No True Christians (or Scotsmen)

I wanted to make a clarification about the No True Scotsman fallacy because I've seen a lot of people on the internet recklessly accuse people of committing this fallacy whenever they say something that merely resembles a "no true Scotsman" statement. Here's the no true Scotsman fallacy in a nutshell.

Jim: No Scotsman puts pineapple on his pizza.

Bob: Wait a minute. Dan is a Scotsman, and he puts pineapple on his pizza.

Jim: Well, Dan isn't a true Scotsman, though.

Bob: Why do you say that?

Jim: Because he puts pineapple on his pizza. No true Scotsman would do that.

Jim is committing the No True Scotsman fallacy. He makes a claim about all Scotsman, and when presented with a counter-example to his claim, he merely redefines "Scotsman" in such a way as to rule out the counter-example. Unless not putting pineapple on your pizza is part of what it means to be a Scotsman, this is an illegitimate move on Jim's part.

And therein lies the mistake a lot of people make when accusing others of committing this fallacy. Whether it's a fallacy or not depends on whether Jim is making a generalization that may or may not be true, or whether Jim is giving a definition, which would entail that it's true of necessity. Some people have a knee jerk reaction whenever any claim resembling, "No true Scotsman" is made. I've heard people say things like, "You're in No True Scotsman territory," and their use of territory seems to be a way of hedging their accusation in case they've misidentified an occasion of the fallacy.

But let me give you an example of a No True Scotsman-Like statement that does not commit the fallacy so you can see what I'm talking about.

Jim: All archers shoot bows.

Bob: Wait a minute. Dan is an archer and he doesn't shoot a bow.

Jim: Well, Dan isn't a true archer.

Bob: Why do you say that?

Jim: Because Dan doesn't shoot bows. All true archers shoot bows.

Obviously Jim hasn't committed any fallacy because shooting a bow is an essential part of what it means to be an archer. An archer is somebody who shoots bows. It's Bob who has made the mistake here because he thinks somebody is an archer who doesn't shoot bows.

As a side note here, you may quibble with the fact that I said, "all archers" instead of "no archers." But these are horns on the same goat. To say, "All P's are Q" is logically equivalent to saying, "No P's are Not-Q." So if all archers shoot bows, then there are no archers who do not shoot bows.

This confusion about the No True Scotsman fallacy comes up in the context of Christians sometimes. One person will make a claim about all Christians, somebody else will come up with a supposed counter-example, and the first person will dismiss the counter-example on the basis that the person isn't a real Christian. Now, it could be that in a lot of these cases, the No True Scotsman fallacy really is being committed. Here's an example of when the fallacy is being committed.

Jim: All Christians vote Republican.

Bob: Dan doesn't vote Republican.

Jim: Dan isn't a true Christian.

Bob: Why not?

Jim: Because he votes Democrat. No true Christian would vote Democrat.

Jim commits the No True Scotsman fallacy because whether you vote Republican or Democrat (or whatever) isn't part of what it means to be a Christian. Nor does voting for one party or the other exclude one from being a Christian. But consider this conversation:

Jim: All Christians are followers of Christ.

Bob: Dan is a Christian, and he doesn't follow Christ.

Jim: Well, obviously, Dan isn't a real Christian. All real Christians follow Christ because that's what it means to be a Christian.

In this case, Dan is just confused about what it means to be a Christian. That's how he managed to misidentify somebody as being a counter-example to Jim's claim. Jim wasn't telling Bob something that just happened to be true about all Christians. He was telling Bob what it means to be a Christian. He was giving Bob a definition of "Christian."

Now, there is some gray area here. Consider a case in which some property may not be part of the definition of a class of people, but it is nevertheless how we usually identity people of that class. For example, we usually identify Mormon missionaries as people who wear Latter Day Saint Elder name tags while they're out and about doing their missionary work. Now consider this dialogue:

Jim: All Mormon missionaries wear name tags when out witnessing.

Bob: Dan doesn't.

Jim: Well, Dan isn't even a Mormon missionary.

Bob: Why do you say that?

Jim: Because if he was a Mormon missionary, he'd be wearing a name tag. No true Mormon missionary goes door to door without their Latter Day Saint Elder name tag.

Has Jim committed the No True Scotsman fallacy? Maybe and maybe not. Wearing a name tag isn't what makes somebody a Mormon missionary, and it's at least possible for a Mormon missionary to go door to door without their name tag. That would indicate that Jim has committed the No True Scotsman fallacy. On the other hand, the name tag is one of the primary ways we identify Mormon missionaries, and since it's practically unheard of for one of them to go about witnessing without their name tag, the fact that somebody isn't wearing one is a good indication that they're not a Mormon missionary. If Mormon missionaries happen to be really good about remembering their name tags, and if there happen to be imposters out there, then the lack of a name tag is a good indication that somebody isn't actually a Mormon missionary. So maybe Jim isn't committing the No True Scotsman fallacy after all. He's just giving a piece of evidence to indicate that Dan is probably not actually a Mormon missionary.

There can be gray areas in the case of Christians because Christians disagree amongst themselves about what is essential to Christianity and what excludes somebody from being a Christian. For example, most Christians think belief in the resurrection of Jesus is essential to Christianity and that if you don't believe in the resurrection, then you're not a true Christian. Other people disagree. There are what's called "liberal protestants," who consider themselves Christians but who may or may not believe Jesus literally rose from the dead. Here's Jim and Bob again.

Jim: All Christians believe Jesus literally rose from the dead.

Bob: John Shelby Spong doesn't believe in the literal resurrection, and he's a Bishop of an Episcopal church. Obviously, he's a counter-example to your claim.

Jim: Mr. Spong is not a true Christian. He's a fake.

Bob: Why do you say that?

Jim: If he was a true Christian, then he'd believe in the literal resurrection of Jesus.

Some people are going to think Jim committed the No True Scotsman fallacy, and some aren't. It depends on whether you think belief in the literal resurrection of Jesus is essential to being a Christian or not. If it is, then Jim isn't committing a fallacy. If it's not, then he is committing a fallacy. I happened to be one of those who thinks the literal resurrection of Jesus is essential, so I don't think Jim is committing any fallacy. I have no qualms whatsoever in identifying John Shelby Spong as a fake Christian on the basis that he claims to be a Christian but denies the literal resurrection of Jesus. The same thing is true of John Dominic Crossan, though I have a lot of respect for Crossan as an academic. There are a lot of people who claim to be Christians but who aren't. There have been since the earliest days of Christianity.

The resurrection is a case where the definition of "Christian" is the deciding factor, but the case that usually comes up has more to do with identifying people as Christians by looking at their behavior. For example, people sometimes will cast dispersions on Christians in general based on the behavior of some people who called themselves Christians. The defense against these accusations is to say, "Well, those people weren't true Christians, and we know that because of their actions." This is a gray area because, on the one hand, all Christians sin, and being a Christian doesn't mean you'll never sin. But on the other hand, a person who has been regenerated by God will be sanctified by the Holy Spirit, and as a result should exhibit the fruit of the Spirit--love, joy, patience, kindness, self-control, etc. So there is a degree to which one can observe somebody's life to determine whether an actual conversion has taken place or not. And this is important because there have been times in history when claiming to be a Christian was expedient even if one was not actually a Christian.

The case of Adolf Hitler is a good example. He was attempting to become a leader of a predominantly Lutheran country. As a typical politician, we should expect him to say things that are friendly to Lutheranism. But apart from that, when you look at his life, there's no reason in the world to take his Christian claims seriously. He obviously wasn't a Christian because no true Christian would behave the way he did.

But how bad can a person be before it's obvious they're not really a Christian, in spite of their claims? I don't know. I've done things that made me question my own Christianity. I do think that when people doubt other's Christianity on the basis of their behavior, they are in No True Scotsman territory, but whether they've actually committed the fallacy or not is sometimes hard to tell.

Further reading

"Epistemological and ontological assurance of Salvation" This is about how behavior can serve as evidence of whether somebody is really a regenerated Christian or not.

"ad hominem, no true Scotsman, and arguments from authority" This one has a little more on the No True Scotsman fallacy.

Ad hominem fallacy revisited

In the past I used to say that insults are not necessarily ad hominems (see ad hominem, no true Scotsman, an arguments from authority) Insults are just insults. They only become ad hominems when they are meant to cast doubt on the other person's position. For example, if I say, "You're an idiot," I may be insulting you, but I'm not committing the ad hominem fallacy. It's only the ad hominem fallacy if I say something like, "You're an idiot; therefore, you are wrong."

I've changed my mind, though. Ad hominem just means "against the man." As long as your comment is against the man rather than against the argument, that's an ad hominem. Since that's exactly what personal insults are, then person insults are ad hominems.

A comment doesn't have to be a mistake in reasoning in order to be a fallacy. Red herrings are also considered fallacies even though they are not mistakes in reasoning. A red herring is a fallacy of distraction. It's meant to draw somebody's attention away from the main point. Insults do the same thing, so insults can be considered red herrings. Ad hominems of this type fall under the general category of red herring. They are fallacies because, like all red herrings, the fallacy lies in the fact that they suffer from irrelevance.

ad hominem, no true Scotsman, and arguments from authority

I just thought I'd write a quick note on the ad hominem and no true Scotsman fallacies, because I've noticed a lot of people being confused by them.

A lot of people confuse an insult for an ad hominem fallacy.  Ad hominems do often involve insults, but they don't necessarily, and not all insults are ad hominems.  If I said that you're a man, and therefore your opinion on abortion cannot be trusted, I'm using an ad hominem argument, but I'm not insulting you.  Calling you a man is not a criticism.  It's just an observation about you that is irrelevant to the soundness of whatever argument you have for or against abortion.  If you gave me an argument against abortion, and my reaction was to call you an idiot, that is not an ad hominem.  That's just an insult.  It only becomes an ad hominem if I say something like, "Since you are an idiot, you must be wrong about abortion."  An ad hominem is when you point to something about a person that is irrelevant to the soundness of their argument or the truth of their point of view, but you offer it as evidence against their point of view or the soundness of their argument.

A lot of people lately have been accusing Bart Ehrman of the No True Scotsman fallacy, but they are confused about what the fallacy is.  A fellow named Jason Goertzen had this to say in the comment section of Ehrman's piece called "Acharya S, Richard Carrier, and a Cocky Peter (Or: "A Cock and Bull Story")":

I lost count of the number of times you felt the need to point out that "no serious scholars" (a variant of the No True Scotsman fallacy, given how strenuously you define what you mean) believes x, or y; to the person who wants to be convinced, this isn't adequate.

Ehrman doesn't dismiss people as being serious scholars because they deny the existence of Jesus.  A fellow named Steve Bollinger said on his blog:

But it's not merely that Ehrman declares the discussion to be over; he states as well, on no firm basis whatsoever if you ask me, that no accredited professor in the Western World "who teaches New Testament or Early Christianity or even Classics" disagrees with him.  That already puts Ehrman into no-true-Scotsman territory.

Ehrman doesn't dismiss these people because they deny the existence of Jesus, so this is not the No True Scotsman fallacy.

Here is an illustration of the fallacy:

Jim:  No Scotsman would ever tell a lie.

Bob:  But Dan is a Scotsman, and he tells lies.

Jim:  Dan is not a true Scotsman.

Bob:  Why do you say that?

Jim:  Because no true Scotsman would ever tell a lie.  The fact that he tells lies proves that he's not a true Scotsman.

The No True Scotsman fallacy trades on a distinction between an analytic truth and a synthetic truth.  If being honest were part of what it meant to be a Scotsman, then when Jim says no Scotsman would ever tell a lie, he's not making a synthetic statement.  He's making an analytic statement.  He's giving us part of the definition of a Scotsman.  If he's right, then Bob is stating a contradiction.  Saying that Dan is a Scotsman who tells lies is equivalent to saying, "A person who tells no lies, actually does tells lies."

The No True Scotsman fallacy only comes into play when statements like "No Scotsman would ever tell a lie" is a synthetic statement.  Jim isn't saying that it's part of the definition of a Scotsman that they don't tell lies.  He's saying something that happens to be true about Scotsmen, but it's not a necessary truth.  It's not part of the definition.  In fact, it's possible that a Scotsman could tell a lie even if none ever have.  In that case, Jim is committing a fallacy when he objects to Dan being a Scotsman merely on the basis that Dan tells lies and no true Scotsman tells a lie.  If you reason that way, then you're basically just dismissing the possibility of counter-examples to your claim.  Jim is treating a synthetic statement as if it were an analytic statement.

In the case of Bart Ehrman, he has claimed that most of the mythicists who deny the existence of  Jesus are not credentialed scholars.  For that, he is being accused of committing the No True Scotsman Fallacy. But to be guilty of the No True Scotsman fallacy, Ehrman would have to be saying that the reason these mythicists are not credentialed scholars is because they deny the existence of Jesus.   It would have to go something like this:

Bart:  No credentialed scholar of the New Testament would ever deny the existence of Jesus.

Robert:  But D.M. Murdock is a credentialed scholar, and she denies the existence of Jesus.

Bart:  The fact that she denies the existence of Jesus is precisely why I say she is not a credentialed scholar.

But that is not how Ehrman has been arguing.  Rather, he's been saying that she and most mythicists are not credentialed scholars because they do not have advanced degrees in the relevant areas, they are not published in peer reviewed academic journals, and they don't hold teaching positions at any colleges or universities on the relevant subjects.   A person might still accuse Ehrman of the No True Scotsman fallacy on the basis that every time somebody comes up with a counter-example, Ehrman changes his definition of what counts as a "credentialed scholar" so as to dismiss the counter-example.  But so far, to my knowledge, this has never happened.  These are not arbitrary criteria for what counts as an expert meant to exclude people who deny the existence of Jesus.  I remember when I had to write papers in college, pretty much all of my professors, whether in philosophy or history, demanded that our secondary sources be academic.  I remember one of my philosophy professors specifically said that we could not quote from a web page called "Joe's Automotive and Existential Philosophy."  Credibility in our sources mattered, and we had to use scholarly sources.

But let's suppose it turns out that Ehrman argues something like this:  Since most mythicists are not credentialed scholars, their opinion on the existence of Jesus is false, or their arguments against the existence of Jesus are unsound.  If he argues that way, then he's not committing the No True Scotsman fallacy.  Rather, he's committing an ad hominem fallacy.  A person's credentials are irrelevant to whether their point of view is true or their argument is sound.

A person's credentials are not completely irrelevant in this whole debate, though.  They are relevant only in cases of arguments from authority.  If you cite Richard Dawkins as an authority on the cosmological argument, then that is a fallacious appeal to authority because he has no expertise in the subject.  But if you quote Richard Dawkins as an authority on the subject of gene replication, then that is not a fallacious appeal to authority.  He actually is an expert in the subject of biology.  An appeal to authority is only a fallacy if the authority you appeal to is not an expert on the subject you cite him on.  If somebody is actually an expert in the subject of the New Testament or historical Jesus studies, then their opinion is relevant.

But some people will claim that any appeal to authority is a fallacy since it's the argument the authorities use that count, and not the mere fact that they are authorities.  I vaguely remember Robert Price going so far as to say there are no authorities when it comes to the historical Jesus.  I think he may have a point.  The opinions about Jesus in academia are diverse.  If the experts disagree, then it's fallacious to quote one of the experts to support a view that's actually controversial among that expert's peers.  On the other hand, there are a handful of things about Jesus for which there is a strong consensus among experts, e.g., he was baptized by John the Baptist, he had disciples, he preached about the kingdom of God, he used parables in his teaching, he was known for being a miracle worker, and he was crucified on the orders of Pontius Pilate.

In his recent podcast, Price said he had written a pieces called "Paradigm Policemen," where he criticized Bart Ehrman for vociferously defending the status quo.  Price made what I thought were some good points, but I think he went too far.  It is true that the mere existence of a consensus does not mean the consensus is right, and it's true that if we stick to consensus and never dare to challenge it, that we stifle progress.  After all, we can point to moments in our history when paradigms were overturned, often with much difficulty.  The Copernican Revolution is one of the most famous examples.  Price thinks it's a mistake for Ehrman to criticize mythicists merely on the basis that they are going against the current consensus on the existence of Jesus.  I think he's right, but on the other hand, I do think consensus counts for something.

Most of us are not experts in any field.  We're armchair theologians, armchair philosophers, armchair historians, armchair biologists, etc.  Most of our education comes from reading books, not doing our own research.  Many of us read books and think that counts as doing research.  But really, for the majority of our educations, both formal and informal, we rely on the findings of experts.  If consensus counted for nothing, then our educations would be worthless.  We could read a dozen books on the historical Jesus or evolution and still not know anything.

Sometimes, if you're writing on a historical point of view, it is too tedious to spell out the arguments for every little piece of evidence you bring forth.  Even scholars, when writing on the historical Jesus, will appeal to studies that other scholars have done on some small point, then use that small point as part of their case for their point of view.  It helps when there's a consensus because then you can use that piece of information in your case without too many people raising objections about it.  If consensus didn't matter, or if expert opinion didn't matter, then we would never be able to build on information discovered by other people.  Everybody who wrote on any subject in history or biology would have to start from scratch.

I think we should lean in favour of the experts, especially when there's a consensus, but we should not do so dogmatically.  We should be willing to go against consensus when we ourselves have done enough research or have been adequately persuaded to hold a differing opinion.  I can't tell you what's adequate. You have to judge that on a case by case basis, and in a lot of cases, it's subjective.  But I don't think we should fault mythicists merely on the basis that they are in the minority.

However, I think it is appropriate to point out that there is a strong consensus among experts on the existence of Jesus to people we run into on the internet because most of them haven't done any research.  They've watched Zeitgeist and just took their word for it.  If they're going to just take somebody's word for something, then they should take the word of those who are actually credentialed scholars.  It's appropriate to bring up the consensus for a lot of those people because they may just not know any better. Two or three years ago, I got an email from somebody who had just seen Religulous with Bill Maher.  Apparently, Maher had brought up the whole myth thing, which was completely new to the person who emailed me.  She did a quick google search, found a short article on Religious Tolerance about Jesus and Horus, and was convinced.  This was all new to her, and she wanted to see what I'd think.  I think she half expected me to be surprised.  I think it was perfectly appropriate for me to point out that almost every single New Testament scholar or historical Jesus scholar believed that Jesus really existed, and that it wasn't even a serious debate in academia.

I'm rambling, aren't I?  Okay, I'l stop.