just like her rapist, she couldn't handle it anymore. She tried for a few days, and finally, she drowned her baby in the bathtub. Would you excuse her on the basis that she was only trying to spare herself the emotional trauma of seeing the offspring of her rapist? She just killed her own baby! That shouldn't be allowed. Babies don't deserve to die even if their fathers are rapists and even if their existence causes their mothers emotional trauma.
Thankfully, there's at least the option of adoption once a baby is born. But a person might say that once the woman has chosen not to have an abortion, it is wrong for her to go back on that after the baby is born. It's wrong for her to kill her baby because she has already agreed not to. Somebody did once say this to me when I brought up the above thought experiment.
In answer, let's try another thought experiment. Let's suppose a pregnant women who was raped decides to keep her baby. But then after a few months, when she starts to 'show,' she decides it's too much for her. The pain is too deep, and the turmoil is overwhelming. Does she then have the right to change her mind and abort the pregnancy? Well, if we take the above reasoning to its logical conclusion, you'd have to say 'no.' Having chosen to keep the baby, she can't then turn around and have it killed. But I suspect the person who gave me that answer would say 'yes.' As long as it hasn't been born yet, she should be allowed to have an abortion. But that falsifies the above reasoning. It isn't really because of the choice she made that she shouldn't be allowed to kill her baby once it's born. Rather, it's because once it's born, it's a full member of the human family, and emotional trauma is just not an adequate justification for taking the life of a full member of the human family, especially an innocent one. That takes us back to what I originally said. If the unborn are just as much members of the human family as the rest of us, then emotional trauma is not an adequate justification for taking their lives either.
So go ahead and be offended by Todd Akin's opposition to abortion even in the case of rape. But instead of droning on and on with gasps of shock, wallowing in your emotional frenzy, deal with the arguments. Think a little. Offer a rational refutation.
And I know this is too much to ask and that nobody will listen to me, but be fair-minded. Consider what your opponents are saying. Listen to them. Don't misrepresent them. If they truly are being offensive, you don't have to make stuff up to prove it.
Monday, June 18, 2012
The gulf between the infinite and the finite
Today, I heard somebody use the phrase, "near infinity" or "nearly infinite" or something like that. I don't remember who said it or what the context was, but that phrase jumped out at me.
If you think about it, it's impossible for any finite number to be nearly infinite. Take any finite number you want, be it ever so large. If you double that finite number, you still will not have reached infinity. If you multiply it by a thousand, you still will not have reached infinity. So no finite number is near infinity.
If you think about it, it's impossible for any finite number to be nearly infinite. Take any finite number you want, be it ever so large. If you double that finite number, you still will not have reached infinity. If you multiply it by a thousand, you still will not have reached infinity. So no finite number is near infinity.
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