Evolutionist: All scientists believe in evolution.
Creationist: What about Michael Behe?
Evolutionist: He's not a scientist.
Creationist: Why do you say that?
Evolutionist: Because he doesn't believe in evolution. All true scientists believe in evolution.
No true scientist would ever deny evolution.
Orthodox Jew: All Jews deny that Jesus is the messiah.
Messianic Jew: Wait a minute. I'm a Jew, and I think Jesus is the messiah.
Orthodox Jew: You're not a Jew.
Messianic Jew: Why do you say that?
Orthodox Jew: Because you think Jesus is the messiah. That makes you a Christian, not a Jew.
Messianic Jew: I am a Christian, but I'm also a Jew. "Christianity" is a subcategory within Judaism.
Orthodox Jew: Now who do you think is in a better position to say what a Jew is? A Christian or a Jew? As a Christian, you have no right to say what constitute a Jew. Only Jews have that right.
Messianic Jew: But I am a Jew, which gives me the right to say what constitutes a Jew.
Orthodox Jew: No, you're not. You're a Christian. Christians are not Jews.
Round and round they go.
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Born again Jehovah's Witness style
This morning, a couple of Jehovah's Witness women rang my door bell. It has been many years since the JW's have visited me, and this visit was unlike any I've ever had from them. In the past, every time they have come by, they have asked me a lot of questions. Usually, the questions come from their book, Reasoning from the Scriptures. But this time they didn't ask me any questions at all. They read a verse in Ecclesiastes about how oppression causes craziness (which I thought was kind of random), and then they they gave me an Awake magazine and a Watchtower magazine.
The Watchtower magazine is dated April 1, 2009, and the featured article is called "Born Again: What Does It Mean?" As I read the first part of the article, I was surprised by how Calvinistic it sounded. First, they pointed out that one cannot enter the kingdom of God unless they are born again. Then they argued that one cannot choose to be born again. God is the one who decides who will be born again. They cite such scriptures as John 1:13, which says, "...who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," and 1 Peter 1:3, which says, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to his great mercy has caused us to be born again to a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."
But then in the next section, they argue that being born again isn't for all Christians. It's just for the heavenly class of 144,000 who will rule with Christ in heaven for 1,000 years. The rest of Christians will live in a paradise earth, and they are not born again. Being born again is not necessary for salvation, and entering the kingdom of God is not the same as being saved or having eternal life.
In the next section, they explain how the new birth takes place. John 3:5 says, "Unless anyone is born from water and spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," so a person is born again by water baptism and spirit baptism. Does that strike anyone else as odd? Earlier they argued that being born again is entirely an act of God and not a choice that people make. But clearly water baptism is a choice that people make, and they are arguing water baptism is necessary for the new birth. They go on to argue that water baptism comes first. Nobody is baptized with the spirit until they are first baptized with water.
In the next section, the authors equate those who have been born again with those who are the adopted sons of God. If you have been born from the spirit of God, then you have been adopted as a son of God. Earlier, I said that they cited John 1:13 as a proof text showing that when people are born again, it is by the will of God, and not by the will of man. But John 1:13 is the second half of a sentence that begins in verse 12, which they did not include in their citation. Together, it reads, "But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in his name, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." So this new birth experience isn't limited to 144,000 Christians. It applies to all Christians because it applies to all those who receive Jesus and believe in him.
Being born again isn't some special privileged status God bestows on a select group of Christians. Being born again is an act of God whereby he cures you of your rebellion which enables you to receive Christ in the first place. One cannot put their trust in Jesus if they have not been born again. All Christians are adopted sons of God. And entering the kingdom of God doesn't mean going to heaven. The JW's are right that the kingdom of God is a government. One enters the kingdom of God when they become citizens of that government. That includes all Christians. Jesus makes exclusion from the kingdom out to be a bad thing. Here are some examples:
Matthew 5:20 "unless your righteousness surpasses that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven."
Matthew 7:21-23 "Not everyone who says to me, "Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven; but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and in your name cast out demons, and in your name perform many miracles?' And then I will declare to them, 'I never knew you; depart from me, you who practice lawlessness."
Matthew 13:37-43 "The one who sows the good seed is the son of man, and the field is the world, and as for the good seed, these are the sons of the kingdom; and the tares are the sons of the evil one; and the enemy who sowed them is the devil, and the harvest is the end of the age; and the reapers are angels. Therefore just as the tares are gathered up and burned with fire, so shall it be at the end of the age. The son of man will send forth his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all stumbling blocks, and those who commit lawlessness, and will cast them into the furnace of fire; in that place there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then the righteous will shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." (see also v. 47-49)
Matthew 25 is another good example. It has the parable of the ten virgins which Jesus compares to the kingdom of heaven. Some were included and some were excluded. Starting from verse 31, Jesus explains the judgment, saying he will put "the sheep on his right" and "the goats on his left." He'll say to those on his right, "Come, you who are blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Then he will say to those on his left, "Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels." There are only two groups--those who enter the kingdom, and those who don't. Those who don't enter eternal punishment.
As far as "entering the kingdom of God" being the same as "being saved," Matthew 19:24-26 says, "'And again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.' And when the disciples heard this, they were very astonished and said, 'Then who can be saved?' And looking upon them Jesus said to them, 'With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.'"
Many more verses could be cited, but I think this is enough.
The Watchtower magazine is dated April 1, 2009, and the featured article is called "Born Again: What Does It Mean?" As I read the first part of the article, I was surprised by how Calvinistic it sounded. First, they pointed out that one cannot enter the kingdom of God unless they are born again. Then they argued that one cannot choose to be born again. God is the one who decides who will be born again. They cite such scriptures as John 1:13, which says, "...who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," and 1 Peter 1:3, which says, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to his great mercy has caused us to be born again to a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."
But then in the next section, they argue that being born again isn't for all Christians. It's just for the heavenly class of 144,000 who will rule with Christ in heaven for 1,000 years. The rest of Christians will live in a paradise earth, and they are not born again. Being born again is not necessary for salvation, and entering the kingdom of God is not the same as being saved or having eternal life.
In the next section, they explain how the new birth takes place. John 3:5 says, "Unless anyone is born from water and spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God," so a person is born again by water baptism and spirit baptism. Does that strike anyone else as odd? Earlier they argued that being born again is entirely an act of God and not a choice that people make. But clearly water baptism is a choice that people make, and they are arguing water baptism is necessary for the new birth. They go on to argue that water baptism comes first. Nobody is baptized with the spirit until they are first baptized with water.
In the next section, the authors equate those who have been born again with those who are the adopted sons of God. If you have been born from the spirit of God, then you have been adopted as a son of God. Earlier, I said that they cited John 1:13 as a proof text showing that when people are born again, it is by the will of God, and not by the will of man. But John 1:13 is the second half of a sentence that begins in verse 12, which they did not include in their citation. Together, it reads, "But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become children of God, even to those who believe in his name, who were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." So this new birth experience isn't limited to 144,000 Christians. It applies to all Christians because it applies to all those who receive Jesus and believe in him.
Being born again isn't some special privileged status God bestows on a select group of Christians. Being born again is an act of God whereby he cures you of your rebellion which enables you to receive Christ in the first place. One cannot put their trust in Jesus if they have not been born again. All Christians are adopted sons of God. And entering the kingdom of God doesn't mean going to heaven. The JW's are right that the kingdom of God is a government. One enters the kingdom of God when they become citizens of that government. That includes all Christians. Jesus makes exclusion from the kingdom out to be a bad thing. Here are some examples:
Matthew 5:20 "unless your righteousness surpasses that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven."
Matthew 7:21-23 "Not everyone who says to me, "Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven; but he who does the will of my Father who is in heaven. Many will say to me on that day, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and in your name cast out demons, and in your name perform many miracles?' And then I will declare to them, 'I never knew you; depart from me, you who practice lawlessness."
Matthew 13:37-43 "The one who sows the good seed is the son of man, and the field is the world, and as for the good seed, these are the sons of the kingdom; and the tares are the sons of the evil one; and the enemy who sowed them is the devil, and the harvest is the end of the age; and the reapers are angels. Therefore just as the tares are gathered up and burned with fire, so shall it be at the end of the age. The son of man will send forth his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all stumbling blocks, and those who commit lawlessness, and will cast them into the furnace of fire; in that place there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then the righteous will shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." (see also v. 47-49)
Matthew 25 is another good example. It has the parable of the ten virgins which Jesus compares to the kingdom of heaven. Some were included and some were excluded. Starting from verse 31, Jesus explains the judgment, saying he will put "the sheep on his right" and "the goats on his left." He'll say to those on his right, "Come, you who are blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world." Then he will say to those on his left, "Depart from me, accursed ones, into the eternal fire which has been prepared for the devil and his angels." There are only two groups--those who enter the kingdom, and those who don't. Those who don't enter eternal punishment.
As far as "entering the kingdom of God" being the same as "being saved," Matthew 19:24-26 says, "'And again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.' And when the disciples heard this, they were very astonished and said, 'Then who can be saved?' And looking upon them Jesus said to them, 'With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.'"
Many more verses could be cited, but I think this is enough.
Wednesday, April 08, 2009
Review: The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins
I got a copy of The God Delusion for $5.98 at one of the Half Price Books in Austin, TX. Wahoo! I love a good deal.
I couldn't decide whether I was going to blog on this book or not. I just didn't have the motivation to take detailed notes, and as I began reading it, I quickly lost my enthusiasm for it. So my review is not going to be very detailed.
Whenever I read a book that expresses a different point of view than mine, and I want to critique it, I always look for clear statements about the purpose of the book. Then I evaluate the book based on that purpose. I do that because it's easy to get sidetracked on rabbit trails that don't have much to do with the central thesis. I like to stay focused if I can. The more you can dismiss as irrelevant, the less work you have to do.
Dawkins did me a huge favour by making his purpose clear and by filling the book full of irrelevant material. That's not to say a lot of it wasn't interesting, and it may have even been useful for people who agreed with his point.
Dawkins wrote, "If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down" (p. 28). So the whole purpose of the book is to persuade the reader to be an atheist. But there are two different kinds of atheism, so I'm told. There's strong atheism and weak atheism. Weak atheism is just a lack of belief in the existence of God, and it is consistent with agnosticism. Strong atheism is the view that God does not exist. Dawkins appears to have been defending strong atheism. In chapter 4, which he says contains his central argument, he concludes: "If the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion--the God Hypothesis--is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist" (p. 189).
In the first chapter, Dawkins writes, "I am not attacking any particular version of God or gods. I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented" (p. 57). But he doesn't attack all things supernatural in this book. If that was his intention, I think he ought to at least had a chapter on the mind/body problem, and maybe a chapter on paranormal phenomena like witchcraft, ghost hunters, psychics, and things like that. I don't think anything in his book amounted to an argument against all things supernatural.
There are really only two chapters in this book that support his main purpose--chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3, he responds to several arguments for God. In chapter 4, he makes his case that God almost certainly doesn't exist. The second half of the book, while interesting, doesn't address the question of whether God exists or not.
In chapter 3, Dawkins responds to Aquinas' "Five Ways," Anselm's ontological argument, Pascal's Wager, the argument from religious experience, and a few other obscure arguments for God. In the end, he said the most promising argument was the argument from design, so he dedicated the whole of chapter 4 to addressing the argument from design. There are two versions of the argument from design that he addressed--the fine tuning of the universe for life, and biological complexity.
I think that given his goal of converting people to atheism, he should've addressed some of the more contemporary arguments for God such as the kalam cosmological argument, and maybe even Plantinga's ontological argument. If you're going to write a book refuting a whole worldview, you ought to address its best defenders. I wish he had addressed William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument or J.P. Moreland's argument from mind. Maybe he could've even addressed Greg Bahnsen's transcendental argument.
I've never thought the design argument was very persuasive until maybe the last three years or so. I still don't think it's the strongest argument, but apparently, a lot of other people do. It seems to be the primary argument that caused Antony Flew to go from atheism to deism.
I know I'm not being very specific about Dawkin's arguments (I didn't take good notes), but there is one part of chapter 4 that I think deserves mention because I thought he made a good point. He said that "if genuinely irreducible complexity could be properly demonstrated, it would wreck Darwin's theory" (p. 151). The problem is that it's almost impossible to demonstrate that anything is irreducibly complex. He said:
Although Dawkin's meant chapter 4 to be an argument against God's existence, I don't think it amounted to any such thing. It doesn't follow that "God almost certainly doesn't exist" just because the design argument is fallacious. It could be that God exists for some other reason. Or it could be that God exists, and we don't know about it. Or maybe some other kind of god exists that Dawkins doesn't address.
The whole purpose of this book is to demonstrate that God doesn't exist, but only one paragraph in the entire 420 page book amounts to an argument against the existence of God--specifically, the Christian God. It comes on page 101. The Christian God is both omniscient and omnipotent, and Dawkins argues that the two attributes are incompatible. If they are, that would prove the Christian God doesn't exist, or at least that the Christians are wrong about the attributes of their God.
If God is all-knowing, then he knows everything he is ever going to do. If he knows everything he's ever going to do, then he can't change his mind about what he's going to do. And if he can't change his mind, then he isn't all-powerful. The problem with this argument is that elsewhere in the book, Dawkins seems to concede that omnipotence is the ability to do all things logically possible. The reason an all-knowing God couldn't change his mind is because it is logically impossible. So it isn't because of a lack of power that he can't do it.
I read the book from cover to cover, and it did not cause me the least bit of doubt about the existence of God. That is not to say I'm 100% certain of God's existence, just that Dawkins failed to diminish in the least what confidence I have. According to Dawkins, the reason I was unconvinced is because I'm a "dyed in the wool faith-head," who is "immune to argument," and my resistance to argument is "built up over years of childhood indoctrination" (p. 28). Good grief! How many people are so confident in their own arguments that they think the only reason a person will not immediately change their minds because of them is because they are "immune to argument"? Is it not even possible that maybe some of Dawkins' arguments are unsound or that he just didn't make a persuasive case?
I couldn't decide whether I was going to blog on this book or not. I just didn't have the motivation to take detailed notes, and as I began reading it, I quickly lost my enthusiasm for it. So my review is not going to be very detailed.
Whenever I read a book that expresses a different point of view than mine, and I want to critique it, I always look for clear statements about the purpose of the book. Then I evaluate the book based on that purpose. I do that because it's easy to get sidetracked on rabbit trails that don't have much to do with the central thesis. I like to stay focused if I can. The more you can dismiss as irrelevant, the less work you have to do.
Dawkins did me a huge favour by making his purpose clear and by filling the book full of irrelevant material. That's not to say a lot of it wasn't interesting, and it may have even been useful for people who agreed with his point.
Dawkins wrote, "If this book works as I intend, religious readers who open it will be atheists when they put it down" (p. 28). So the whole purpose of the book is to persuade the reader to be an atheist. But there are two different kinds of atheism, so I'm told. There's strong atheism and weak atheism. Weak atheism is just a lack of belief in the existence of God, and it is consistent with agnosticism. Strong atheism is the view that God does not exist. Dawkins appears to have been defending strong atheism. In chapter 4, which he says contains his central argument, he concludes: "If the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion--the God Hypothesis--is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist" (p. 189).
In the first chapter, Dawkins writes, "I am not attacking any particular version of God or gods. I am attacking God, all gods, anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented" (p. 57). But he doesn't attack all things supernatural in this book. If that was his intention, I think he ought to at least had a chapter on the mind/body problem, and maybe a chapter on paranormal phenomena like witchcraft, ghost hunters, psychics, and things like that. I don't think anything in his book amounted to an argument against all things supernatural.
There are really only two chapters in this book that support his main purpose--chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3, he responds to several arguments for God. In chapter 4, he makes his case that God almost certainly doesn't exist. The second half of the book, while interesting, doesn't address the question of whether God exists or not.
In chapter 3, Dawkins responds to Aquinas' "Five Ways," Anselm's ontological argument, Pascal's Wager, the argument from religious experience, and a few other obscure arguments for God. In the end, he said the most promising argument was the argument from design, so he dedicated the whole of chapter 4 to addressing the argument from design. There are two versions of the argument from design that he addressed--the fine tuning of the universe for life, and biological complexity.
I think that given his goal of converting people to atheism, he should've addressed some of the more contemporary arguments for God such as the kalam cosmological argument, and maybe even Plantinga's ontological argument. If you're going to write a book refuting a whole worldview, you ought to address its best defenders. I wish he had addressed William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument or J.P. Moreland's argument from mind. Maybe he could've even addressed Greg Bahnsen's transcendental argument.
I've never thought the design argument was very persuasive until maybe the last three years or so. I still don't think it's the strongest argument, but apparently, a lot of other people do. It seems to be the primary argument that caused Antony Flew to go from atheism to deism.
I know I'm not being very specific about Dawkin's arguments (I didn't take good notes), but there is one part of chapter 4 that I think deserves mention because I thought he made a good point. He said that "if genuinely irreducible complexity could be properly demonstrated, it would wreck Darwin's theory" (p. 151). The problem is that it's almost impossible to demonstrate that anything is irreducibly complex. He said:
More generally, there are many structures that are irreducible in the sense that they cannot survive the subtraction of any part, but which were built with the aid of scaffolding that was subsequently subtracted and is no longer visible. Once the structure is completed, the scaffolding can be removed safely and the structure remains standing. In evolution, too, the organ or structure you are looking at may have had scaffolding in an ancestor which has since been removed. p. 156So some things can appear irreducibly complex even if it isn't, and we have no way of knowing. That makes it almost impossible to demonstrate that anything is really irreducibly complex.
Although Dawkin's meant chapter 4 to be an argument against God's existence, I don't think it amounted to any such thing. It doesn't follow that "God almost certainly doesn't exist" just because the design argument is fallacious. It could be that God exists for some other reason. Or it could be that God exists, and we don't know about it. Or maybe some other kind of god exists that Dawkins doesn't address.
The whole purpose of this book is to demonstrate that God doesn't exist, but only one paragraph in the entire 420 page book amounts to an argument against the existence of God--specifically, the Christian God. It comes on page 101. The Christian God is both omniscient and omnipotent, and Dawkins argues that the two attributes are incompatible. If they are, that would prove the Christian God doesn't exist, or at least that the Christians are wrong about the attributes of their God.
If God is all-knowing, then he knows everything he is ever going to do. If he knows everything he's ever going to do, then he can't change his mind about what he's going to do. And if he can't change his mind, then he isn't all-powerful. The problem with this argument is that elsewhere in the book, Dawkins seems to concede that omnipotence is the ability to do all things logically possible. The reason an all-knowing God couldn't change his mind is because it is logically impossible. So it isn't because of a lack of power that he can't do it.
I read the book from cover to cover, and it did not cause me the least bit of doubt about the existence of God. That is not to say I'm 100% certain of God's existence, just that Dawkins failed to diminish in the least what confidence I have. According to Dawkins, the reason I was unconvinced is because I'm a "dyed in the wool faith-head," who is "immune to argument," and my resistance to argument is "built up over years of childhood indoctrination" (p. 28). Good grief! How many people are so confident in their own arguments that they think the only reason a person will not immediately change their minds because of them is because they are "immune to argument"? Is it not even possible that maybe some of Dawkins' arguments are unsound or that he just didn't make a persuasive case?
Sunday, April 05, 2009
On the third day
Earlier this year, I put my ipod through the washing machine. It was an accident, of course. Not surprisingly the ipod was completely dead. I didn't throw it away immediately, though. I kept pushing the button every time I got in my car just to see what would happen if anything. For two days, it was completely dead. Then, on the third day, it came back to life. The screen didn't light up like it was supposed to, though. It was dim. But it played just fine, and I was happy and relieved. Ipods are expensive. About a week later, the screen lit up, and the ipod was just like new. At that point, I was pretty impressed with ipods. But then somebody stole it out of my car. Bummer!
Of course anybody who does some studying knows this story couldn't possibly be true. I'm a Christian, and I've been a Christian for many years. The Bible is full of third day motifs, not least of which is the resurrection of Jesus. The story of the dying and rising ipod has too many parallels with the dying and rising myth of Jesus to have been a coincidence. Why, even the ipod being stolen is similar to Jesus' ascension where the disciples could see him no more. Clearly, the story about the ipod was borrowed (perhaps even subconsciously) from the story of Jesus.
But the ipod story is true.
Of course anybody who does some studying knows this story couldn't possibly be true. I'm a Christian, and I've been a Christian for many years. The Bible is full of third day motifs, not least of which is the resurrection of Jesus. The story of the dying and rising ipod has too many parallels with the dying and rising myth of Jesus to have been a coincidence. Why, even the ipod being stolen is similar to Jesus' ascension where the disciples could see him no more. Clearly, the story about the ipod was borrowed (perhaps even subconsciously) from the story of Jesus.
But the ipod story is true.
Friday, March 20, 2009
Morality debate, part 11 of 11
Cheetah's final reflections
WeirdBrake, I too am impressed with your analysis and appreciate your comments. I'm glad you offered to moderate. Now, I haven't had a chance to finish reading ephphatha's final notes, but in case he didn't say it, I think one thing that hampered us, as we discussed via PM, was that 1500 words turned out not to be enough at all. Many things, particularly in round 1, that you thought were lacking in my post were actually in the original post, but were cut due to space. In retrospect, I definitely cut the wrong stuff in post 1. I had a whole section on ephphatha's conclusion, but at the time it was not clear to me how central that was to his argument, and by cutting it out, I essentially wasted time. I think I saw hints that ephphatha could have really used the extra space to address some of your comments, too, and I know from his PM that he had some significant space issues also. Ah well, we live and learn.
Another thing is that, for the record, I don't even believe everything I said. I am still squarely on the side of subjectivism if I had to CHOOSE, but I don't think it is comprehensive enough.
On another note, I have never participated in a formal debate online and it turned out to be a bit disconcerting. I really wanted to draw ephphatha out on a few points, but didn't always have the space. I would love it if we could have sort of a "Socrates Cafe" format (heard of these?) where we could really go back and forth and get each other to elaborate on items that we feel could benefit from more description.
Also, I'm glad you got the meaning of parsimony. Late last night, as I was doing the final edits to my final post, I hit F7 to see what the Word Thesaurus had for it and it said frugal, etc. and I was shocked! Almost the only time I ever hear or use parsimonious is in the scientific sense, and yes, Jodie Foster's character in Contact encapsulates this perfectly. I wondered by context if ephphatha also did not know the true meaning of the word, as I got the sense he wasn't using it correctly in Post 3, but again, I didn't have space to explain the meaning of parsimony, only how it applied to my argument!
Finally, about the "nice" thing. I'm a little surprised by that, but that may have just been another mistake in judging my audience/opponent in the first post mostly. With the average audience, I believe it would have been critical to show that there is still the ability to have a smooth, community-based system that treats people with value and dignity, even if it is not objective. This is important, I have found, on some Christian foums where fundamentalists think being an atheist, and therefore not believing in an independent higher power, automatically means we "have no morals." Anyway, this wasn't quite the right tack, though I presisted in showing that what we do have in this world, a fairly successful community-based system, is not inconsistent with subjectivism.
Now, I have a couple more posts to read...
THE END
WeirdBrake, I too am impressed with your analysis and appreciate your comments. I'm glad you offered to moderate. Now, I haven't had a chance to finish reading ephphatha's final notes, but in case he didn't say it, I think one thing that hampered us, as we discussed via PM, was that 1500 words turned out not to be enough at all. Many things, particularly in round 1, that you thought were lacking in my post were actually in the original post, but were cut due to space. In retrospect, I definitely cut the wrong stuff in post 1. I had a whole section on ephphatha's conclusion, but at the time it was not clear to me how central that was to his argument, and by cutting it out, I essentially wasted time. I think I saw hints that ephphatha could have really used the extra space to address some of your comments, too, and I know from his PM that he had some significant space issues also. Ah well, we live and learn.
Another thing is that, for the record, I don't even believe everything I said. I am still squarely on the side of subjectivism if I had to CHOOSE, but I don't think it is comprehensive enough.
On another note, I have never participated in a formal debate online and it turned out to be a bit disconcerting. I really wanted to draw ephphatha out on a few points, but didn't always have the space. I would love it if we could have sort of a "Socrates Cafe" format (heard of these?) where we could really go back and forth and get each other to elaborate on items that we feel could benefit from more description.
Also, I'm glad you got the meaning of parsimony. Late last night, as I was doing the final edits to my final post, I hit F7 to see what the Word Thesaurus had for it and it said frugal, etc. and I was shocked! Almost the only time I ever hear or use parsimonious is in the scientific sense, and yes, Jodie Foster's character in Contact encapsulates this perfectly. I wondered by context if ephphatha also did not know the true meaning of the word, as I got the sense he wasn't using it correctly in Post 3, but again, I didn't have space to explain the meaning of parsimony, only how it applied to my argument!
Finally, about the "nice" thing. I'm a little surprised by that, but that may have just been another mistake in judging my audience/opponent in the first post mostly. With the average audience, I believe it would have been critical to show that there is still the ability to have a smooth, community-based system that treats people with value and dignity, even if it is not objective. This is important, I have found, on some Christian foums where fundamentalists think being an atheist, and therefore not believing in an independent higher power, automatically means we "have no morals." Anyway, this wasn't quite the right tack, though I presisted in showing that what we do have in this world, a fairly successful community-based system, is not inconsistent with subjectivism.
Now, I have a couple more posts to read...
THE END
Tuesday, March 17, 2009
Morality debate, part 10 of 11
Ephphatha's final reflections
I hope that I'm allowed to give a few reflections. I'll try my best not to "debate." :-)
First of all, congratulations to Cheetah! Good job!
Second, I just want to thank Weirdbrake and say that I'm impressed with your feedback. It's obvious that you gave a lot of time and thought to it, and you were very fair. One of the most frustrating things for me when I'm debating--especially on message boards where the "common folk" hang out--is that an unusual amount of time has to be spent just explaining the arguments, because people have hard time following it. I got the impression that the reason cheetah didn't directly attack my argument in her first post is because she didn't understand it, and that's why her characterization of it in her dialogue was incorrect. But you obviously DID understand it, and I was impressed by that--not to mention relieved! LOL
I almost completely agree with your critique (until the third round), but there are a couple of exceptions. You thought that we spent too much time distinguishing between cultural relativism and individual subjectivism rather than on whether or not OMV exist. There's a reason we did that. It had to do with how the question for this debate was framed. If it had been simply, "Do objective moral values exist?" then you would've been entirely correct. The burden of proof is on he who asserts, and since I would've been the affirmative in the debate, it would be pointless and unnecessary to explore alternative moral theories, such as egoism, subjectivism, nihilism, etc. But the second part of the question placed part of the burden of proof on cheetah. "Is morality subjective?" That means that it wasn't enough for cheetah to rebut all of my arguments. She had to make a case for her own position. Since her own position was cultural relativism and not individual subjectivism, I made the distinction and attacked cultural relativism. So I don't think the distinction, as far as this debate is concerned, was unimportant.
Speaking of burden of proof, you said,
Speaking of positive arguments against OMV, I completely agree with you that cheetah's argument from the law of parsimony (i.e. Occam's razor) was her strongest argument. In fact, I think that's the only argument for her case she made that was valid. (That was a very good argument, cheetah, and something you ought to continue to develope.)
The fact that you understood my arguments (and I'm guessing cheetah's as well) in the first two rounds made it all the more surprizing to me that you completely MISunderstood my third post. I can only guess that your misunderstanding was my fault. You obviously have a strong ability to follow an argument, and you were able to understand my first two posts, so I guess I just wasn't as clear in my third post as I should have been.
To be specific, you made the surprizing comment about the parsimony argument that I didn't respond to it at all. What was even more surprizing was that you quoted my response to it! Perhaps I just wasn't clear. My response to that argument was to say,
1. If cheetah's argument is sound, then Berkley's argument is sound.
2. Berkley's argument is not sound.
3. Therefore, cheetah's argument is not sound.
Do you see how I'm sticking to the original comparison I made between how we know the external world and how we know morality? We know them both in the same way--by strong mental intuitions. It could be that in both cases, the perception of OMV and the external world only exist in the mind, and the law of parsimony would dictate that they do, but the law of parsimony doesn't work in these cases because it requires us to reject that our intuition knowledge is correct. Berkley and cheetah were both mistaken for the same reason.
You also misunderstood my "ad hominem" attacks on cheetah. I was not arguing that since cheetah is inconsistent, then I must be right. I was merely pointing out that cheetah affirms my position. It seems to me that when your opponent affirms your position, you win the debate.
In my "moral dispute" paragraph that you had a problem with, I think you misunderstood my point as much as cheetah did. You said,
I agree, in a sense, that I spent too much time arguing that everybody believes in objective morality rather than arguing that their beliefs are correct. The reason I did that, though, was because I was thinking practically. I could either win this debate or I could pursuade people. I was more interested in pursuading people. Since my moral epistemology involves intuitive knowledge, my strategy was to cause the reader's intuitions to rise to the surface so the person would realize that they already believe in objective morality. I use the exact same strategy when arguing with people who deny logic. That's why I kept bringing up the clear case examples, such as the Nazi's, James Byrd, rape, etc. I wanted to make obvious to each reader what may not have already been obvious to them.
But anyway, I thoroughly enjoyed reading your critique, and I appreciate the time and thought you put into it. And thanks again to cheetah for debating with me. I shall print a copy of this debate with Weirdbrake's assessment and treasure it always. :-)
ephphatha
Part 11
I hope that I'm allowed to give a few reflections. I'll try my best not to "debate." :-)
First of all, congratulations to Cheetah! Good job!
Second, I just want to thank Weirdbrake and say that I'm impressed with your feedback. It's obvious that you gave a lot of time and thought to it, and you were very fair. One of the most frustrating things for me when I'm debating--especially on message boards where the "common folk" hang out--is that an unusual amount of time has to be spent just explaining the arguments, because people have hard time following it. I got the impression that the reason cheetah didn't directly attack my argument in her first post is because she didn't understand it, and that's why her characterization of it in her dialogue was incorrect. But you obviously DID understand it, and I was impressed by that--not to mention relieved! LOL
I almost completely agree with your critique (until the third round), but there are a couple of exceptions. You thought that we spent too much time distinguishing between cultural relativism and individual subjectivism rather than on whether or not OMV exist. There's a reason we did that. It had to do with how the question for this debate was framed. If it had been simply, "Do objective moral values exist?" then you would've been entirely correct. The burden of proof is on he who asserts, and since I would've been the affirmative in the debate, it would be pointless and unnecessary to explore alternative moral theories, such as egoism, subjectivism, nihilism, etc. But the second part of the question placed part of the burden of proof on cheetah. "Is morality subjective?" That means that it wasn't enough for cheetah to rebut all of my arguments. She had to make a case for her own position. Since her own position was cultural relativism and not individual subjectivism, I made the distinction and attacked cultural relativism. So I don't think the distinction, as far as this debate is concerned, was unimportant.
Speaking of burden of proof, you said,
Then you begin to do what you should have done in your first response post to Eph: dis-analogize between belief in OM and belief in the external world. Your points about corroboration, testability, and consistency for the external world (as opposed to the cultural variance on moral norms) are very much on-target. These points support the idea that comparing belief in OM to belief in the external world is not a good analogy and hence why Eph's argument is not valid (and therefore why belief in OM is actually less reasonable than not).I think you're completely mistaken in what I have in bold. Assuming cheetah's argument that you're discussing is sound, all it amounts to is a rebuttal, not a refutation. By dis-analogizing my comparison of OMV and the external world, all cheetah will have shown is that I haven't carried the burden of proof, but that would not have shown that belief in OMV is less reasonable than not. It only would've left us at an impasse until she built up her own case against OMV. Cheetah could've torn down every single argument I made, and it still would not have made OMV less reasonable to believe in than not until she gave some positive arguments against OMV and/or for cultural relativism.
Speaking of positive arguments against OMV, I completely agree with you that cheetah's argument from the law of parsimony (i.e. Occam's razor) was her strongest argument. In fact, I think that's the only argument for her case she made that was valid. (That was a very good argument, cheetah, and something you ought to continue to develope.)
The fact that you understood my arguments (and I'm guessing cheetah's as well) in the first two rounds made it all the more surprizing to me that you completely MISunderstood my third post. I can only guess that your misunderstanding was my fault. You obviously have a strong ability to follow an argument, and you were able to understand my first two posts, so I guess I just wasn't as clear in my third post as I should have been.
To be specific, you made the surprizing comment about the parsimony argument that I didn't respond to it at all. What was even more surprizing was that you quoted my response to it! Perhaps I just wasn't clear. My response to that argument was to say,
George Berkley argued that postulating an external world to explain our sensory perceptions is ad hoc (invoking the same law of parsimony cheetah uses to reject morality) since perceptions occur strictly in our minds.I answered the argument exactly like you said I should have--by showing that the law of parsimony does not hold in every case. And in this case, I go back to the comparison of the external world and OMV. Here's my argument in a syllogism:
1. If cheetah's argument is sound, then Berkley's argument is sound.
2. Berkley's argument is not sound.
3. Therefore, cheetah's argument is not sound.
Do you see how I'm sticking to the original comparison I made between how we know the external world and how we know morality? We know them both in the same way--by strong mental intuitions. It could be that in both cases, the perception of OMV and the external world only exist in the mind, and the law of parsimony would dictate that they do, but the law of parsimony doesn't work in these cases because it requires us to reject that our intuition knowledge is correct. Berkley and cheetah were both mistaken for the same reason.
You also misunderstood my "ad hominem" attacks on cheetah. I was not arguing that since cheetah is inconsistent, then I must be right. I was merely pointing out that cheetah affirms my position. It seems to me that when your opponent affirms your position, you win the debate.
In my "moral dispute" paragraph that you had a problem with, I think you misunderstood my point as much as cheetah did. You said,
Her attack is not that rational self-interest is consistent with OM. It's that rational self-interest is an explanation for moral debate that ELIMINATES THE NEED for our assumption of OM.My whole point was that if you're arguing from self-interest, then that is by definition not a moral debate! Read the paragraph again with that understanding. It makes perfectly good sense. You also said,
In short, you can't fault her on is/ought grounds when she's trying to explain away the objective "ought" entirely.I didn't fault her for trying to explain away the objective "ought." I faulted her for explaining away the moral "ought." My argument would apply whether she was assuming subjective or objective morality because she was arguing from a pragmatic "ought" and not a moral "ought". In her view, the pragmatic ought and the moral ought are one and the same, committing the is/ought fallacy.
I agree, in a sense, that I spent too much time arguing that everybody believes in objective morality rather than arguing that their beliefs are correct. The reason I did that, though, was because I was thinking practically. I could either win this debate or I could pursuade people. I was more interested in pursuading people. Since my moral epistemology involves intuitive knowledge, my strategy was to cause the reader's intuitions to rise to the surface so the person would realize that they already believe in objective morality. I use the exact same strategy when arguing with people who deny logic. That's why I kept bringing up the clear case examples, such as the Nazi's, James Byrd, rape, etc. I wanted to make obvious to each reader what may not have already been obvious to them.
But anyway, I thoroughly enjoyed reading your critique, and I appreciate the time and thought you put into it. And thanks again to cheetah for debating with me. I shall print a copy of this debate with Weirdbrake's assessment and treasure it always. :-)
ephphatha
Part 11
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Morality debate, part 9 of 11
Weirdbrake's assessment continued...
ROUND THREE:
Eph.... I had one thing on my mind after I read Cheetah's response post in Round 2 and while I was awaiting your post. I wanted to see how you'd answer her parsimony argument. It was an extremely good argument-- and quite damaging to your position-- and I felt like you had to answer it. You had to answer it in either one of two ways: 1) Argue that parsimony is not always a valid rule in all situations and not valid when applied to belief in OM (definitely not an impossible argument to make); or 2) Argue that OM is, in fact, more parsimonious than Cheetah's biopsychosocial explanation (the harder position to argue, in my opinion).
Or you could have tried to argue both.
But you did the worst possible thing, in my opinion. You didn't respond to it at all. This hurt you badly.
In that sizable fifth paragraph, you seem to attack Cheetah for implying that you can only gain knowledge through the senses. But I'm not sure she ever implied that. All she said was that the DIFFERENCE between belief in OM and belief in external world is that our senses consistently affirm facts about the latter but not the former. This implies only that she believes the senses are ONE way to gain knowledge-- a way that happens to be distinguishable from the way we might gain knowledge about OM (remember, she's trying to undermine your main argument: your comparison between belief in OM and belief in the external world).
You used this paragraph to attack her on this point, which I thought was rather misguided and outside the scope. One sentence in particular I had a big problem with: "George Berkley argued that postulating an external world to explain our sensory perceptions is ad hoc (invoking the same law of parsimony cheetah uses to reject morality) since perceptions occur strictly in our minds."
What point were you trying to make here? That Berkeley invoked the law of parsimony? That he DIDN'T? That Berkeley was right? That Berkeley was wrong? I didn't think this sentence was clear enough. Moreover, I couldn't understand why you'd even want to mention a thinker like George Berkeley in a debate like this. He basically rejected the idea of the external world. Why would you mention him in a debate where your whole argument depends on the external world being more reasonable to believe in than not? As a tactical matter, I didn't like that you made the Berkeley reference, and in any case, that sentence needed to be clearer because I just didn't understand how it fit in with your arguments.
You made a decent point about some things being known a priori and morality fitting into this paradigm. Though I thought you should have explicitly stated that this is why morality, like our a priori acceptance of the external world's existence, is more reasonable to believe in than not.
You then mentioned the law of non-contradiction (why there can't be four-sided triangles) and proceeded to compare it to Cheetah's (and other moral relativists') self-contradiction in rejecting OM. I didn't think this was a very strong argument. Even if Cheetah is contradicting herself, how does that mean that OM itself must necessarily exist? If OM doesn't exist, then people can believe in OM all they want, and their belief would still be false. And similarly, if OM doesn't exist, then those who pretend to reject OM but still express an implicit belief in it may be contradicting themselves. But that wouldn't change the fact that OM itself doesn't exist. This is why I didn't buy your argument that self-contradiction in rejecting OM is analogous to the actual logical contradiction of a four-sided triangle.
And it's also why I didn't feel your ad hominem attacks on Cheetah were very strong. Supposing that Cheetah is a total hypocrite (not saying you are, Cheetah!) that still doesn't make OM any more or less reasonable to believe in. All it does is possibly restate your Arg. 1, which you've already overstated throughout.
Then you wrote another paragraph that I had a major problem with:
"Cheetah argues that moral dispute is meaningful even if there are no OMV because it's possible to reach agreement based on self-interest. This argument fails for several reasons. First, it commits the is/ought fallacy. It doesn't follow that we ought to do X just because X is in our self-interest. Scenarios exist where killing an innocent man may be in the interest of all, but it isn't moral. Second, it confuses the pragmatic ought for the moral ought. We ought, in the pragmatic sense, to change the oil in our car, because it's in our self-interest, but it isn't immoral for us to refrain. Third, there's no principled way of resolving conflicts of interest. Fourth, scenarios exist where being moral is against self-interest, like risking your life to save a drowning stranger. It may be in self-interest to be immoral provided you won't get caught. Fifth, we simply don't argue morality that way. When we argue morality, we don't talk about utility and interest. We talk about fairness and obligation. Not even Cheetah argues morality that way. In the "$87 billion request" thread, cheetah demonstrated that she believes in some sort of just war theory. She thinks it's wrong to go to war for oil money."
The first problem is that you mischaracterize Cheetah's attack on your whole "moral debate implies belief in OM" (Arg. 1) idea. Her attack is not that rational self-interest is consistent with OM. It's that rational self-interest is an explanation for moral debate that ELIMINATES THE NEED for our assumption of OM. You seemed to treat it as though she were operating within the assumption of OM (instead of attacking it like she was), and in doing so, you were begging the central question of this debate: Is it more reasonable than not to believe in actual OM?
In short, you can't fault her on is/ought grounds when she's trying to explain away the objective "ought" entirely.
That was the essential problem with that paragraph: question-begging and thus assuming too much of your own conclusions.
In the final big paragraph, you make the point about Texans, Hindus, and Grandma in order to show that many times, "moral differences" are really less about a dispute over fundamental principles than a dispute about the worldviews and facts which inform those principles. I thought this was a good insight, but unfortunately, it does little more than restate Arg. 1 in yet another form.
Cheetah.... You elucidate a little more clearly about why Eph's Arg. 1 is not as strong as he thinks it is, and you do this by asking us to imagine a future world with radically different (but still eminently conceivable) moral values. This is your first argument in Round 3 that's directly relevant to the debate. Also, you elucidate more clearly about why the law of parsimony makes the biopsychosocial explanation for belief in OM more reasonable than Eph's assertion that OM actually exists. In doing so, you effectively "call on Eph" for not answering your parsimony argument. Needless to say, that's an appropriate context in which to restate your argument. I also like that you spell out the rule of parsimony and how it applies to OM: specifically, that assuming OM requires the CREATION of a new concept/entity while the biopsychosocial assumption uses the ones we already have and know about.
These points all go to the main issue.
Unfortunately for Eph and fortunately for you, Eph's lack of good "heart of the issue" arguments in his Round 3 posts means that, in my judgment, these good arguments of yours are sufficient to make you the winner of Round 3.
I therefore judge Cheetah to be the winner of Round 3.
And given that Eph won the first round, and Cheetah won the second round, I declare Cheetah as the winner of this debate.
Congratulations, Cheetah!
And congratulations to both of you for doing a great job. Thank you for allowing me to be the judge. I enjoyed reading all of your posts.
Part 10
ROUND THREE:
Eph.... I had one thing on my mind after I read Cheetah's response post in Round 2 and while I was awaiting your post. I wanted to see how you'd answer her parsimony argument. It was an extremely good argument-- and quite damaging to your position-- and I felt like you had to answer it. You had to answer it in either one of two ways: 1) Argue that parsimony is not always a valid rule in all situations and not valid when applied to belief in OM (definitely not an impossible argument to make); or 2) Argue that OM is, in fact, more parsimonious than Cheetah's biopsychosocial explanation (the harder position to argue, in my opinion).
Or you could have tried to argue both.
But you did the worst possible thing, in my opinion. You didn't respond to it at all. This hurt you badly.
In that sizable fifth paragraph, you seem to attack Cheetah for implying that you can only gain knowledge through the senses. But I'm not sure she ever implied that. All she said was that the DIFFERENCE between belief in OM and belief in external world is that our senses consistently affirm facts about the latter but not the former. This implies only that she believes the senses are ONE way to gain knowledge-- a way that happens to be distinguishable from the way we might gain knowledge about OM (remember, she's trying to undermine your main argument: your comparison between belief in OM and belief in the external world).
You used this paragraph to attack her on this point, which I thought was rather misguided and outside the scope. One sentence in particular I had a big problem with: "George Berkley argued that postulating an external world to explain our sensory perceptions is ad hoc (invoking the same law of parsimony cheetah uses to reject morality) since perceptions occur strictly in our minds."
What point were you trying to make here? That Berkeley invoked the law of parsimony? That he DIDN'T? That Berkeley was right? That Berkeley was wrong? I didn't think this sentence was clear enough. Moreover, I couldn't understand why you'd even want to mention a thinker like George Berkeley in a debate like this. He basically rejected the idea of the external world. Why would you mention him in a debate where your whole argument depends on the external world being more reasonable to believe in than not? As a tactical matter, I didn't like that you made the Berkeley reference, and in any case, that sentence needed to be clearer because I just didn't understand how it fit in with your arguments.
You made a decent point about some things being known a priori and morality fitting into this paradigm. Though I thought you should have explicitly stated that this is why morality, like our a priori acceptance of the external world's existence, is more reasonable to believe in than not.
You then mentioned the law of non-contradiction (why there can't be four-sided triangles) and proceeded to compare it to Cheetah's (and other moral relativists') self-contradiction in rejecting OM. I didn't think this was a very strong argument. Even if Cheetah is contradicting herself, how does that mean that OM itself must necessarily exist? If OM doesn't exist, then people can believe in OM all they want, and their belief would still be false. And similarly, if OM doesn't exist, then those who pretend to reject OM but still express an implicit belief in it may be contradicting themselves. But that wouldn't change the fact that OM itself doesn't exist. This is why I didn't buy your argument that self-contradiction in rejecting OM is analogous to the actual logical contradiction of a four-sided triangle.
And it's also why I didn't feel your ad hominem attacks on Cheetah were very strong. Supposing that Cheetah is a total hypocrite (not saying you are, Cheetah!) that still doesn't make OM any more or less reasonable to believe in. All it does is possibly restate your Arg. 1, which you've already overstated throughout.
Then you wrote another paragraph that I had a major problem with:
"Cheetah argues that moral dispute is meaningful even if there are no OMV because it's possible to reach agreement based on self-interest. This argument fails for several reasons. First, it commits the is/ought fallacy. It doesn't follow that we ought to do X just because X is in our self-interest. Scenarios exist where killing an innocent man may be in the interest of all, but it isn't moral. Second, it confuses the pragmatic ought for the moral ought. We ought, in the pragmatic sense, to change the oil in our car, because it's in our self-interest, but it isn't immoral for us to refrain. Third, there's no principled way of resolving conflicts of interest. Fourth, scenarios exist where being moral is against self-interest, like risking your life to save a drowning stranger. It may be in self-interest to be immoral provided you won't get caught. Fifth, we simply don't argue morality that way. When we argue morality, we don't talk about utility and interest. We talk about fairness and obligation. Not even Cheetah argues morality that way. In the "$87 billion request" thread, cheetah demonstrated that she believes in some sort of just war theory. She thinks it's wrong to go to war for oil money."
The first problem is that you mischaracterize Cheetah's attack on your whole "moral debate implies belief in OM" (Arg. 1) idea. Her attack is not that rational self-interest is consistent with OM. It's that rational self-interest is an explanation for moral debate that ELIMINATES THE NEED for our assumption of OM. You seemed to treat it as though she were operating within the assumption of OM (instead of attacking it like she was), and in doing so, you were begging the central question of this debate: Is it more reasonable than not to believe in actual OM?
In short, you can't fault her on is/ought grounds when she's trying to explain away the objective "ought" entirely.
That was the essential problem with that paragraph: question-begging and thus assuming too much of your own conclusions.
In the final big paragraph, you make the point about Texans, Hindus, and Grandma in order to show that many times, "moral differences" are really less about a dispute over fundamental principles than a dispute about the worldviews and facts which inform those principles. I thought this was a good insight, but unfortunately, it does little more than restate Arg. 1 in yet another form.
Cheetah.... You elucidate a little more clearly about why Eph's Arg. 1 is not as strong as he thinks it is, and you do this by asking us to imagine a future world with radically different (but still eminently conceivable) moral values. This is your first argument in Round 3 that's directly relevant to the debate. Also, you elucidate more clearly about why the law of parsimony makes the biopsychosocial explanation for belief in OM more reasonable than Eph's assertion that OM actually exists. In doing so, you effectively "call on Eph" for not answering your parsimony argument. Needless to say, that's an appropriate context in which to restate your argument. I also like that you spell out the rule of parsimony and how it applies to OM: specifically, that assuming OM requires the CREATION of a new concept/entity while the biopsychosocial assumption uses the ones we already have and know about.
These points all go to the main issue.
Unfortunately for Eph and fortunately for you, Eph's lack of good "heart of the issue" arguments in his Round 3 posts means that, in my judgment, these good arguments of yours are sufficient to make you the winner of Round 3.
I therefore judge Cheetah to be the winner of Round 3.
And given that Eph won the first round, and Cheetah won the second round, I declare Cheetah as the winner of this debate.
Congratulations, Cheetah!
And congratulations to both of you for doing a great job. Thank you for allowing me to be the judge. I enjoyed reading all of your posts.
Part 10
Wednesday, March 11, 2009
Morality debate, part 8 of 11
Weirdbrake's assessment continued...
ROUND TWO:
Eph... You quickly attacked Cheetah's "why be moral?" tautology, which I thought was a good point. You also went on to attack the her suggestion that we must know where OM came from before we can believe in it. I liked your point about the universe-- how there's dispute over the origin but no one disputes its existence. This was a good counter-argument. I also liked your point about how epistemological skepticism is ultimately pointless and ad infinitum and thus not a good argument against OM (given that such skepticism could be equally aimed at the external world).
These were all decent insights. But I wanted you to go for Cheetah's jugular (so to speak). I wanted you to attack Cheetah's alternative biopsychosocial explanation for belief in OM. What you should have done is say something like, "Sensory input, too, comes from biological processes, but that doesn't mean it doesn't correspond with reality. Just because there's a biological explanation for vision doesn't mean the table we see in front of us isn't really there. And similarly, even if we grant that there could be a biological/psych/social explanation for our belief in OM, it doesn't follow that OM itself isn't real."
You needed to say something like that. You needed to emphatically restate your central argument-- that you are COMPARING the belief in OM to the belief in the external world (and that if one is reasonable, the other has to be, too). You should have pounced on Cheetah for not dis-analogizing sufficiently. Instead, you spent way too much time at the end restating your Arg. 1 in different forms (all those references to the Holocaust, Nazi, genocide, and the crime against James Byrd doesn't do anything for your argument except re-demonstrate that most of us believe that stuff is wrong-- a point you already made in Arg. 1). Same with the reference to "sociopaths."
Your attack on Cheetah's dialogue was an attack on small-fry points but not an attack on the main one. I wanted you to show why her dialogue was ineffective in proving the circularity of OM belief and why her dialogue didn't dis-analogize belief in OM from belief in the external world. Here you came up with this great argument, and you didn't attack her dialogue from that angle.
I did like your point, however, in the sixth paragraph up from the bottom where you basically said that disagreement on moral norms doesn't necessarily mean disagreement on whether there IS an objective morality (rescuing yourself from Cheetah's attack on your Arg. 1).
Cheetah... Here you start to better elucidate your whole biopsychosocial explanation of our belief in OM. "Cutting it down to size," so to speak. I liked the peeing in your pants example (please don't quote me out of context on what I just said!).
Then you begin to do what you should have done in your first response post to Eph: dis-analogize between belief in OM and belief in the external world. Your points about corroboration, testability, and consistency for the external world (as opposed to the cultural variance on moral norms) are very much on-target. These points support the idea that comparing belief in OM to belief in the external world is not a good analogy and hence why Eph's argument is not valid (and therefore why belief in OM is actually less reasonable than not).
I thought this was a great way to attack Eph's main argument.
I also liked your attack on Eph's assertion that moral debate implies a belief in OM (his Arg. 1). You said there are also more down-to-earth bio/psych/social and rational self-interest (individual or collective) reasons for engaging in moral debate, and therefore such debate doesn't automatically imply a belief in OM. I thought that was a good point. If I argue that society should adopt Policy X, it may not imply that I believe Policy X to be on par with objective moral truth. Maybe I simply feel that those in my community and those I emotionally care about will benefit more from Policy X.
Then you made what I thought was your best argument in this whole debate: the argument from parsimony.
Now I admit, I had to go to webster's online dictionary and look up parsimonious. First it told me something like "stingy to the point of frugality." And I was like, "Huh??" So I looked up parsimony and it made a reference to the principle of Occam's Razor. Ah-HAH! Cheetah was making an Occam's Razor argument against OM!
Just to clarify (for those in our live studio audience), Occam's Razor is an old philosophical principle articulated by the medieval thinker William of Occam, who said, "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily." Or, as Jodie Foster's character explains it in the movie Contact, "All things being equal, the simplest explanation for something tends to be the right one."
In essence, Cheetah argued that the belief in OM is less parsimonious (and more unnecessarily complicated) than the belief that bio/psycho/social influences cause us to believe in OM. Cheetah's explanation for belief in OM employs concepts and factors that we already know about, things we know to be at least somewhat measurable and testable-- biology, the body, the brain, psychology. Eph's explanation for belief in OM requires the assumption of another concept/entity: a sort of "cosmic rule book" where OM is written. Therefore, because Cheetah's explanation is simpler, it is also more reasonable-- as in accordance with Occam's Razor (parsimony).
I say again- I thought this was a great argument against Eph's position. This arguments takes you much further than your original articulation of the biopsychosocial argument in Round 1. Your original biopsychosocial argument simply demonstrated that this was an alternative explanation for belief in OM. But your parsimony argument shows why it is SUPERIOR to belief in OM. Which is, of course, a more emphatic argument as to why Eph's position is less reasonable than not.
In conclusion, and judging only Round 2, I think that Eph made some decent points but ultimately did not attack Cheetah on the main points. He spent too much time attacking her on smaller, less important matters. Cheetah, on the other hand, made some great arguments that went to the heart of the whole issue.
I therefore judge Cheetah to be the winner of Round 2.
Part 9
ROUND TWO:
Eph... You quickly attacked Cheetah's "why be moral?" tautology, which I thought was a good point. You also went on to attack the her suggestion that we must know where OM came from before we can believe in it. I liked your point about the universe-- how there's dispute over the origin but no one disputes its existence. This was a good counter-argument. I also liked your point about how epistemological skepticism is ultimately pointless and ad infinitum and thus not a good argument against OM (given that such skepticism could be equally aimed at the external world).
These were all decent insights. But I wanted you to go for Cheetah's jugular (so to speak). I wanted you to attack Cheetah's alternative biopsychosocial explanation for belief in OM. What you should have done is say something like, "Sensory input, too, comes from biological processes, but that doesn't mean it doesn't correspond with reality. Just because there's a biological explanation for vision doesn't mean the table we see in front of us isn't really there. And similarly, even if we grant that there could be a biological/psych/social explanation for our belief in OM, it doesn't follow that OM itself isn't real."
You needed to say something like that. You needed to emphatically restate your central argument-- that you are COMPARING the belief in OM to the belief in the external world (and that if one is reasonable, the other has to be, too). You should have pounced on Cheetah for not dis-analogizing sufficiently. Instead, you spent way too much time at the end restating your Arg. 1 in different forms (all those references to the Holocaust, Nazi, genocide, and the crime against James Byrd doesn't do anything for your argument except re-demonstrate that most of us believe that stuff is wrong-- a point you already made in Arg. 1). Same with the reference to "sociopaths."
Your attack on Cheetah's dialogue was an attack on small-fry points but not an attack on the main one. I wanted you to show why her dialogue was ineffective in proving the circularity of OM belief and why her dialogue didn't dis-analogize belief in OM from belief in the external world. Here you came up with this great argument, and you didn't attack her dialogue from that angle.
I did like your point, however, in the sixth paragraph up from the bottom where you basically said that disagreement on moral norms doesn't necessarily mean disagreement on whether there IS an objective morality (rescuing yourself from Cheetah's attack on your Arg. 1).
Cheetah... Here you start to better elucidate your whole biopsychosocial explanation of our belief in OM. "Cutting it down to size," so to speak. I liked the peeing in your pants example (please don't quote me out of context on what I just said!).
Then you begin to do what you should have done in your first response post to Eph: dis-analogize between belief in OM and belief in the external world. Your points about corroboration, testability, and consistency for the external world (as opposed to the cultural variance on moral norms) are very much on-target. These points support the idea that comparing belief in OM to belief in the external world is not a good analogy and hence why Eph's argument is not valid (and therefore why belief in OM is actually less reasonable than not).
I thought this was a great way to attack Eph's main argument.
I also liked your attack on Eph's assertion that moral debate implies a belief in OM (his Arg. 1). You said there are also more down-to-earth bio/psych/social and rational self-interest (individual or collective) reasons for engaging in moral debate, and therefore such debate doesn't automatically imply a belief in OM. I thought that was a good point. If I argue that society should adopt Policy X, it may not imply that I believe Policy X to be on par with objective moral truth. Maybe I simply feel that those in my community and those I emotionally care about will benefit more from Policy X.
Then you made what I thought was your best argument in this whole debate: the argument from parsimony.
Now I admit, I had to go to webster's online dictionary and look up parsimonious. First it told me something like "stingy to the point of frugality." And I was like, "Huh??" So I looked up parsimony and it made a reference to the principle of Occam's Razor. Ah-HAH! Cheetah was making an Occam's Razor argument against OM!
Just to clarify (for those in our live studio audience), Occam's Razor is an old philosophical principle articulated by the medieval thinker William of Occam, who said, "Entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily." Or, as Jodie Foster's character explains it in the movie Contact, "All things being equal, the simplest explanation for something tends to be the right one."
In essence, Cheetah argued that the belief in OM is less parsimonious (and more unnecessarily complicated) than the belief that bio/psycho/social influences cause us to believe in OM. Cheetah's explanation for belief in OM employs concepts and factors that we already know about, things we know to be at least somewhat measurable and testable-- biology, the body, the brain, psychology. Eph's explanation for belief in OM requires the assumption of another concept/entity: a sort of "cosmic rule book" where OM is written. Therefore, because Cheetah's explanation is simpler, it is also more reasonable-- as in accordance with Occam's Razor (parsimony).
I say again- I thought this was a great argument against Eph's position. This arguments takes you much further than your original articulation of the biopsychosocial argument in Round 1. Your original biopsychosocial argument simply demonstrated that this was an alternative explanation for belief in OM. But your parsimony argument shows why it is SUPERIOR to belief in OM. Which is, of course, a more emphatic argument as to why Eph's position is less reasonable than not.
In conclusion, and judging only Round 2, I think that Eph made some decent points but ultimately did not attack Cheetah on the main points. He spent too much time attacking her on smaller, less important matters. Cheetah, on the other hand, made some great arguments that went to the heart of the whole issue.
I therefore judge Cheetah to be the winner of Round 2.
Part 9
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