But there is further reason I have for taking issue with the common understanding of faith as belief without evidence. I don't think the Bible advocates blind faith at all, but rather, it encourages critical thinking. First of all, 1 Peter 3:15 says, "be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason for the hope that is in you with meekness and fear." In this passage, we are admonished to "give a reason" for the hope we have. Before we can give a reason for why we have hope, we have to first HAVE a reason for our hope. So this passage presupposes that our faith not be blind or arbitrary. It must be based on reasons. 1 Peter 3:15 is where the ministry of apologetics comes from. The Greek word translated as "answer" here and as "defense" in the NASB is "apologia," from which we get "apologetics," which involves giving reasons for thinking Christianity is true and answering objections to the Christian worldview. It's something that according to 1 Peter every Christian should do, but that requires them to engage the gospel on an intellectual level and not to be content with mere blind belief without reasons.
Part 3
Friday, September 30, 2005
Thursday, September 29, 2005
What is faith? part 1
A couple of years ago in one of my philosophy classes, the issue of "faith" came up, and predictably, just about everybody understood faith to mean "belief in the absense of evidence," or something like that. One guy in there was a Baptist pastor named Billy, he said, and he was especially adamant about this definition. He seemed to think it was downright inappropriate to make arguments for the existence of God, because it destroyed faith.
In our class email discussions, Billy and I debated the issue. It was a short debate. I basically wrote an email spelling out all my reasons for disagreeing with him, and he basically never gave much of a response. In the next few blogs, I'm going to be posting that email. Of course I'm cutting out big chunks of it that I don't think are all that important. Here we go...
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Billy: Belief in God focuses on faith. Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of thing not seen. (Hebrew 11:1)
Sam: Okay, this is where I'm going to get theological, and since you're a pastor, you may have better insight into these things than I do, but I want to tell you my point of view and see what you think of it. It seems to be your understanding that "faith" is "belief in the absense of evidence." After thinking about this for a while, I went to a Bible study Monday night and asked the people there to define "faith" in their own words. I wanted to see how many people would say the same thing, and there were a few who basically agreed that faith is belief in the absense of evidence. The same sort of thing came up in our philosophy class when we were pitting faith against reason, and a few people had the same idea of faith. I mentioned in another post that I disagreed with that understanding of faith, so now I want to say why that is.
I guess Hebrews 11:1 is a good place to start. It says two things about faith. First, it says faith is the substance of things hoped for. Second, it says faith is the evidence of things not seen. I suppose it is because of the phrase, "things not seen," that faith is taken to be belief without evidence. But that seems inconsistent with the fact that it says faith is the EVIDENCE of things not seen. If we take "things not seen" as the object of faith, then this passage seems to be saying that although we don't see the object of our faith, our belief in it is nevertheless based on evidence. I don't see anything unusual about this because there are many things we don't see but yet believe in because we infer it from evidence. For example, we believe in electrons, but nobody has ever seen an electron. We infer the existence of electrons based on what we DO see, so in the case of electrons, we have evidence for something that is not seen. Why couldn't belief in God be infered in the same way?
According to Hebrews 11:1, faith involves more than mere belief. It also involves hope. So not only do we believe in the "thing not seen," but we also place our hope and trust in it. The reason I define faith as "trust in what we think is true," is because by definition, to believe something is to think it is true, and because believing, by itself, isn't what faith is, but rather, faith is also hope and trust in the object of our faith. It's possible for me to have some belief but not put my trust in it. For example, I may believe that my chair is able to hold me up without ever sitting in it, but to sit in the chair is to trust it to hold me up. In the same way, a person may believe the gospel is true, but to have faith in the gospel is to actually trust in Jesus for their salvation.
I actually don't take the phrase, "things not seen," to mean things like angels, spirits, and things that we have no visual perception of. I take it to be referring to the substance of the things hoped for. The reason I take it that way is because this passage seems to closely correspond to Romans 8:18-25 where Paul is talking about the renewal of the cosmos and the resurrection, which he calls the "redemption of our body." He says, "For in hope we have been saved, but hope that is seen is not hope; for why does one also hope for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, with perseverance we wait eagerly for it." What Paul means by "seen" here clearly isn't visual perception. He's just referring to an event that hasn't happened yet. In the same way, I don't take Hebrews 11:1 to mean "belief in something you can't see," but rather, "hope in something that hasn't happened yet." See how the two phrases, "substance of things hoped for," and "evidence of things not seen," go together according to this undersanding? Our hope is in a resurrection to eternal life which hasn't happened yet, and we place our faith in Jesus for that hope. It has nothing to do with belief in the absense of evidence.
Part 2
In our class email discussions, Billy and I debated the issue. It was a short debate. I basically wrote an email spelling out all my reasons for disagreeing with him, and he basically never gave much of a response. In the next few blogs, I'm going to be posting that email. Of course I'm cutting out big chunks of it that I don't think are all that important. Here we go...
***************
Billy: Belief in God focuses on faith. Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of thing not seen. (Hebrew 11:1)
Sam: Okay, this is where I'm going to get theological, and since you're a pastor, you may have better insight into these things than I do, but I want to tell you my point of view and see what you think of it. It seems to be your understanding that "faith" is "belief in the absense of evidence." After thinking about this for a while, I went to a Bible study Monday night and asked the people there to define "faith" in their own words. I wanted to see how many people would say the same thing, and there were a few who basically agreed that faith is belief in the absense of evidence. The same sort of thing came up in our philosophy class when we were pitting faith against reason, and a few people had the same idea of faith. I mentioned in another post that I disagreed with that understanding of faith, so now I want to say why that is.
I guess Hebrews 11:1 is a good place to start. It says two things about faith. First, it says faith is the substance of things hoped for. Second, it says faith is the evidence of things not seen. I suppose it is because of the phrase, "things not seen," that faith is taken to be belief without evidence. But that seems inconsistent with the fact that it says faith is the EVIDENCE of things not seen. If we take "things not seen" as the object of faith, then this passage seems to be saying that although we don't see the object of our faith, our belief in it is nevertheless based on evidence. I don't see anything unusual about this because there are many things we don't see but yet believe in because we infer it from evidence. For example, we believe in electrons, but nobody has ever seen an electron. We infer the existence of electrons based on what we DO see, so in the case of electrons, we have evidence for something that is not seen. Why couldn't belief in God be infered in the same way?
According to Hebrews 11:1, faith involves more than mere belief. It also involves hope. So not only do we believe in the "thing not seen," but we also place our hope and trust in it. The reason I define faith as "trust in what we think is true," is because by definition, to believe something is to think it is true, and because believing, by itself, isn't what faith is, but rather, faith is also hope and trust in the object of our faith. It's possible for me to have some belief but not put my trust in it. For example, I may believe that my chair is able to hold me up without ever sitting in it, but to sit in the chair is to trust it to hold me up. In the same way, a person may believe the gospel is true, but to have faith in the gospel is to actually trust in Jesus for their salvation.
I actually don't take the phrase, "things not seen," to mean things like angels, spirits, and things that we have no visual perception of. I take it to be referring to the substance of the things hoped for. The reason I take it that way is because this passage seems to closely correspond to Romans 8:18-25 where Paul is talking about the renewal of the cosmos and the resurrection, which he calls the "redemption of our body." He says, "For in hope we have been saved, but hope that is seen is not hope; for why does one also hope for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, with perseverance we wait eagerly for it." What Paul means by "seen" here clearly isn't visual perception. He's just referring to an event that hasn't happened yet. In the same way, I don't take Hebrews 11:1 to mean "belief in something you can't see," but rather, "hope in something that hasn't happened yet." See how the two phrases, "substance of things hoped for," and "evidence of things not seen," go together according to this undersanding? Our hope is in a resurrection to eternal life which hasn't happened yet, and we place our faith in Jesus for that hope. It has nothing to do with belief in the absense of evidence.
Part 2
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
When arguments go awry
It's interesting when you do a lot of debating on message boards and stuff that there are some things you say that are guaranteed to be misunderstood. It's like something happens between the time the words leave your mind and arrive at the other person's mind. They hear something completely different than what you say. Here are a few examples:
When arguing for the resurrection, we will sometimes make the point that since the disciples were willing to lay down their lives for their beliefs, it's clear that they were not just pulling off some kind of scam; they really believed what they were saying. When you make this point, people hear something completely different. What they hear is that since the disciples were willing to die for their beliefs, then Christianity must be true. And then they'll point out the many other people from other religions who have been willing to die for their beliefs. I always respond the same way. I point out that the fact that other people are willing to die for their beliefs proves the same thing in their case as it does in mine. If people die for their beliefs, it proves they really believe it.
When spelling out the kalam cosmological argument, the first premise is "Whatever begins to exist has a cause to its existence." But that's not what people hear. What they hear is, "Whatever exists has a cause to its existence," and then they say, "Who created God?" They figure since God exists, then God must have a cause for his existence, too. Then you have to explain how there are two kinds of things in existence--those which had a beginning, and those which didn't. Those that didn't have a beginning don't require a cause. Those that do have a beginning do require a cause.
When making the moral argument for God, the first premise is that "If there is no God, then there are no objective moral values." But that's not what people hear. What they hear is, "If you don't believe in God, then you can't be moral." And then they go on to point out that atheists are often more moral than Christians, and they think they've refuted your argument.
Here's one more involving same sex marriage. Some people will defend same sex marriage on the basis that anybody ought to be allowed to marry if they love each other. To rebut that argument, we will point out that a brother and sister might love each other, so by their reasoning, we have to allow incest. Or we might point out that Jim, Jill, Jason, Joanna, John, and Jasmine all love each other, so by their reasoning, we'd have to allow polygamy, too. These are ad absurdum arguments. That's where you show that a position is false by taking it to its logical conclusion. The logical conclusion to the premise that people ought to be allowed to marry if they love each other is that brothers and sisters ought to be allowed to marry each other, and multiple partners ought to be allowed to marry each other. If we reject these conclusions, then we have to reject the premise they are based on since that premise leads inevitably to them.
But that's not what people hear. It's especially not what gay people hear. What people usually hear is this: If you start allowing gay marriages, then next thing you know, there'll be incest and polygamy. Then they'll accuse you of committing the slippery slope fallacy. (Of course in a sense, it is a logical slippery slope, but it's not the causal slippery slope they're accusing you of.)
Gay people hear something even worse. What they hear is that you're comparing homosexuality to polygamy and incest, and then they get offended. At this point it becomes impossible to reason with them, because they're offended. They refuse to actually address your argument from here on out, and instead whine about you likening their lifestyle to polygamy and incest because you're such a mean homophobe, and fundie, too. Of course the only sense in which you're likening them to incest and polygamy is in the fact that they love each other, but even heterosexuals love each other!
I tell ya, it's frustrating. The frustrating thing about it is that you know ahead of time that the person is going to hear something completely different than what you say, and you know ahead of time that you're going to have to correct their misunderstanding.
These are just a few examples off the top of my head. There are others. If you've noticed the same thing, please tells us about your experiences in the comments.
When arguing for the resurrection, we will sometimes make the point that since the disciples were willing to lay down their lives for their beliefs, it's clear that they were not just pulling off some kind of scam; they really believed what they were saying. When you make this point, people hear something completely different. What they hear is that since the disciples were willing to die for their beliefs, then Christianity must be true. And then they'll point out the many other people from other religions who have been willing to die for their beliefs. I always respond the same way. I point out that the fact that other people are willing to die for their beliefs proves the same thing in their case as it does in mine. If people die for their beliefs, it proves they really believe it.
When spelling out the kalam cosmological argument, the first premise is "Whatever begins to exist has a cause to its existence." But that's not what people hear. What they hear is, "Whatever exists has a cause to its existence," and then they say, "Who created God?" They figure since God exists, then God must have a cause for his existence, too. Then you have to explain how there are two kinds of things in existence--those which had a beginning, and those which didn't. Those that didn't have a beginning don't require a cause. Those that do have a beginning do require a cause.
When making the moral argument for God, the first premise is that "If there is no God, then there are no objective moral values." But that's not what people hear. What they hear is, "If you don't believe in God, then you can't be moral." And then they go on to point out that atheists are often more moral than Christians, and they think they've refuted your argument.
Here's one more involving same sex marriage. Some people will defend same sex marriage on the basis that anybody ought to be allowed to marry if they love each other. To rebut that argument, we will point out that a brother and sister might love each other, so by their reasoning, we have to allow incest. Or we might point out that Jim, Jill, Jason, Joanna, John, and Jasmine all love each other, so by their reasoning, we'd have to allow polygamy, too. These are ad absurdum arguments. That's where you show that a position is false by taking it to its logical conclusion. The logical conclusion to the premise that people ought to be allowed to marry if they love each other is that brothers and sisters ought to be allowed to marry each other, and multiple partners ought to be allowed to marry each other. If we reject these conclusions, then we have to reject the premise they are based on since that premise leads inevitably to them.
But that's not what people hear. It's especially not what gay people hear. What people usually hear is this: If you start allowing gay marriages, then next thing you know, there'll be incest and polygamy. Then they'll accuse you of committing the slippery slope fallacy. (Of course in a sense, it is a logical slippery slope, but it's not the causal slippery slope they're accusing you of.)
Gay people hear something even worse. What they hear is that you're comparing homosexuality to polygamy and incest, and then they get offended. At this point it becomes impossible to reason with them, because they're offended. They refuse to actually address your argument from here on out, and instead whine about you likening their lifestyle to polygamy and incest because you're such a mean homophobe, and fundie, too. Of course the only sense in which you're likening them to incest and polygamy is in the fact that they love each other, but even heterosexuals love each other!
I tell ya, it's frustrating. The frustrating thing about it is that you know ahead of time that the person is going to hear something completely different than what you say, and you know ahead of time that you're going to have to correct their misunderstanding.
These are just a few examples off the top of my head. There are others. If you've noticed the same thing, please tells us about your experiences in the comments.
Tuesday, September 27, 2005
more on self-refutation
While I’ve got your attention, I want to talk some more about self-refuting claims. There are several claims that have been made in class that are self-refuting.
There are no absolutes: That claim is self-refuting because if there are no absolutes, then the claim itself is not absolute, and if the claim itself is not absolute, then there are at least some absolutes. If the claim is absolute, then there is at least one absolute, namely, the claim itself.
There is nothing that is not in a constant state of change: Is the truth that nothing changes an unchanging truth? If it is, then there’s at least one unchanging truth, namely, the claim itself. If not, then the claim itself will change, and when it does, then there will be unchanging truths.
Truth is relative: If truth is relative, then the claim itself is only relatively true. It does not hold across the board, which means that truth is not necessarily relative.
Truth is created, not discovered: Was that truth created or discovered?
There are no truths: Then the statement itself is not true.
I think there were others, but I don’t remember what they were off the top of my head. I covered a few of them earlier in this post. I’m pretty tired now. I think I can study German if I don’t fall asleep. If you read this whole thing, then kudos to you. You’ve gone above and beyond the call of duty. Thanks for giving me a hearing.
Sam
There are no absolutes: That claim is self-refuting because if there are no absolutes, then the claim itself is not absolute, and if the claim itself is not absolute, then there are at least some absolutes. If the claim is absolute, then there is at least one absolute, namely, the claim itself.
There is nothing that is not in a constant state of change: Is the truth that nothing changes an unchanging truth? If it is, then there’s at least one unchanging truth, namely, the claim itself. If not, then the claim itself will change, and when it does, then there will be unchanging truths.
Truth is relative: If truth is relative, then the claim itself is only relatively true. It does not hold across the board, which means that truth is not necessarily relative.
Truth is created, not discovered: Was that truth created or discovered?
There are no truths: Then the statement itself is not true.
I think there were others, but I don’t remember what they were off the top of my head. I covered a few of them earlier in this post. I’m pretty tired now. I think I can study German if I don’t fall asleep. If you read this whole thing, then kudos to you. You’ve gone above and beyond the call of duty. Thanks for giving me a hearing.
Sam
Monday, September 26, 2005
knowledge by inductive reasoning
Inductive reasoning is where you reason from the specific to the general, unlike deductive where you reason from the general to the specific. Inductive reasoning depends on assumptions such as that the future will be like the past and that the universe is uniform. The scientific method is based on induction. It assumes that the future will be like the past. Experiments are performed and repeated over and over, and when a large enough sampling is taken, scientists conclude that the results that have been reached so far will also be manifest in the future. So, for example, if things always fall when we drop them, and they’ve always done that in the past, then they will probably also do that tomorrow.
As David Hume and many others before him have pointed out, the assumptions of the scientific method cannot be proved by the scientific method. How would you go about proving that the future will be like the past? The temptation is to say, “Well, the scientific method has always worked in the past, so surely it will work tomorrow,” but that begs the question because whether or not the future will be like the past is the thing we’re trying to prove. So the only way the scientific method can give us true information is if we assume the future will be like the past. It’s not even provable in principle. The scientific method is the least reliable way we can know things because it depends on the previous ways we can know things. It depends on the reliability of our sensory experience to give us true information about the world, and it depends on our intuitive knowledge of the uniformity of nature. No conclusion can be more reliable than the premises upon which it rests.
That’s why scientism is self-refuting. Scientism is the belief that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge we can have. If something is not demonstrated by the scientific method, then it can’t be known. That’s a self-refuting claim because the claim itself cannot be demonstrated by the scientific method.
It seems like we are well-justified in trusting inductive reasoning in general and the scientific method in particular to give us true information. What is remarkable is the fact that it seems we can be more certain about our knowledge of immaterial things than about material things since our knowledge at the intuitive level—the most reliable level—is full of knowledge about immaterial things like logic, minds, propositions, numbers, etc.
There are other ways we know things (e.g. knowledge by analogy is how we know solipsism is false), but those are the four major ways as I see it. Of course epistemology is a fairly broad area of philosophy.
Next: More on self-refutation
As David Hume and many others before him have pointed out, the assumptions of the scientific method cannot be proved by the scientific method. How would you go about proving that the future will be like the past? The temptation is to say, “Well, the scientific method has always worked in the past, so surely it will work tomorrow,” but that begs the question because whether or not the future will be like the past is the thing we’re trying to prove. So the only way the scientific method can give us true information is if we assume the future will be like the past. It’s not even provable in principle. The scientific method is the least reliable way we can know things because it depends on the previous ways we can know things. It depends on the reliability of our sensory experience to give us true information about the world, and it depends on our intuitive knowledge of the uniformity of nature. No conclusion can be more reliable than the premises upon which it rests.
That’s why scientism is self-refuting. Scientism is the belief that scientific knowledge is the only knowledge we can have. If something is not demonstrated by the scientific method, then it can’t be known. That’s a self-refuting claim because the claim itself cannot be demonstrated by the scientific method.
It seems like we are well-justified in trusting inductive reasoning in general and the scientific method in particular to give us true information. What is remarkable is the fact that it seems we can be more certain about our knowledge of immaterial things than about material things since our knowledge at the intuitive level—the most reliable level—is full of knowledge about immaterial things like logic, minds, propositions, numbers, etc.
There are other ways we know things (e.g. knowledge by analogy is how we know solipsism is false), but those are the four major ways as I see it. Of course epistemology is a fairly broad area of philosophy.
Next: More on self-refutation
Friday, September 23, 2005
knowledge by sensory perceptions
The third way we can know things is through sensory experience. Here, we are moving away from certainty because, as Descartes said, it is possible that our senses are deceiving us. Here is where I agree with Nietzsche in his criticism of some philosophers. The ironic thing, though, is that it is actually eastern philosophers who doubt the existence of the external world. Hindus think everything is maya, that is, illusion. Western philosophers generally accept the existence of the external world, so what Nietzsche’s real problem should be is with the fact that some western philosophers think the physical world is not all there is in reality. Here we notice something interesting. If we assume that our senses are giving us true information about the world, then what do we base that knowledge on? Do we base it on our sensory experience? No, we base it on our intuition. We just assume our senses are giving us true information. So those who claim that we can only have knowledge through our senses are making a self-refuting claim since their claim is not known through their senses. Since the claim is self-refuting, we know that it is false. Since it’s false, it cannot be the case that sensory experience is the only way we can know things. Intuition is the other way we can know, and we could not know anything through our senses if it were not for intuition to tell us that we should trust our senses.
But should we trust our senses? I think so. One of the arguments used against relying on our senses is the fact that we dream and the fact that we hallucinate. But look at it this way. If we are in a constant state of delusion, then how would we ever know that we had been hallucinating before or that we had been dreaming before? The only way we can know that is if we are not dreaming or hallucinating now. The fact that we make a distinction between dream and reality shows that we are not always dreaming. We are not always delusional.
Should we trust our intuition when it tells us to trust our senses? I think so. I asked one person in class whose name I can’t remember whether he thought it was more reasonable to believe that the world is maya or to believe the world is real. He said he didn’t prefer one over the other. But how many of you would walk out into moving traffic and ask, “What is reality anyway?” I suspect that when it comes down to it, you all believe very strongly in the physical world. And what reason is there not to? While it may be possible that we are being deceived, the fact that it is possible does not mean that it’s reasonable to believe. The external world stares us in the face every day, but the theory that the world isn’t really there is contrived. It’s just made up. Nobody lives consistently with the belief that the external world is an illusion because no matter how much we deny the physical world, we all live in it, and we all believe in it.
At this point, we can see how we are moving from certainty to doubt. Some of those things we knew intuitively are actually more certain that what we can know of the physical world. There is one last way of knowing that I’ll mention, and although it is said by some to be the most reliable way of knowing, it is actually the least reliable because it depends on the previous ways of knowing for it’s foundation. That is inductive reasoning.
[In a debate I had a couple of years ago, the person I was debating with said we can trust our senses, because everybody else around us is observing the same thing. If I see a green jeep, and everybody around me sees the same thing, then I should trust that my perception of the green jeep is accurate.
But this argument is question-begging. How do we know that there's anybody around us that sees what we see? Well, we can only know that through our senses. We have to see these other people, and we have to hear them when they tell us they see the same thing. The only way we can appeal to other people is if we assume already that our senses are giving us true information about the external world, and that begs the whole question.
Another person might say that our different senses themselves give us multiple attestation. If our nose, ears, eyes, and hands, all agree that the green jeep is there, I should trust them.
But this argument fails, too, because all of our sensory experiences take place in one and the same mind. When we dream, we see people talking and hear their voices at the same time, and yet it all goes on in the mind. If all of our senses are in question, then we can't appeal to any of them to justify the others. And we can't appeal to consistency either, because our mind produces consistent perceptions even when we're dreaming.]
Next: Knowledge by inductive reasoning
But should we trust our senses? I think so. One of the arguments used against relying on our senses is the fact that we dream and the fact that we hallucinate. But look at it this way. If we are in a constant state of delusion, then how would we ever know that we had been hallucinating before or that we had been dreaming before? The only way we can know that is if we are not dreaming or hallucinating now. The fact that we make a distinction between dream and reality shows that we are not always dreaming. We are not always delusional.
Should we trust our intuition when it tells us to trust our senses? I think so. I asked one person in class whose name I can’t remember whether he thought it was more reasonable to believe that the world is maya or to believe the world is real. He said he didn’t prefer one over the other. But how many of you would walk out into moving traffic and ask, “What is reality anyway?” I suspect that when it comes down to it, you all believe very strongly in the physical world. And what reason is there not to? While it may be possible that we are being deceived, the fact that it is possible does not mean that it’s reasonable to believe. The external world stares us in the face every day, but the theory that the world isn’t really there is contrived. It’s just made up. Nobody lives consistently with the belief that the external world is an illusion because no matter how much we deny the physical world, we all live in it, and we all believe in it.
At this point, we can see how we are moving from certainty to doubt. Some of those things we knew intuitively are actually more certain that what we can know of the physical world. There is one last way of knowing that I’ll mention, and although it is said by some to be the most reliable way of knowing, it is actually the least reliable because it depends on the previous ways of knowing for it’s foundation. That is inductive reasoning.
[In a debate I had a couple of years ago, the person I was debating with said we can trust our senses, because everybody else around us is observing the same thing. If I see a green jeep, and everybody around me sees the same thing, then I should trust that my perception of the green jeep is accurate.
But this argument is question-begging. How do we know that there's anybody around us that sees what we see? Well, we can only know that through our senses. We have to see these other people, and we have to hear them when they tell us they see the same thing. The only way we can appeal to other people is if we assume already that our senses are giving us true information about the external world, and that begs the whole question.
Another person might say that our different senses themselves give us multiple attestation. If our nose, ears, eyes, and hands, all agree that the green jeep is there, I should trust them.
But this argument fails, too, because all of our sensory experiences take place in one and the same mind. When we dream, we see people talking and hear their voices at the same time, and yet it all goes on in the mind. If all of our senses are in question, then we can't appeal to any of them to justify the others. And we can't appeal to consistency either, because our mind produces consistent perceptions even when we're dreaming.]
Next: Knowledge by inductive reasoning
Thursday, September 22, 2005
logic and language
The argument was made in class that logic was invented right along with language, which implies somehow that if we had just redone language, we could’ve also undone logic. If it is the case, however, that language actually conveys true information about ideas, then logic does not apply merely to language, but also to ideas, and if ideas can actually correspond to reality, then logic also corresponds to reality.
We can easily know that language actually does accurately convey ideas because the negation of that is self-refuting. The claim that “Language cannot convey meaning,” is self-refuting when understood. If language could not convey meaning, we would not be able to really understand what the statement meant or what the speaker meant by saying it. If Nietzsche makes the claim that language cannot convey meaning, and if we believe him, then it’s pointless for us to read him since we have no hope of understanding what he was trying to convey to us.
The fact that language conveys meaning is obvious. The other morning, I did another thought experiment with a co-worker named Donna. I said, “Donna, look at the TV,” and she turned her head and looked at the TV. Then I said, “Donna, look back at me,” and she turned her head and looked back at me. I had an idea of what I wanted her to do in my head, and I used language to convey that to her. Either my language accurately conveyed my thought to her, or else it was just a huge coincidence that she did exactly what I had envisioned. Which is more reasonable to believe?
One person in class rightly pointed out that language is a created system of tokens. A statement represents an idea, but it is not the idea itself. One proposition can be stated in a variety of different ways. You can state a proposition in different languages, and you can write it several times on a sheet of paper, but you’re still talking about the same proposition. The usefulness of language is in the fact that it can actually correspond to reality. Now if language can correspond to reality, then so does logic. If you claim that logic is a function of language, and that language corresponds to reality, then logic must also correspond to reality.
If logic did not apply to the real world, there would be nothing to prevent you from building a house that was bigger on the inside than the outside. Married bachelors might be as common as either single or married people. You could even exist and not exist at the same time. Everyone, including eastern philosophers who claim to subscribe to both/and thinking and reject either/or thinking use logic every day of their lives. Nobody walks out into moving traffic because they know it’s either them or the car, not both.
We would not be able to infer anything through deduction if not for intuition, for we must be able to recognize and know the laws of logic before we can use them. So logic and deduction depend on our intuitive knowledge.
[I might also point out that while a person can say things like "four-sided triangle," or "married bachelor," no such entities can exist in reality. You can say, "My cat is pregnant, and the same cat is also not pregnant," but your cat can't actually be both pregnant and not pregnant at the same time and in the same sense. That's because logic is not merely a function of language. Nor are the laws of logic merely laws of thought. They are laws of reality. It is because logic is a function of reality that we must think logically if our thoughts are to have any correspondence with reality.]
Next: Knowledge by sensory perception
We can easily know that language actually does accurately convey ideas because the negation of that is self-refuting. The claim that “Language cannot convey meaning,” is self-refuting when understood. If language could not convey meaning, we would not be able to really understand what the statement meant or what the speaker meant by saying it. If Nietzsche makes the claim that language cannot convey meaning, and if we believe him, then it’s pointless for us to read him since we have no hope of understanding what he was trying to convey to us.
The fact that language conveys meaning is obvious. The other morning, I did another thought experiment with a co-worker named Donna. I said, “Donna, look at the TV,” and she turned her head and looked at the TV. Then I said, “Donna, look back at me,” and she turned her head and looked back at me. I had an idea of what I wanted her to do in my head, and I used language to convey that to her. Either my language accurately conveyed my thought to her, or else it was just a huge coincidence that she did exactly what I had envisioned. Which is more reasonable to believe?
One person in class rightly pointed out that language is a created system of tokens. A statement represents an idea, but it is not the idea itself. One proposition can be stated in a variety of different ways. You can state a proposition in different languages, and you can write it several times on a sheet of paper, but you’re still talking about the same proposition. The usefulness of language is in the fact that it can actually correspond to reality. Now if language can correspond to reality, then so does logic. If you claim that logic is a function of language, and that language corresponds to reality, then logic must also correspond to reality.
If logic did not apply to the real world, there would be nothing to prevent you from building a house that was bigger on the inside than the outside. Married bachelors might be as common as either single or married people. You could even exist and not exist at the same time. Everyone, including eastern philosophers who claim to subscribe to both/and thinking and reject either/or thinking use logic every day of their lives. Nobody walks out into moving traffic because they know it’s either them or the car, not both.
We would not be able to infer anything through deduction if not for intuition, for we must be able to recognize and know the laws of logic before we can use them. So logic and deduction depend on our intuitive knowledge.
[I might also point out that while a person can say things like "four-sided triangle," or "married bachelor," no such entities can exist in reality. You can say, "My cat is pregnant, and the same cat is also not pregnant," but your cat can't actually be both pregnant and not pregnant at the same time and in the same sense. That's because logic is not merely a function of language. Nor are the laws of logic merely laws of thought. They are laws of reality. It is because logic is a function of reality that we must think logically if our thoughts are to have any correspondence with reality.]
Next: Knowledge by sensory perception
Wednesday, September 21, 2005
The logic challenge
If you’re still having your doubts about logic, then I have a couple of challenges for you. The first challenge is this: Take a piece of paper and draw a four-sided triangle. The second challenge is this: Take a piece of paper and draw three straight lines, labeled A, B, and C, such that A is longer than B, B is longer than C, and C is longer than A. When you fail, ask yourself why. (Hint: Both challenges entail logical contradictions.) You will notice that logic is not a mere matter of language. It actually applies to the external world. You need not search the universe to see if there are any four-sided triangles. You can already see that there aren’t just by noticing that a four-sided triangle is a contradiction.
[A few years ago, I started two threads on beliefnet where I made these two challenged to anybody who denied logic. I was going to post a link to those threads here, but I can't find them. If I find them, I'll post a link in the comments section.]
Next: Logic and language
[A few years ago, I started two threads on beliefnet where I made these two challenged to anybody who denied logic. I was going to post a link to those threads here, but I can't find them. If I find them, I'll post a link in the comments section.]
Next: Logic and language
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