They are made of walnut and maple spliced together. Pretty neat, huh?
Saturday, December 31, 2005
My first arrows
Well here they are, my first real arrows. I'm so excited I can hardly stand it.
They are made of walnut and maple spliced together. Pretty neat, huh?
They are made of walnut and maple spliced together. Pretty neat, huh?
Friday, December 30, 2005
The transcendental argument for the existence of God
A few years ago, I saw a flier on a bulletin board at school advertizing a class on apologetics. I emailed the guy because I was curious about it. He sent me to his web page. After looking at it, it became obvious that he was a reformed Christian who was heavily influenced by presuppositional apologetics. He especially seemed to be a big fan of Cornelius van Til. I posted a message on his bulletin board because I was curious about the transcendental argument. After his response, I gave him a few reasons I was skeptical of it. Then he wrote me an email asking a little about my background and inquiring further into my thoughts. I don't have what I wrote on the bulletin board, but I thought I'd post what I wrote in the email. Maybe it will stir up some discussion.
***********
Benjamin,
I appreciate the response. I'm a busy person myself, so I understand the delay. I guess I'll first tell you a little about my own presuppositions. :-) I am a Christian. I'm reformed, but I only made the switch about two year ago, and I haven't worked out all the kinks yet. I do believe the Bible is inspired by God and that it's the sole infallible rule of faith for Christians. I'm really not that educated in theology, apologetics, and philosophy. I'm almost exclusively self-educated in those areas although I've taken a few philosophy classes in college. Most of my education comes from reading books, articles, and debates, and I've spent a little time debating on message boards myself. I'm not that familiar with Conelius van Til except from secondary literature, and I've read a few of his articles on the internet. I know more about his fans than the man himself.
I'm not at all opposed to the presupositional method in general. In fact, I've found it very useful in dealing with self-referentially absurd claims (such as "There are no absolutes") and arguments that are incoherent (such as the argument against God from the problem of evil). But I also see merit in the evidentialist approach, and if you want, I'll tell you why I think that approach is consistent with the Bible. I'm not at all opposed to transcendental arguments in general. The moral argument, being a version of the TAG, is sound in my opinion.
The reason I find the moral argument pursuasive and not the logic argument is because moral laws are not the same kind of laws as the laws of logic. Moral laws are prescriptive, and the laws of logic are descriptive. Supposing there were no necessary, transcendent, sovereign, and personal being who imposed obligation, there could be no universal objective prescriptive laws of any kind. We'd be left with nihilism or relativism, both being forms of prescriptive non-realism. But I see no reason why certain descriptive truths would not exist if there were no such God. If there were no God, and I had a blue cup, then the proposition, "My cup is blue," would still be a true description of the world. At a minimum, if there were no God, then the proposition, "There is no God," would be a true proposition, as I've said before. Truth is just correspondence with reality, and I see no reason to think God's existence is necessary for such a correspondence to be possible.
I suppose one could make the case that the laws of logic are prescriptive in the sense that we have a rational ought imposed on us by them. We ought to be logical because it's rationally correct to do so. There is certainly a difference between a rational ought and a moral ought, but they are both prescriptive in a sense. But I don't see that the laws of logic are themselves prescriptive because the rational ought itself is not one of the laws of logic. The imperative, "You ought to believe in logic," cannot itself be a law of logic. The laws of logic describe the way the world is, and the rational ought tells us that we ought to believe the description because it's true. The laws of logic do not impose this ought on us as far as I can see.
I guess one of the problems I see with the TAG is that the ontological status of universals and other abstract entities is never discussed. It's as if there's no controversy surrounding the issue. A good example of this is the difference between good and evil. Good can be said to have positive ontological status. It really exists as "part of the furniture of the universe" as some like to say. But evil, being a departure from good, doesn't really have positive ontological status. Evil is the absense of good, not the presence of something else. So when we say "good exists," we mean something different by "exist" than when we say "evil exists." Greg Koukl of Stand to Reason uses the analogy of a doughnut and a doughnut hole. A doughnut hole doesn't really exist in any ontological sense. It's just where the doughnut is not. Likewise, a shadow is where the light is not. Light and doughnuts clearly have ontology, but shadows and doughnut holes don't, and many people dispute whether universals such as the laws of logic really have ontological status. To deny the positive ontological status of the laws of logic is not to say that they don't exist in some sense or that they aren't true. The laws of logic are propositions that correspond to reality, so it may be argued that reality would remain exactly what it is even if the propositions which described reality were not apprehended by any minds, including God's. There would be no four-sided triangles in reality even if there were no personal being or beings to apprehend it. So the laws of logic describe reality, but they don't determine reality because they are not prescriptive.
Greg Bahnsen hammered Gorden Stein on the fact that Stein kept using and asserting logic while being unable to give a basis for logic other than God. What was never made clear to me was why logic required a basis to begin with. For anything to exist, whether contingent or necessary, something much exist necessarily. It seems inuitively obvious to me that logic exists necessarily, and if it doesn't, then that's what I need help seeing. Why is logic contingent and not necessary? Bahnsen argued that it was because the laws of logic are rules of thought and therefore require a mind to have a basis, and I think I've explained why I have a problem with that. What I would like to have asked Bahnsen is "How do you give a non-question begging basis for the principle of sufficient reason?" which is the principle he seemed to be working with. If he says, "God is the basis for the principle of sufficient reason," do you see how that would get him into trouble? One could make the following argument:
1. If there is no God, then the principle of sufficient reason is not true.
2. There is no God.
3. Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is not true.
So Stein could've begun with the presupposition that God does not exist in order to argue that logic requires no basis since if God doesn't exist, the principle of sufficient reason is not true. I see no way for Bahnsen to dispute that argument without using circular reasoning.
To be honest with you, I don't see that the presuppositionalist approach is necessarily different from an evidentialist approach because the presuppositionalist is using universals as evidence for the existence of God. Things like morals, propositions, numbers, logic, etc, are all being used as evidence that God exists.
1. If there is no God, then there are no universals.
2. There are universals.
3. Therefore, there is a God.
Well, I meant to stop typing a long time ago, but it's becoming evident to me that I'm not going to find a stopping place. I'm just going to have to DECIDE to stop. Sorry about the length. I suppose I've been rambling. I am interested in the TAG, especially the necessity of God for the existence of logic. It seems to me that if there is something to it that I'm not seeing, this argument would have to be an air-tight irrefutable argument for the claim that God not only exists, but that God exists necessarily, and that's it incoherent nonsense to deny it. So if there's something I'm not seeing, I would very much like to be able to see it.
I'm not familiar with Herman Dooyeweerd. Thanks again for the email. I know I've said a lot, and hope you'll respond, but I'll understand if you take a while in getting back to me.
Sam
***********
Benjamin,
I appreciate the response. I'm a busy person myself, so I understand the delay. I guess I'll first tell you a little about my own presuppositions. :-) I am a Christian. I'm reformed, but I only made the switch about two year ago, and I haven't worked out all the kinks yet. I do believe the Bible is inspired by God and that it's the sole infallible rule of faith for Christians. I'm really not that educated in theology, apologetics, and philosophy. I'm almost exclusively self-educated in those areas although I've taken a few philosophy classes in college. Most of my education comes from reading books, articles, and debates, and I've spent a little time debating on message boards myself. I'm not that familiar with Conelius van Til except from secondary literature, and I've read a few of his articles on the internet. I know more about his fans than the man himself.
I'm not at all opposed to the presupositional method in general. In fact, I've found it very useful in dealing with self-referentially absurd claims (such as "There are no absolutes") and arguments that are incoherent (such as the argument against God from the problem of evil). But I also see merit in the evidentialist approach, and if you want, I'll tell you why I think that approach is consistent with the Bible. I'm not at all opposed to transcendental arguments in general. The moral argument, being a version of the TAG, is sound in my opinion.
The reason I find the moral argument pursuasive and not the logic argument is because moral laws are not the same kind of laws as the laws of logic. Moral laws are prescriptive, and the laws of logic are descriptive. Supposing there were no necessary, transcendent, sovereign, and personal being who imposed obligation, there could be no universal objective prescriptive laws of any kind. We'd be left with nihilism or relativism, both being forms of prescriptive non-realism. But I see no reason why certain descriptive truths would not exist if there were no such God. If there were no God, and I had a blue cup, then the proposition, "My cup is blue," would still be a true description of the world. At a minimum, if there were no God, then the proposition, "There is no God," would be a true proposition, as I've said before. Truth is just correspondence with reality, and I see no reason to think God's existence is necessary for such a correspondence to be possible.
I suppose one could make the case that the laws of logic are prescriptive in the sense that we have a rational ought imposed on us by them. We ought to be logical because it's rationally correct to do so. There is certainly a difference between a rational ought and a moral ought, but they are both prescriptive in a sense. But I don't see that the laws of logic are themselves prescriptive because the rational ought itself is not one of the laws of logic. The imperative, "You ought to believe in logic," cannot itself be a law of logic. The laws of logic describe the way the world is, and the rational ought tells us that we ought to believe the description because it's true. The laws of logic do not impose this ought on us as far as I can see.
I guess one of the problems I see with the TAG is that the ontological status of universals and other abstract entities is never discussed. It's as if there's no controversy surrounding the issue. A good example of this is the difference between good and evil. Good can be said to have positive ontological status. It really exists as "part of the furniture of the universe" as some like to say. But evil, being a departure from good, doesn't really have positive ontological status. Evil is the absense of good, not the presence of something else. So when we say "good exists," we mean something different by "exist" than when we say "evil exists." Greg Koukl of Stand to Reason
Greg Bahnsen hammered Gorden Stein on the fact that Stein kept using and asserting logic while being unable to give a basis for logic other than God. What was never made clear to me was why logic required a basis to begin with. For anything to exist, whether contingent or necessary, something much exist necessarily. It seems inuitively obvious to me that logic exists necessarily, and if it doesn't, then that's what I need help seeing. Why is logic contingent and not necessary? Bahnsen argued that it was because the laws of logic are rules of thought and therefore require a mind to have a basis, and I think I've explained why I have a problem with that. What I would like to have asked Bahnsen is "How do you give a non-question begging basis for the principle of sufficient reason?" which is the principle he seemed to be working with. If he says, "God is the basis for the principle of sufficient reason," do you see how that would get him into trouble? One could make the following argument:
1. If there is no God, then the principle of sufficient reason is not true.
2. There is no God.
3. Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is not true.
So Stein could've begun with the presupposition that God does not exist in order to argue that logic requires no basis since if God doesn't exist, the principle of sufficient reason is not true. I see no way for Bahnsen to dispute that argument without using circular reasoning.
To be honest with you, I don't see that the presuppositionalist approach is necessarily different from an evidentialist approach because the presuppositionalist is using universals as evidence for the existence of God. Things like morals, propositions, numbers, logic, etc, are all being used as evidence that God exists.
1. If there is no God, then there are no universals.
2. There are universals.
3. Therefore, there is a God.
Well, I meant to stop typing a long time ago, but it's becoming evident to me that I'm not going to find a stopping place. I'm just going to have to DECIDE to stop. Sorry about the length. I suppose I've been rambling. I am interested in the TAG, especially the necessity of God for the existence of logic. It seems to me that if there is something to it that I'm not seeing, this argument would have to be an air-tight irrefutable argument for the claim that God not only exists, but that God exists necessarily, and that's it incoherent nonsense to deny it. So if there's something I'm not seeing, I would very much like to be able to see it.
I'm not familiar with Herman Dooyeweerd. Thanks again for the email. I know I've said a lot, and hope you'll respond, but I'll understand if you take a while in getting back to me.
Sam
Wednesday, December 28, 2005
More silly objections to miracles
Another Biblical miracle is in Joshua 10. Joshua prayed to God to cause the sun to stand still, and it did. People object to this event for a few different reasons. None of these reasons, though, are because it's a miracle. Nobody says, "Well God couldn't have done that!"
The first objection is that the Bible has its cosmology all wrong. The sun isn't moving at all. Rather, the earth is turning. Supposedly the old bloke who wrote Joshua was just ignorant of this fact. Think about that for a minute. If we talk about the supposed movement of the sun in the sky, does that mean we're wrong? If so, then we're all a bunch of ignorant blokes. Every one of us, at one time or another, talks about the sun rising or the sun going down. Yet we know perfectly well that the earth is turning, and the sun only appears to be rising or going down. Whether the author of Joshua understood this fact or not is completely irrelevent. Our knowledge of the fact doesn't change the way we talk. Even our scientists, trained in astronomy, geology, and meteorology speak of the sun, moon, and stars as moving across the sky. These people are not ignorant. We're all simply talking about events as they appear to us from our point of view. From our point of view, these objects do move across the sky.
The second objection is that if God stopped the earth from turning on its axis, everything on the surface of the earth would've been destroyed. Imagine if you're driving down the road in a car and you run into a brick wall. Without a seatbelt on, you'd go slamming into the windshield and possibly through it. Well it's much worse with the earth. The circumference of the earth at the equator is 24,902 miles. The earth turns around once in 24 hours. So we can figure out how fast the surface of the earth moves at the equator.
24,902 miles/24 hours = 1038 miles per hour.
Imagine the destruction if everything on the surface of the earth is moving at that speed and suddenly stops!
Well the silliness of this objection is that on the one hand, the objector grants that God could stop the earth from rotating, but the objector seems to not grant that God could, at the same time, stop everything on the earth from moving. The objection hinges on the idea that if the earth stopped, everything on the surface would keep moving just as people in a car keep moving even when the car is stopped by a brick wall. If we've already granted that God could perform such a spectacular miracle as stopping the earth from rotating and then restarting it again, it seems like God would have no trouble taking care of the details. It is a miracle we're talking about after all.
There's a third reason people object to this miracle, but I can't remember what it is.
The first objection is that the Bible has its cosmology all wrong. The sun isn't moving at all. Rather, the earth is turning. Supposedly the old bloke who wrote Joshua was just ignorant of this fact. Think about that for a minute. If we talk about the supposed movement of the sun in the sky, does that mean we're wrong? If so, then we're all a bunch of ignorant blokes. Every one of us, at one time or another, talks about the sun rising or the sun going down. Yet we know perfectly well that the earth is turning, and the sun only appears to be rising or going down. Whether the author of Joshua understood this fact or not is completely irrelevent. Our knowledge of the fact doesn't change the way we talk. Even our scientists, trained in astronomy, geology, and meteorology speak of the sun, moon, and stars as moving across the sky. These people are not ignorant. We're all simply talking about events as they appear to us from our point of view. From our point of view, these objects do move across the sky.
The second objection is that if God stopped the earth from turning on its axis, everything on the surface of the earth would've been destroyed. Imagine if you're driving down the road in a car and you run into a brick wall. Without a seatbelt on, you'd go slamming into the windshield and possibly through it. Well it's much worse with the earth. The circumference of the earth at the equator is 24,902 miles. The earth turns around once in 24 hours. So we can figure out how fast the surface of the earth moves at the equator.
24,902 miles/24 hours = 1038 miles per hour.
Imagine the destruction if everything on the surface of the earth is moving at that speed and suddenly stops!
Well the silliness of this objection is that on the one hand, the objector grants that God could stop the earth from rotating, but the objector seems to not grant that God could, at the same time, stop everything on the earth from moving. The objection hinges on the idea that if the earth stopped, everything on the surface would keep moving just as people in a car keep moving even when the car is stopped by a brick wall. If we've already granted that God could perform such a spectacular miracle as stopping the earth from rotating and then restarting it again, it seems like God would have no trouble taking care of the details. It is a miracle we're talking about after all.
There's a third reason people object to this miracle, but I can't remember what it is.
Tuesday, December 27, 2005
Silly objections to miracles
There are actually some good arguments against miracles, but today, I just want to talk about some bad ones. These aren't objections to miracles in general; they are objections to specific miracles in the Bible.
The occurence of miracles in the Bible is a serious obstacle to faith for some people. Imagine, though, that there were no miracles in the Bible at all. Recall from a previous entry that I defined a miracles as an event in the natural world whose cause is not natural. Any direct act of God in the natural world, then, is a miracle. If God never acted in nature, though, there'd be no reason to be a Christian. I don't see how Christianity could exist if God never acted in nature. Isn't that ironic? If God doesn't act in nature, then we should forget about Christainity, but if God does act in nature, and the Bible records it, then we should forget about the Bible.
Anyway, back to the topic. Since Christmas just happened, I might as well use the virgin birth as an example. When a person objects to this event on the basis that virgins do not give birth, they're essentially objecting to the fact that it's a miracle, and miracles don't happen. So their objection is really to miracles in general, and the virgin birth is just an example of a miracle. But some people will accept that there could be miracles, and they object to the virgin birth for a different reason. But given their acceptance of miracles in general, this objection seems completely silly to me.
The objection is that Jesus was male. You see, to get a male, the father has to contribute a Y chromosome. Women don't have Y chromosomes. But if Mary was a virgin when she conceived, then there was no father to contribute a Y chromosome. With no Y chromosome, Jesus should have been female. The fact that he was male proves that Mary was not a virgin.
Do I even have to point out the silliness of this argument? If a person accepts that the virgin birth could have happened as long as Jesus turned out to be female, then the person has accepted that miracles can happen. If miracles can happen, then God can act in nature. If God can act in nature, then why couldn't he create a Y chromosome? If God created life to begin with, one measly little Y chromosome is going to be no problem for him. I suppose a person could say that God is powerful enough to produce a virginal conception, but not powerful enough to produce a Y chromosome at the same time. On what basis, though?
The occurence of miracles in the Bible is a serious obstacle to faith for some people. Imagine, though, that there were no miracles in the Bible at all. Recall from a previous entry that I defined a miracles as an event in the natural world whose cause is not natural. Any direct act of God in the natural world, then, is a miracle. If God never acted in nature, though, there'd be no reason to be a Christian. I don't see how Christianity could exist if God never acted in nature. Isn't that ironic? If God doesn't act in nature, then we should forget about Christainity, but if God does act in nature, and the Bible records it, then we should forget about the Bible.
Anyway, back to the topic. Since Christmas just happened, I might as well use the virgin birth as an example. When a person objects to this event on the basis that virgins do not give birth, they're essentially objecting to the fact that it's a miracle, and miracles don't happen. So their objection is really to miracles in general, and the virgin birth is just an example of a miracle. But some people will accept that there could be miracles, and they object to the virgin birth for a different reason. But given their acceptance of miracles in general, this objection seems completely silly to me.
The objection is that Jesus was male. You see, to get a male, the father has to contribute a Y chromosome. Women don't have Y chromosomes. But if Mary was a virgin when she conceived, then there was no father to contribute a Y chromosome. With no Y chromosome, Jesus should have been female. The fact that he was male proves that Mary was not a virgin.
Do I even have to point out the silliness of this argument? If a person accepts that the virgin birth could have happened as long as Jesus turned out to be female, then the person has accepted that miracles can happen. If miracles can happen, then God can act in nature. If God can act in nature, then why couldn't he create a Y chromosome? If God created life to begin with, one measly little Y chromosome is going to be no problem for him. I suppose a person could say that God is powerful enough to produce a virginal conception, but not powerful enough to produce a Y chromosome at the same time. On what basis, though?
Monday, December 26, 2005
I have discovered photobucket!
I just discovered Photobucket. It's where you can upload pictures for free and post them on the internet by linking to them. You can't stick that with a beat. I've always wanted to have pictures in my blog. Let's see if I can figure out how to do it.
I hope you all had a holly jolly Christmas. I'm on vacation this week, and I'm making a really cool bow and I'm also making my first arrows. I love being able to sleep at night. I got about 11 hours of sleep last night. Wahoo!
I hope you all had a holly jolly Christmas. I'm on vacation this week, and I'm making a really cool bow and I'm also making my first arrows. I love being able to sleep at night. I got about 11 hours of sleep last night. Wahoo!
Friday, December 23, 2005
Merry Christmas
I just wanted to say Merry Christmas to Dale, Steve, Jeff, Paul, Safiyyah, Kelly, Angie, and anybody else who might visit my blog from time to time. Thanks for coming, and I hope you have a good weekend.
Sam
Sam
Thursday, December 22, 2005
Resurrection, part 19
I have a few last thoughts. Resurrection in Jewish thought always involved a body vacating its grave. If the first Christians had meant anything like being tranformed into spirits, they would not have used the word "resurrection." Resurrection is essential to Christianity. Without it, we have no hope. Jesus did not conquer death for us if he did not rise from the dead. If Jesus' resurrection were just a metaphor for Christ's continued presence in our memories and inspiration, there wouldn't be a clear indication in the scripture of a series of appearances that suddenly stopped. Since Jesus was raised bodily from the dead, we will be raised bodily from the dead. Our bodies will be like his body with all knew groovy things. I can't help but wonder if we'll be able to appear and disappear like Jesus did.
Now I want to make a summary of the arguments for Jesus' bodily resurrection. I did this to make it easy to remember.
1. Empty tomb argument:
a. If Jesus did not raise his actual body that he died in, then the empty tomb cannot be used as evidence for his resurrection.
b. Both the angels and the apostles used the empty tomb as evidence for Jesus' resurrection.
C. Therefore, Jesus raised his actual body that he died in.
2. Scars as proof argument:
a. If the body Jesus appeared in was not the same body that died, then the scars on the appearance body do not prove that it was Jesus himself who had risen.
b. Jesus showed his scars to prove that he had risen.
c. Therefore, Jesus was raised with the same body he died in.
3. The temple argument:
a. Jesus said, "if you destroy this temple, I will raise it up in three days."
b. By "this temple," Jesus meant his physical body.
c. Therefore, Jesus meant, "if you destroy my physical body, I will raise my physical body in three days."
4. Flesh and bones argument:
a. A spirit does not have flesh and bones.
b. Jesus' body has flesh and bones.
c. Therefore, Jesus' body was not a spirit.
5. Definition argument:
a. If the apostles had not meant that Jesus was raised physically from the dead, they would not have called it a resurrection.
b. The apostles did call it a resurrection.
c. Therefore, the apostles meant that Jesus was raised physically from the dead.
6. 1 Corinthians 15 argument, several points:
a. The body that rises is the same body that died.
b. The distinction between the body that died and the resurrection body is not a distinction in substance, but in properties.
c. The resurrection body puts on properties, like immortality; it doesn't lose properties, like physicality.
d. There is continuity between the seed that is planted and the plant that grows from it, and Paul uses the seed/plant analogy to talk about the resurrection body.
Silly me! I was having such fun with this topic that I even came up with an acronym to remember some of these arguments. If we want to argue for the bodily resurrection of Jesus, then we want to use the BEST arguments we have.
Bones
Empty tomb
Scars
Temple
The end.
Now I want to make a summary of the arguments for Jesus' bodily resurrection. I did this to make it easy to remember.
1. Empty tomb argument:
a. If Jesus did not raise his actual body that he died in, then the empty tomb cannot be used as evidence for his resurrection.
b. Both the angels and the apostles used the empty tomb as evidence for Jesus' resurrection.
C. Therefore, Jesus raised his actual body that he died in.
2. Scars as proof argument:
a. If the body Jesus appeared in was not the same body that died, then the scars on the appearance body do not prove that it was Jesus himself who had risen.
b. Jesus showed his scars to prove that he had risen.
c. Therefore, Jesus was raised with the same body he died in.
3. The temple argument:
a. Jesus said, "if you destroy this temple, I will raise it up in three days."
b. By "this temple," Jesus meant his physical body.
c. Therefore, Jesus meant, "if you destroy my physical body, I will raise my physical body in three days."
4. Flesh and bones argument:
a. A spirit does not have flesh and bones.
b. Jesus' body has flesh and bones.
c. Therefore, Jesus' body was not a spirit.
5. Definition argument:
a. If the apostles had not meant that Jesus was raised physically from the dead, they would not have called it a resurrection.
b. The apostles did call it a resurrection.
c. Therefore, the apostles meant that Jesus was raised physically from the dead.
6. 1 Corinthians 15 argument, several points:
a. The body that rises is the same body that died.
b. The distinction between the body that died and the resurrection body is not a distinction in substance, but in properties.
c. The resurrection body puts on properties, like immortality; it doesn't lose properties, like physicality.
d. There is continuity between the seed that is planted and the plant that grows from it, and Paul uses the seed/plant analogy to talk about the resurrection body.
Silly me! I was having such fun with this topic that I even came up with an acronym to remember some of these arguments. If we want to argue for the bodily resurrection of Jesus, then we want to use the BEST arguments we have.
Bones
Empty tomb
Scars
Temple
The end.
Wednesday, December 21, 2005
Resurrection, part 18
The most often cited scripture against bodily resurrection I've heard is 1 Peter 3:18. It says that Jesus was "put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit." When a Jehovah's Witness reads this passage, he reads something a little different. He reads that Jesus was "put to death as flesh, but made alive as a spirit." To them, this seems like a pretty convincing argument against the bodily resurrection of Jesus.
But this passage has nothing to do with the substance of Jesus before or after his resurrection. It has to do with the power by which he is animated. Being "in the spirit" does not mean you become a spirit being. John was "in the spirit" when he received his revelation (Revelation 1:10, 4:2, 17:3, 21:10). We are to pray "in the spirit" (Ephesians 6:18). That doesn't mean we or John must become spirits.
This same contrast between being "in the spirit" and being "in the flesh" is used in Romans 8:9, so let's compare them.
1 Peter 2:18
put to death in the flesh (en sarki)
made alive in the spirit (en pneumatic)
Romans 8:9
you are not in the flesh (en sarki)
but in the spirit (en pneumatic)
The Greek is identical in both passages. En sarki means "in the flesh" and en pneumatic means "in the spirit." But in Romans 8:9, it's clear that being "in the spirit" doesn't mean we are spirit creatures, and being "in the flesh" doesn't mean we're made of flesh. Rather, it has to do with our orientation. Read Romans 8:1-11 to get the full sense of this passage. It parallels closely to 1 Peter 2:18.
to be continued... Part 19
But this passage has nothing to do with the substance of Jesus before or after his resurrection. It has to do with the power by which he is animated. Being "in the spirit" does not mean you become a spirit being. John was "in the spirit" when he received his revelation (Revelation 1:10, 4:2, 17:3, 21:10). We are to pray "in the spirit" (Ephesians 6:18). That doesn't mean we or John must become spirits.
This same contrast between being "in the spirit" and being "in the flesh" is used in Romans 8:9, so let's compare them.
1 Peter 2:18
put to death in the flesh (en sarki)
made alive in the spirit (en pneumatic)
Romans 8:9
you are not in the flesh (en sarki)
but in the spirit (en pneumatic)
The Greek is identical in both passages. En sarki means "in the flesh" and en pneumatic means "in the spirit." But in Romans 8:9, it's clear that being "in the spirit" doesn't mean we are spirit creatures, and being "in the flesh" doesn't mean we're made of flesh. Rather, it has to do with our orientation. Read Romans 8:1-11 to get the full sense of this passage. It parallels closely to 1 Peter 2:18.
to be continued... Part 19
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)