Lambda-CDM vs. Timescape

A long long time ago, Albert Eistein felt like he needed to have a cosmological constant in his field equations to counter the force of gravity because without it, the universe should be collapsing or expanding. When it was discovered later on (I think by Edwin Hubble) that the universe was expanding, Einstein was all like, "The cosmological constant was the biggest blunder of my career."

Once it became widely accepted that the universe was expanding, it was always assumed that the rate at which it expands should be slowing down because of gravity. The big question was whether it was slowing down fast enough to cause the universe to recollapse or if the universe would expand forever. In 1998, some astrophycisists tried to answer this question, but what they found, instead, was that the expansion of the universe was accelerating.

The accelerating expansion of the universe gave rise to the Λ-CDM model of the universe (aka Lambda-Cold Dark Matter), which has been the prevailing view for the last two decades. Lambda is the old cosmological constant that has resurfaced. Eistein's "blunder" wasn't a blunder after all. Lambda was back. Nobody knew what was causing the expanasion of the universe to accelerate, so they called it "dark energy." Lots of ideas have been suggested for what might be causing it.

Well, recently, there has been a new plot twist. Two papers were published suggesting that the accelerating expansion might just be an illusion brought on by time dilation. You see, as the universe expands, it becomes more clumpy. Galaxies merge, while voids become bigger. Since time passes more slowly near massive objects (because of the higher gravity), and time passes more quickly in the voids, this may cause it to appear that the expansion of the universe is accelerating when it really isn't.

This other model of the universe is called Timescape, and it does away with the cosmological constant because the expansion of the universe isn't really accelerating. If Timescape turns out to be right, it would undermine the Λ-CDM model. You wouldn't need a cosmological constant.

What I find interesting about this development is that the cosmological constant is often cited as the best example of fine-tuning. They say that the cosmological constant is so fine-tuned that if it were to differ by one part in 10¹²⁰, then the universe would either have collapsed too quickly for life to have ever emerged, or it would have expanded so fast that stars and galaxies could not have formed, in which case, life would not have been possible. The cosmological constant has to be fine-tuned to an incredibly precise value for life to even be possible in the universe, they say.

But if Timescape is true, then there isn't a cosmological constant at all, much less a fine-tuned one. I find that very interesting.

Several YouTube science channels have commented on the two new papers. Two of the best videos I've seen on it were by Dr. Becky and PBS Spacetime. I recommend watching these videos because they explain the papers really well. They both express skepticism about the Timescape model and say the evidence still favours Λ-CDM.

I suppose only time will tell. It's like whenever somebody claims to have discovered some artifact that over-turns everything we thought we knew about the ancient world. You have to wait and see. Sometimes, it pans out, and sometimes it doesn't. Most of the time, it doesn't. But it's always very interesting when it does.

20 year blog anniversary

It's been 20 years today since I started this blog. It has been a great outlet. I'm glad I did it. Thanks to everybody who has left comments and engaged me in conversation, especially DagoodS, Paul Scott Pruett, Psiomniac, Dale, Jeff, Steve, and all the people who participated in the Book of Mormon discussions, including Carl, Angela, Curtis, Tracy, Fern, and Dave. A huge thanks to my old friend, Angie, for allowing me to post the Conversations With Angie series. Also thanks to Tabatha for engaging with me on your Jewish view about Jesus. Thanks to Richard, Safiyyah and everybody who left one-off comments and were never seen again. Thanks to everybody I left out. It's been 20 years, so I can't very well go through and name everybody.

In the last 20 years, there's only been one year I didn't post anything - 2016.

Does it make sense to pray for another person's salvation?

This is an issue that both Calvinists and non-Calvinist challenge each other with. The challenge is different depending on how you think God saves people.

Calvinists believe that God decides before the foundation of the world who he is going to save, and he does so for his own good pleasure. It has nothing to do with anything about the person. He doesn't look ahead and choose people based on his foreknowledge of their belief or behavior. He just makes a unilateral decision to save people. Then he disposes the world in such a way that whoever he decides to save will eventually comes to faith in Jesus.

Here's the challenge for Calvinists: If God determines who he will save and who he won't, and God always gets his way, then what's the point in praying for anybody's salvation? We can't change God's sovereign will. He decided what he was going to do before we were even born. Whether God chooses to save somebody or not, our prayer shouldn't make any difference.

My answer is basically the same as my answer to the question of why we should evangelize if God determines who will be saved. It's because God doesn't just determine the end result. He also determines how that end result will get accomplished. The reason people come to believe in Jesus is because somebody preached the gospel to them. The preaching of the gospel is part of the means through which God brings about conversion. And the fact that we evangelize is also determined by God because he's sovereign over everything that happens.

In the same way, God may determine, for his own glory, to act in answer to prayers, and he may plan to do so from the foundation of the world. The prayers themselves may be part of what God decrees to happen, and God plans before he even creates the world, that he will act in answer to those prayers. So it makes all the sense in the world to pray for people's salvation given the Calvinistic belief that God is sovereign in salvation.

Here's the challenge for non-Calvinists: If God loves all people equally, and equally wants to save them all, then we should expect that God has exhausted all effort to save them short of violating their free will. With that being the case, what is the point in praying for their salvation? God has already done all he is willing to do. If he has not done all he is willing to do, then why not if he wants to save everybody? In a syngergistic model of salvation where God does his part in offering the gift of salvation, and it remains for us to do our in accepting the gift, it doesn't seem like there would be anything left for God to do except make the person willing to accept the gospel, which God supposedly never does because that would violate our free will. If you deny irresistable grace, then God can't actually accomplish saving somebody without that person's cooperation. So God can't actually answer your prayer for somebody's salvation. He can only try.

A non-Calvinist could give a similar answer that I gave. They could say that God knows we're going to pray for somebody's salvation, so he withholds whatever effort he would otherwise have made toward getting somebody saved until we pray. Then he could be said to have exerted whatever effort toward somebody's salvation in answer to that prayer. That is a possibility, but I've never heard a non-Calvinist put it like that.

I often hear non-Calvinists say the reason God doesn't perform spectacular miracles or do whatever he can to save people is because he knows they wouldn't repent even if they saw a miracle. Only people who would repent get to see the miracles. They may be right. It seems to be implicit in this sort of statement, though, that everybody who would embrace the gospel under any circumstances, God does bring about the necessary circumstances for those people. For anybody who God knows would not embrace the gospel, there's no reason to bring about any circumstances we think might lead to their conversion. God knows it wouldn't.

On the surface, I think that's a reasonable response, but it's not without some snags. For example, Jesus said in Matthew 11:21 that if the miracles that were performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida were also performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented. But the miracles were not performed, and they did not repent. This seems to cast doubt on whether God does everything that could have been done to save people.

I suppose there are a lot of responses a non-Calvinist could give to the issues raised. To a certain degree, we just have to admit we don't know why God does or doesn't do things the way we think he should or would like for him to. I don't think there's anything wrong with just saying, "I don't know," and trusting God anyway.

But I do think the problem non-Calvinists face is a little thornier than the problem Calvinists face when it comes to praying for somebody's salvation.

AN AFTERTHOUGHT: I am so disappointed! I heard a sermon a long time ago, I think by Brian Borgman, where he used Isaiah 37 as an example of where God did something in answer to prayer, yet the whole thing was planned long before the prayer was ever uttered. Hezekiah prayed that God would save Israel from Sennacherib, the king of Assyria (verses 14-20). In verse 21, God said, "Because you have prayed to me concerning Sennacherib king of Assyria. . ." then it launches into a judgment against Sennacherib in which 185,000 Assyrian soldiers die, and Sennacherib eventually dies. In verse 26, it says, "Have you not heard that I determined it long ago? I planned from days of old what now I bring to pass." The sermon I listened to said God planned the judgment against Sennacherib long ago, yet he brings it about in answer to Hezekiah's prayer. This was meant to be an example of how praying is consistent with, and included in, God's eternal decree. I was going to use this as an example until I read it more carefully.

When it says God planned the whole thing long ago, it wasn't talking about the judgment against Sennacherib and Assyria. Rather, it was talking about all the terrible things Assyria did to other nations. There is nothing in this passage that says God planned long ago to judge Assyria in answer to Hezekiah's prayer, so it's not a good proof text for that sort of thing. It is, however, a good proof text that God does decree evil, which I talked more about here.

Leighton Flowers and James White debate John 6:44

James White and Leighton Flowers debated whether John 6:44 teaches unconditional election. I've watched the debate twice now. I got more out of it the second time than the first time.

Interestingly, the debate came down to verse 45 and how it was supposed to shed light on verse 44. Here are the verses:

No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day. It is written in the Prophets, ‘And they will all be taught by God.’ Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me—

In Leighton's view, it works like this: The Father taught all the Israelites. The teaching is the drawing. But not all the Israelites learned. The ones who did learn came to the Father. The Father gave those people to Jesus, those people came to Jesus, and Jesus will raise them on the last day. So, in Leighton's view, the "all" who were taught by God are not the same people as the "all" who heard and learned from the Father. Those who heard and learned from the Father were a subset of those who were taught. Since the teaching is the drawing, and not all who taught end up coming to Jesus, it follows that not all who are drawn end up coming to Jesus.

In James' view, it works like this: The Father sovereignly chooses who will come to Jesus. He draws (i.e teaches) those people, those people hear and learn from the Father, the Father gives them to Jesus, they come to Jesus, and they are raised on the last day. So, in James' view, all those who are taught of God are the same people who hear and learn from the Father.

James and Leighton both agreed that the teaching is the drawing. They also agree that those who heard and learned from the Father do end up coming to Jesus and being raised on the last day. Where they disagree, though, is on whether all who are taught by God also hear and learn from the Father. Or, in other words, they disagree on whether all who are drawn by the Father come to Jesus.

Leighton's argument is that it is possible to teach somebody without that person learning. He offers, as a proof text, Jeremiah 32:33, which says, "And though I [the LORD - vs.26] have taught them persistently, they have not listened to receive instruction."

James's argument is that verse 45 comes after verse 44 and is an explanation of it. Also, he appears to be arguing that unless there is something in the immediate text that allows us to distinguish all who are taught from all those who hear and learn, that we should assume they are the same group of people.

Leighton agreed that if those taught by God are the same people as those who heard and learned from the Father, then TULIP would follow (1:35:05), so the debate really came down to that one point. After all, the U in TULIP is unconditional election.

Although I agree with Leighton that it is possible to teach somebody who doesn't learn, that is not what happens in John 6:44-45. I agree with James that those who are taught by God are the same people as those who hear and learn from the Father. There are a few reasons I agree with James.

One reason is because the meaning that jumps out at me when I read John 6:44 is that whoever is drawn is also raised on the last day. He ends the first part of the sentence with "draws him," and says in the second part that Jesus will "raise him." It appears that the "him" in both cases refers to the same person, so the one raised is the one who was drawn. Verse 45 looks like Paul's proof text. Paul quotes this passage in explanation of the drawing of the Father. It wouldn't make sense to quote a passage about God teaching people in this context unless the teaching is what is meant by drawing. Since those who are drawn come to Jesus and are raised up, this seems to indicate that all who are taught by God will come to Jesus and be raised on the last day.

The second reason is because Paul's comment about all those hearing and learning from the Father is his inference or explanation of the passage he quoted about all being taught by God. That is Paul's commentary on the passage, which means Paul must take it that those who hear and learn from the Father are the same people as those who were taught by God. In Paul's mind, if you are taught by God, that implies that you heard and learned from the Father.

A third reason is because if we look at the passage Paul quotes in its context, it appears to imply that all those who are taught do, in fact, hear and learn. The quote appears to come from Isaiah 54:13. This whole chapter is meant to comfort Israel. In spite of all the horrors they have been through, God is going to make everything wonderful in keeping with all his promises. It says in verse 13, "All your children shall be taught by the Lord, and great shall be the peace of your children." How would this be any comfort to Israel if the teaching didn't result in hearing and learning? If you read the whole chapter, you should be able to see that it's about God turning everything around for Israel and creating ideal conditions. It may even be eschatological. So it certainly seems to imply that by teaching the children of Israel, they will all hear and learn.

So although Leighton is right that it's possible to teach somebody without that person learning, that's not what's going on in John 6:45. James challenged him to show from the context why there is a distinction in groups, and Leighton was unable to do it. He was only able to offer a proof text showing that such a thing is possible. He needed to show that it was actual specificially in the context of John 6:44-45. Although he's right about the possibility, the actuality appears to be that all those who are taught of God are the same as all those who hear and learn from the Father, and all of those who hear and learn from the Father come to Jesus. Since teaching (as well as drawing) is something the Father does, and it results in people coming to Jesus and being raised to eternal life, that means John 6:44 teaches unconditional election.

A CHATGPT BONUS: Just for funsies, I went to Chat GPT to ask a question about John 6:44 because I was curious what Chat GPT would say. Here's what happened:

ME: Consider the following quote: "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day." Does this mean he will raise up all of those who are drawn, or does it mean he will raise up all who come to him? Or does it mean both?

CHATGPT: This quote is from John 6:44, where Jesus says, "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day."

The way this can be interpreted depends on how we understand the relationship between being drawn by the Father and coming to Jesus. Let me break it down:

1. "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him" — This suggests that coming to Jesus is not something a person can do on their own. It’s God’s initiative, meaning that the Father must first draw people to Jesus. This would imply that there is a divine, sovereign action in play. Those who are "drawn" are responding to that divine invitation.

2. "And I will raise him up on the last day" — Jesus promises to raise up those who are drawn to Him. This phrase seems to indicate that those who are drawn to Jesus will experience resurrection at the end of time. So, the "raising up" refers to the final resurrection and eternal life that Jesus grants to those who come to Him through the Father's drawing.

To answer your question:

• The promise of being "raised up on the last day" is for those who come to Jesus, but they can only do so because they are drawn by the Father.
• So, it seems that Jesus is speaking about both: those who are drawn by the Father will come to Him, and those who come to Him will be raised up.

In a sense, both ideas are true, because being drawn by the Father leads to coming to Jesus, and those who come to Him (by the Father's drawing) are guaranteed resurrection on the last day. This passage emphasizes the interdependence of divine initiative (the Father drawing) and human response (coming to Jesus), with the ultimate result being eternal life for those who are drawn and come to Him.

Politics and Spin

I've mentioned before on this blog how I dislike political discourse because of the conflict, spin, dishonesty, lack of charity, etc. I wanted to point out a perfectly good example of this that happened just in the last couple of days.

For a while now, republicans (especially James Comer) have been accusing the Biden family of corruption in which Joe Biden did political favours (like having the attorney investigating Burisma fired) in exchange for money from foreign entities. Comer and others accused the Bidens of money-laundering and tax evasion.

Before Biden left office, he pardoned some members of his family, including his brother, James.

Now, Fox News and other right-wing sources are claiming that in pardoning his family, Joe Biden is implicitly admitting that they are all guilty.

I'm no fan of the Bidens, and I think they probably are guilty, but in all fairness, the pardon is not an implicit confession of guilt. The reason is because there are at least two other possibilities that don't imply guilt. Here's all three possibilities.

1. It could be that they are guilty, and Joe wants to protect them all from prosecution. If this is the case, then it does imply guilt.

2. It could be that Joe is concerned that Trump will use the justice department to go after the Biden family for political reasons, and Biden wants to protect them. This has nothing to do with whether or not anybody is guilty.

3. It's also possible that Joe wants to create the appearance that Trump is a vindictive individual who would use his political power to go after his political opponents. In other words, the pardon is meant simply to make Trump look bad. Again, this would have nothing to do with whether or not the Bidens are guilty.

So, there are three possible motives for pardening Joe's family that I can think of, and only one of them implies an admission of guilt. Notice, though, that the right wing media simply runs with the most uncharitable interpretation. This is not journalism. This is spin. And all sides do it. And the people who consume media eat this stuff up. They go on social media, repeat the uncharitable spin as if it were fact, and it never ends. They love the spin. That's why all these lying news organizations still make money. It's how dishonest politicians keep getting elected.

There is very little charity, fair-mindedness, or honesty when it comes to conversations about politics. I would just ask people to stop taking the news so seriously. Stop taking politicians so seriously. Stop taking political commentators so seriously. They're all full of it. Just slow down and think things through. Don't jump on some bandwagon just because it makes the other side look bad or makes your side look good. That is not how level-headed people behave.

15 questions for Christians who are not Calvinists

The other day, Braxton Hunter posted a video where he, Leighton Flowers, Tim Stratton, and Jonathan Pritchett asked Calvinists 20 questions and wanted us to respond by comment, blog, or video. I responded to it on my blog yesterday, but today I was thinking it might be fun to make a video of my own asking them questions. I figured I would also post the questions on my blog in case anybody wants to answer them here or in case anybody is like me and prefers the written word to the spoken word.

Here are the questions.

1. In John 10, Jesus gives the analogy of the shepherd and the sheep. In verse 16, Jesus said, “And I have other sheep that are not of this fold; I must bring them also, and they will listen to my voice; and they will become one flock, with one shepherd.” Since these sheep have not yet heard Jesus’ voice, how is it that they are already his sheep? How does anybody become one of Jesus’ sheep?

2. According to libertarian free will, if somebody acts freely, then there are no antecedent conditions prior to and up to the moment of choice that are sufficient to determine what that choice will be. Absent Frankfurt cases, if a person acts freely, they could have done otherwise even if everything in the universe prior to and up to the moment of choice had been exactly the same. Suppose there are two possible worlds that are exactly the same up to the moment Bob is faced with choosing whether to have a Dr. Pepper or not. In one of the possible worlds, he chooses to drink the Dr. Pepper. In the other, he chooses not to drink the Dr. Pepper. Could there be a sufficient explanation for why he chose the Dr. Pepper in one world or why he didn’t choose it in the other? What could the explanation for his choice possibly be in each world if no antecedent conditions, including his own desires or plans, are sufficient to determine his choice?

3. If we are capable of acting contrary to all antecedent plans, wishes, motives, inclinations, and desires, then how can we ever know what we are about to do next? It seems like the best we could do is attach some probability to our future actions based on our antecedent desires. However, in cases where we act contrary to our antecedent intentions or motives, our acts should take us completely by surprise. In those cases, there were no antecedent conditions that could have helped us predict our next move. If that is how libertarian free will works, wouldn’t driving be extremely dangerous, not knowing which way you were going to turn the wheel in the next moment?

If you need more explanation for where this question is coming from, see libertarian free will would be a dangerous thing if we really had it.

4. There are multiple places that tell us that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart. Since it also says Pharaoh hardened his own heart, what difference did God’s hardening make? Did it have any effect on Pharaoh’s behavior? Did Pharaoh commit any sins as a result of God hardening his heart that he would not have committed if God had not hardened his heart? Is Pharaoh blamable for the acts he took as a result of God hardening his heart?

5. In John 12:49, Jesus said, “For I did not speak on my own, but the Father who sent me commanded me to say all that I have spoken.” Could Jesus have disobeyed his Father’s commands? If not, is he still worthy of praise for obeying God’s commands perfectly? If so, how do you reconcile that with the view that before one can be worthy of praise or blame, they must have the categorical ability to do otherwise?

6. In Romans 9:19, Paul raises a hypothetical objection. He says, “You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who has resisted his will?’” What gave rise to this objection? Does this objection make sense in light of what Paul taught prior to this objection? Please explain how.

7. Would you agree the stronger the evidence is for some conclusion, the harder it is to deny? If so, suppose the evidence was so strong that one could not honestly deny the conclusion. If a person could not deny the conclusion in light of the evidence, then wouldn’t it be the case that the evidence was sufficient to determine the belief? If our beliefs are determined by antecedent conditions (like being privy to evidence), would it follow that we could not be rational in holding that belief? If so, then wouldn’t it follow that the stronger evidence is, the less rational we are for affirming the conclusion? After all, the stronger evidence is, the closer that evidence is to determining our belief.

8. In 1 Timothy 2:3-4, it says, “This is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Savior, who wants all people to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth.” If God wants every individual human to come to a knowledge of the truth, why does it appear from John 12:37-40 that God blinded people and hardened their hearts expressly so that they would not believe in Jesus? Why did God not perform the same miracles in Tyre and Sidon as he performed in Chorazin and Bethsaida, knowing that if he had, Tyre and Sidon would have repented (Matthew 11:21)?

9. In John 12:32, Jesus said, “And I, if I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself.” John followed up by explaining, “Now he was saying this to indicate the kind of death he was going to die” (v.33). It appears that Jesus being lifted up is a reference to his crucifixion. If the “all people” is not qualified in any way, but actually indicates every single individual, then why did Paul say that "Christ crucified" is a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles? Doesn’t the cross turn at least some people off from Jesus rather than drawing them to Jesus?

10. When the authors of the Bible wrote their works, were they acting freely in the libertarian sense?

11. If God knew exactly who was going to believe in Jesus, why would Jesus’ death on the cross need to be intended for anybody other than those God knew would be saved by it?

12. Does God love those he raises to eternal damnation?

13. If libertarian free will is necessary to have rational beliefs, does it follow that for any rational belief, there are no antecedent conditions (including observations, evidence, arguments, etc.) that are sufficient to determine those beliefs? If so, then are you basically saying that, at least to some degree, your beliefs have to be divorced from or independent of evidence in order to be rational? If the ultimate reason you believe one thing instead of another is because you chose to believe one instead of the other, regardless of what the evidence happened to be, then wouldn’t that call the rationality of your belief into question? Could you choose, right now, to honestly believe the earth is flat?

14. If we have libertarian free will, why is it that nobody is able to live a sinless life? If there are people who are able to live a sinless life, then why is it that out of the billions of people who have lived for the last four thousand years, nobody but Jesus has ever done so?

15. Do you think God gives everybody the same chance to be saved? Does he exert the same effort to reach each individual? If not, why not if he loves everybody equally and wants everybody to be saved? If so, what’s the point in praying for somebody’s salvation? What more do you expect God to do?

EDIT: Here are some additional questions I thought of after making my video with just the 15 questions. I may add to these in the future as questions come to me.

16. This question is based on a thought experiment. Suppose there are two people named Voldemort. Voldemort-1 was born into the world in the usual way and grew up to be a nasty unscrupulous wizard who likes to hurt people. Voldemort-2 was poofed into existence instantaneously by J.K. Rowling just yesterday. Both Voldemorts are alike in every way, including all their brain cells, memories, personality, desires, ambitions, and everything. Considering the fact that at the moment Voldemort-2 came into being, they were identical, except maybe for their location, are they both morally accountable for their behavior? If Voldemort-1 is morally responsible for his behavior, and Vordemort-2 is exactly like Vodlemort-1, is Vodemort-2 responsible for his behavior? If Voldemort-2 is not responsible for his behavior since he was create complete with a bad disposition he didn't choose to have, does it follow that Voldemort-1 isn't responsible for his behavior either since they are exactly alike and have all the same advantages and disadvantages? If they are both responsible for their behavior, does that mean it's possible to be responsible for acting on evil motives that you did not choose to have and that were given to you by your creator?

17. Why is it that some people embrace the gospel and others reject the gospel even when they both hear the same gospel proclaimed in the same way? Is it because some are smarter than others? Is it because some are more humble than others? Is it because some are more moral than others? Or some other reason? If the reason one person embraces the gospel and the other doesn't is because one person has some virtue the other lacks, then doesn't that mean those who embrace the gospel and are therefore saved have something to boast about?

18. Did Jesus' death on the cross atone for the sins of all people, or did it merely make atonement possible? If it actually paid the penalty for everybody's sins, but some people for whom Christ died never exercise faith in him and are not saved, does that mean the same sins have to be paid for twice--once by Jesus, and once by the actual sinner?

20 Questions for Calvinists

Braxton Hunter posted a video today where he, Leighton Flowers, Jonathan Pritchett, and Tim Stratton took turns asking questions of Calvinists. I was interested enough that I transcribed the whole thing so I could respond to it on my blog. I could've made a video, but I just prefer the written word to the spoken word.

As a disclaimer, I'm not a theologian, and all of these guys are smarter and probably more educated than I am. I responded to these questions because I'm interested in the topic and had something to say about the questions. I hope you find it edifying.

Question 1: Leighton Flowers

I understand as a former Calvinist the desire to give God all the glory for the gift of salvation, but why, Biblically and philosophically, do you believe that the gift has to be irresistibly given in order for the giver to be get full credit for giving the gift? Shouldn’t God get all the glory for the gifts he gives even to those who reject it?

This is an ill-conceived question. If somebody rejects the gift of salvation, then God obviously can’t have given them the gift of salvation. But I get his point.

Of course, if God gives the gift of salvation, then he gets full credit for giving that gift. But that isn’t the issue. The issue is whether God can receive full credit for accomplishing salvation if the accomplishment of salvation was a cooperative effort between God and the recipient where God had no say in whether the person would do their part or not.

If we are free, in the libertarian sense, to either accept or reject God’s offer of salvation, and God does not determine that we accept it, then the actual accomplishment of our salvation is a cooperative effort. God does his part in making the offer. We do our part in choosing to accepting it. This is a synergistic enterprise, so, by definition, it’s not entirely a work of God. God cannot take full responsibility for our being saved if our being saved depends on our freely choosing to accept the offer and God played no role in bringing it about that we would make the right choice.

Question 2: Braxton Hunter

Does God determine or decree (a) everything that happens in a person’s life, (b) only their response to the gospel, or (c) none of the above? And please explain your answer.

God determines and decrees everything that happens in a person’s life. I’m not sure what needs to be explained. Maybe Braxton is asking us to give a defense of this position. Or maybe he’s asking for the details of how God brings about his sovereign will for a person’s life. I’m not sure.

Question 3: Jonathan Pritchett

In John 6:39, Jesus says it is the will of the Father that he should lose none of them but raise them up on the last day. However, in John 17:12 Jesus says Judas was both given and lost. So why doesn’t Judas disprove the notion that merely being given by the Father to the Son [?] not lose disprove that Jesus never loses it?

In John 6:39, Jesus is talking about God giving people to Jesus for the purpose of salvation. In John 17:6-12, I get the impression Jesus is praying specifically for his apostles. If that’s correct, then Jesus isn’t talking about everybody God gave him for the purpose of salvation. Rather, he’s talking about the people God gave him for the purpose of apostleship. As verse 12 says, Judas was doomed to destruction so that scripture would be fulfilled. He was never given to Jesus for the purpose of salvation; rather, his destruction was determined before he was even born.

Question 4: Tim Stratton

Molinists like me are often accused of starting with philosophy and then imposing it upon scripture. It seems to me, however, that that shoe is on the other foot. That is to say, it seems to me that it’s Calvinists who are guilty of starting with a philosophical position and then they impose that upon scripture. So, for example, in my debate against James White I made a Biblical case for mere Molinism, which, by the way, was never addressed, but, that’s another topic. But what is the Biblical case for exhaustive divine determination, or what I call EDD or EDD? What’s the Biblical case for EDD, the idea that God determines all things about humanity from our physical actions to our mental states? I don’t see it in Scripture. Now let’s talk about what it means for something to be determined. An event is determined by definition if antecedent conditions are sufficient to necessitate said event. So determinism, or what I refer to as exhaustive divine determination means that God’s decree provides the antecedent conditions sufficient to necessitate all events, including all events regarding each and every human, including the entirety of their mental actions. So it seems to me that Calvinists often start with the philosophy of determinism and then impose that upon scripture. But I see no place in the Bible that implies that God determines all things including all of our thoughts and beliefs. So here’s my question. How in the world does one infer EDD from scripture? What is the Biblical case for exhaustive divine determination?

There have been whole books dedicated to this topic. One famous one is The Sovereignty of God by Arthur W. Pink. Another one is Not A Chance by R.C. Sproul. Norman Geisler made an argument for this position in the first chapter of Chosen But Free, though he contradicted himself throughout the rest of the book.

The argument, as I understand it, is inductive. It comes by way of noticing that God exercises sovereign control over both the major things, like the crucifixion of Jesus (Acts 4:27-28) and the Assyrians attacking Israel (Isaiah 10), and the seemingly small and insignificant things you might think are just the result of chance, like the roll of a dice (Proverbs 16:33). An inductive inference is made that if God controls both the major things and the extremely minor things, that he must control everything in between, too. John Piper and Justin Taylor went into some detail on how God exercises his sovereignty in various situations, including the acts of Satan, in their book, Suffering and the Sovereignty of God.

Another argument I’ve heard is that God would have to determine everything if he is to give specific detailed prophecies. Otherwise, the butterfly effect would mess everything up. If these prophecies consisted merely of predictions, that wouldn’t necessarily mean that God determines all the events leading up to the fulfillment of the prophecy (although some Calvinists disagree with me about that). But any prophecy in which God intends for the event to take place (i.e. it’s his will that it take place), does seem to suggest that God determines all the events leading up to the fulfillment of those prophecies. The fulfillment of those prophecies requires a meticulous degree of determining events because of all the miniscule things that would have to happen for those prophecies to be fulfilled.

Question 5: Leighton Flowers

If a man is born totally depraved in the sense that they’re dead, corpse-like dead, cannot respond positively to the gospel, then why would God blind them with using parabolic language, spirit of stupor, all the language of scripture that says as judgment God blinds people or removes the light from those, he doesn’t contend with men forever. Why blind somebody born already blind. Why put a blindfold on a corpse? Make sense of that for us as non-Calvinists as to why God would need to blind somebody who is innately blind from birth?

That’s a great question, and I don’t know the answer. I can only speculate. This question seems to assume that whatever blinding God does, he does it at some point after they are born. But maybe he does it throughout their lives, from the womb, and it’s this blinding that’s precisely why they are unable to embrace the gospel. It doesn’t have to be an either/or thing. The blindness God brings about may be part of what their depravity consists of.

Question 6: Braxton Hunter

1 Corinthians 10:13 comes up a lot in these discussions. It says, “No temptation has overtaken you except something common to mankind; and God is faithful, so He will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will provide the way of escape also, so that you will be able to endure it.” Now this passage sounds like it’s indicating that in any situation where someone might sin there is a genuine possibility genuine potential that they will take the way of escape and not sin. How is this possible if God has decreed and determined all things?

There are different senses in which we are able to act. Braxton knows about this distinction because he brought it up in the 15th question. I may have the physical ability to pick up a box, but have no desire whatsoever to do so. We can’t act without some motive or inclination, so a lack of motive or inclination would amount to a psychological inability to act. I take 1 Corinthians 10:13 to mean that in any situation, there is a way out. There is a choice available that will avoid sin. Nobody is trapped into sinning. But that doesn’t mean you will have the will, motive, or inclination to do the right thing. It is possible for you to be determined to do the wrong thing by your own desires even if there is a path available that would avoid doing the wrong thing.

Question 7: Jonathan Pritchett

In Romans 9:20, why even think that Paul grants the premise of his interlocutor in verse 19 when nowhere else throughout the book of Romans does Paul ever grant the interlocutor’s premise except in Romans 11:19-20 when the interlocutor is a gentile. What makes you think that Paul grants the premise of Romans 9:19 from the interlocutor when his very response, “Who are you, oh man, to answer back to God?” indicates he doesn’t, exposing the folly of the interlocutor’s protest?

Objection! Assuming facts not in evidence. In no way does Paul’s answer deny the premise behind the interlocutor’s question.

There are two questions his interlocuter asks: (1) Then why does God still blame us, and (2) For who is able to resist his will? The first question assumes that God does still blame us. This is not a controversial assumption. All Biblically-literate Christians agree that God holds people accountable for their sins, so we have every reason to think Paul would grant the premise behind that first question.

The second question appears to be rhetorical. The implicit claim behind it is that nobody can resist God’s will. The reason I don’t think Paul denies this claim is because (1) this objection came up precisely because Paul was teaching the absolute sovereignty of God in election. In fact, he explicitly said it does not depend on human desire or effort (verse 16) and that God hardens who he wills (verse 18). (2) Rather than deny the premise, Paul digs in his heals. He defends God’s right to make some vessels for honorable use and some for dishonorable use and denies his interlocutor’s right to object to God exercising that right.

Question 8: Tim Stratton

No Christian or anyone else on the planet is infallible and possesses a perfect set of theological beliefs. I mean, my reformed colleagues should all agree that a super Pope who never gets theology wrong does not exist. With that in mind, if God determines all things, and given the fact that every Christ follower, pastor, theologian, and Calvinists affirm at least one false theological belief if not multitudes, then it follows that God determines each one of his followers, including all Calvinists, to affirm false theological beliefs. Now, if God determines all, each and every one of his followers, to get theological beliefs wrong, how does this not relegate God into a DOD, a DOD, a Deity of Deception? What’s the relevant difference between a demon who determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs and a deity who determines all Christians to affirm false theological beliefs?

In the fourth question, Tim chided Calvinists for imposing their philosophy on the Bible because he seemed to be unaware of the fact that divine determinism was arrived at through Biblical exegesis. But here, Tim reveals that the shoe was on his foot after all. Tim is making a philosophical argument against divine determinism on the basis that it makes God a deity of deception. Never mind whether the Bible actually teaches that God causes people to believe false things.

He does, though. It says so explicitly in 2 Thessalonians 2:11. And, as Leighton Flowers pointed out in question number five, God blinds people so they will not believe the truth (see, for example, John 12:39-40). This objection Tim brings up applies just as much to non-Calvinists as it does to Calvinists. If God causes people to believe things that aren’t true, how can we trust him? How do we know he’s not always doing that? This is a thorny issue, whether you’re a Calvinist or not, because no matter what answer you give, it might be that it’s a lie God is causing you to believe.

The issue Tim raises is a special case of the problem of evil. If God is perfectly good (including being honest), then why does he allow or cause evil (including allowing or causing his own people to believe false things)?

The procedure for answering a question like this, if you are a Biblically faithful Christian, is not to begin with your philosophy and impose it on the Bible. Rather, it’s to begin with what the Bible teaches, then to try to figure out how it makes sense philosophically. Tim apparently denies what the Bible teaches because of his philosophy. I would rather affirm what the Bible teaches before wrestling with the philosophical implications.

I have written a lot on the problem of evil in this blog (here's a list), so I’m not going to repeat it all here. I’ll just give a short response here. Basically, I believe God is perfectly good. Since God is perfectly good, he has a morally justifiable reason for everything he does. If God creates a world in which even his own people believe false things, then it follows that he has a morally justifiable reason for doing so. I don’t have to know what that reason is to be justified in believing there’s a reason. It follows deductively that there’s a reason from the premise that God is perfectly good. The goodness of God can be arrived at ontologically from the moral argument. If God is the standard of good and evil, and if, by definition, good is to be done and evil is to be shunned, it follows that God only prefers good and never prefers evil, which in turn, means God is wholly good.

So I may not know why God, in his sovereign plan, arranges things so that his own people believe false things, but I trust that he has a good reason for it.

As far as what the difference is between God doing it and a demon doing it, the major difference is that God is sovereign and a demon is not. We can see this in 1 Kings 22:21-23 in which God put a lying spirit in the mouth of some prophets. In this case, the spirit was the immediate cause of the deception, but God was the remote cause. The demon acted on God’s order. Demons are not autonomous beings.

Another difference is that God has a good purpose in everything he does, but demons have an evil purpose in everything they do.

Question 9: Braxton Hunter

From my perspective sovereignty has to do with one’s position of authority. We know what a sovereign is. It’s a king. It’s someone who has command over his realm, and so we are familiar with sovereignty with respect to kings in this world. The thing that’s different about God is his realm is the entire cosmos. We know what a sovereign is, what a king is. He can step in at any time. He can dole out rewards or punishments. He can do as he pleases. And these are all things the Bible says God is and God does. But never before have we thought of the term sovereignty in any other context with respect to any other ruler as being, uh, something that he engages in with deterministic control. Sovereignty seems to have to do with God’s position of authority. Both Calvinists and non-Calvinists from my perspective think that God has the highest position of authority. He is as sovereign as he can be. So here’s my question. Why do you think Calvinists often speak as though determinism is a part of God’s sovereignty such that if you’re not a Calvinist you must think that God is not quite as sovereign as the Calvinist does? It seems to me that we both think God is as sovereign as he can be. The question is simply does he from that position of sovereignty choose to give man libertarian freedom or choose determinism. What are your thoughts?

This appears to me to be a question about semantics. Braxton is making the case that in most contexts, “sovereignty” just refers to authority. Why, then, do Calvinists use “sovereignty” to refer to something else? Why do we use it to refer to God determining everything?

I don’t find this to be an important question. If Braxton doesn’t like the word, “sovereignty,” then just pick a different word. Who cares what we call it? As I’ve said elsewhere, I’m a pragmatist when it comes to vocabulary. It doesn’t matter what words we use as long as we understand each other, and we can understand each other as long as we’re careful to define our terms.

Calvinists mean something in particular when they talk about God’s sovereignty. Whether Braxton thinks we’re using the word correctly or not hardly seems to matter. He need only understand what we mean by the word, and I think he does.

I don’t know the historical or etymological reason for why Calvinists use the word, “Sovereignty,” the way they do, but I can speculate. My speculation is that determinism is an extension of what we already mean by sovereignty in Braxton’s sense. If I have some authority, then I am able to command somebody else, and that person will carry out my will. So my degree of sovereignty impacts my ability to bring about my will. Calvinists say God is absolutely sovereign because his will is exhaustive, and he brings it about without fail.

Question 10:Jonathan Pritchett

In Ephesians 1, even many Calvinist commentators have noted the corporate language of the plural pronouns used throughout the exordium. In verse 4 it says, “He chose us in him before the foundation of the world.” But why think this corporate language in a collectivist culture further entails that specific individuals were chosen to be in him when nothing in the text suggests this? Rather, in verses 1:13 and 1:19 it suggests that people are joined to that “us,” the body of Christ, through believing. So why think something that is true of the corporate body applies even further to individuals?

There are a few of reasons. The first reason is because the most natural reading of Ephesians 1 is that God chose individuals to be in Christ. After all, “us” is made up of individuals. “Us” is a personal pronoun, not an abstract group. It’s not exactly like “team.” If the passage had said something like, “God chose the NY Yankees before the foundation of the world,” Jonathan would probably have a point since members of the NY Yankees can come and go. Paul, on the other hand, is writing to “God’s holy people in Ephesus,” and “us” refers to both himself and them.

Second, in verse 11-12, Paul says that “In him we were also chosen, having been predestined according to the plan of him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will, in order that we, who were the first to put our hope in Christ, might be for the praise of his glory.” Paul is speaking about individuals here. He’s not referring to an abstract group of people but to specific individuals who were the first to put their hope in Christ. It is these individuals who God predestined. Notice also that Paul says we were predestined by “him who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will.” It says everything. Since Paul is connecting predestination with God’s sovereign will over everything, the implication appears to be that the reason every individual who put their hope in Christ did so because it was part of God’s sovereign plan.

Third, this reading is consistent with many other passages in which it appears that God chooses individuals for salvation, including John 6, John 10, Romans 9, and Acts 13:48. In Acts 16:14, we can see an example of God opening the heart of an individual to be receptive to Paul’s message. According to Revelation 17:8, there are individuals whose names were written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the world. It appears from the whole counsel of scripture that God does choose individuals for salvation and not just abstract groups whose members can be in flux.

Question 11: Tim Stratton

Along the same lines as my previous question, if God determines all things and all Christians including each and every Calvinist affirms at least one false theological belief if not multitudes then it follows that God determines all of his followers to affirm false theological beliefs. It also follows that God determines you to affirm false theological beliefs. So here’s my question. Without begging the question, how do you know that Calvinism is not one of these false theological beliefs? Let me put it this way. If a deity of deception assured you that divine determinism is true, why should you believe it?

If Tim would just take a moment to think about what he’s saying, he would surely recognize that this epistemological problem applies equally to anybody who holds false beliefs for whatever reason. He’s making an argument that proves too much. If it is true, as Tim agrees, that we all hold false beliefs, then how do we know that any of our beliefs are true? How does Tim know that Calvinism is NOT true given his acknowledgement that some of his theological beliefs are false? Couldn’t his denial of Calvinism be one of his false theological beliefs?

However fallible we may be, we do have justification for at least some of our beliefs. I think Calvinism is true because after a lot of reading, studying, and thinking, I’m persuaded by the cumulative effect of it all that Calvinism is true. I could be wrong about it, but the mere possibility of me being wrong about it isn’t an adequate reason to think I am wrong about it. I need to be shown that I’m wrong about it, not merely presented with the mere possibility.

I don’t have privileged access to God’s mind. I have nothing but the resources he has given me to judge between true and false. God has made us all fallible. We have no choice but to use our cognitive faculties to the best of our ability to make distinctions between what is true and what is false. We are, inevitably, going to get some things wrong. That’s just the reality we live in, and it’s something we have to live with. But being fallible doesn’t mean we are never justified in affirming anything. We are justified to the degree that evidence, argument, and intuition persuade us.

Question 12: Braxton Hunter

When it comes to apologetics, many Calvinists think that Christians should be presuppositionalists, and the reason for this is because the evidential production of evidence and presentation to an unbeliever is going to be ineffective on someone who is hostile toward God. Or, worse than that, it could mean that they are putting themselves as judges over God. But it’s very common for Calvinists to say that God uses means. He uses the preaching of the gospel in order to convey truth, and then he draws by the Holy Spirit. So why could God not use the production of apologetic evidence embedded in the gospel message where a preacher might use stories and illustrations along with Biblical data. Apologists might use evidence for the resurrection along with Biblical data. Why can God not use means in this way, and if he can, then why do we need to be presuppositional apologists instead of classical apologists?

I am in complete agreement with Braxton. I blogged about it here, here and here. My position on apologetic methods is that we should use sound arguments whether those arguments are evidential, classical, presuppositional, or whatever. It doesn’t matter what kind of argument it is. It only matters whether the argument is sound.

Question 13: Jonathan Pritchett

Noticeably absent in all the talk about the doctrines of grace in reformed circles is any discussion about benefaction, gift giving, and the socioeconomics of patron-client reciprocity. Why is that when this is clearly the context of grace for Paul and his audience in the ancient Mediterranean world? Can you explain Calvinism or the doctrines of Grace using these contextual terms rather than theological loaded terms? I’d love to hear it.

As far as I know, nobody in the 1500’s, 1600’s, or 1700’s, whether they were Calvinists, Wesleyans, Arminians, or whatever, talked about grace and theology in those terms. I don’t use those terms and concepts because I’m not that familiar with them. The theological terms I use are because they work. As I said in question number nine, I’m a pragmatist when it comes to vocabulary. If certain theological terms are effective in communicating theological truths, then I will use those terms. Most Christians don’t seem to have a problem understanding them. It’s really only the Mormons that cause me to get bogged down in defining terms.

Question 14: Tim Stratton

Alright, consider the deity of the deception argument. Premise 1: If EDD is true, then God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs. Two: If God determines all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, then God is deceptive, and his word, the Bible, cannot be trusted, and Christians cannot have assurance of salvation. Three: God is not deceptive, his word can be trusted, and Christians can have assurance of salvation. Four: Therefore, God does not determine all Christians to affirm some false theological beliefs, and Five: therefore, EDD is false. So here's my question. With this argument in mind, what justifiable reasons do you have for believing what was inspired by a deity of deception? Why should you believe the Bible if it were inspired by a deity of deception? Now, be careful not to beg the question in response.

This question is not that different than the eleventh question and, again, Tim is raising an epistemological problem that applies just as well to him as it does to Calvinists. Given the fact that God causes people to believe false things (because the Bible is explicit about that, e.g. Ezekiel 14:9), how can we trust any of the deliverances of our reasoning? How can you solve that problem without begging the question? After all, you can only appeal to what you presumably know as a basis for arguing that you have knowledge, but if all of your alleged knowledge is under question, then you have nothing reliable to appeal to. By appealing to anything, you’re assuming what you’re trying to prove, namely, that you do know something.

We don’t need to wring our hands over the mere possibility that we could be wrong about things. We have many tools with which to distinguish between true and false. We have intuition, sensory perception, inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning, memory, authority, etc. If you come to your beliefs by the use of these tools, then that gives you justification for holding your beliefs. The mere possibility that you could be wrong does not remove that justification.

I believe the Bible partly because having read it from an early age, I find that I can’t help but believe it. My theological explanation for this belief is that I recognize the voice of my shepherd (compare John 10). But part of the reason I believe the Bible is because of my apologetic pursuits. I’m persuaded by historical arguments that Jesus is the messiah, that he rose from the dead, that he appointed apostles, and that those apostles either wrote or approved the books of the New Testament, etc.

Question 15: Braxton Hunter

When it comes to whether we’re morally culpable for our sins compatibilist Calvinists often speak of two different types of ability – conditional ability and categorical ability. Conditional ability has to do with whether a particular person could carry out, say, a moral obligation if he wanted to. Does he have the power to do it if he wanted to? And on this view he would not be held morally culpable if it were the case that he could not carry out some moral obligation even if he wanted to. So, for example, if a man is commanded to move a box from here to there, and this man doesn’t have arms, well, then he’s not morally culpable for not moving the box because he couldn’t do it even if he wanted to. If he does have arms, and he doesn’t move the box, then he is culpable because he has the conditional ability to move the box if he wanted to. But since determinism is true for the compatibilist determinist, and God has decreed that the man with arms will not move the box because his desires have been unchangeably determined, the man cannot want to move the box without undermining God’s decree. So in the case of the man with no arms, he’s not culpable because he doesn’t have the arms to pick up the box with. And in the case of the man with arms who has been determined not to want to pick up the box, the Calvinist can say he could do it if he wanted to, but the problem is his desires were determined by God even if through secondary causes. In either case, in one or the other senses of “can’t,” the man can’t do the thing that he is commanded to do. Why is the man morally culpable in one case but not in the other when, in both cases, there is some sense of “can’t” that means in the actual world the man can’t do what he’s commanded?

That’s a great question. Jonathan Edwards wrote a whole book on it (The Freedom of the Will), and I’ve talked about it a lot on this blog and elsewhere (here for example).

We both agree that the man with no arms is not morally culpable for his failure to lift the box since he is physically unable to lift the box.

We also agree that there is a sense in which the man with arms is also unable to lift the box. But his inability isn’t due to any physical limitation. It’s due to a psychological limitation. He simply lacks the desire to lift the box.

If we treat these two inabilities the same, we end up with some very counter-intuitive results. Let me explain.

Let’s say we require somebody to do something that’s very difficult to do, like maybe running a marathon of lifting something really heavy. If it were something very easy for the person to do, but he didn’t do it, we’d probably blame him. In fact, we often say things like, “It would have been so easy for you to do that. It wouldn’t have cost you a thing.” The fact that it was easy seems to make the person more culpable for failing to do it than they would be if it had been difficult or costly. If it was extremely difficult for somebody to pull something off, and they failed to pull it off, we would be a little more understanding. We’d still blame them since they COULD have done it if they had just tried harder. But we cut them a little slack, knowing how difficult it was. The more difficult it is, the closer it is to being impossible. It’s impossible for an ordinary person to lift a truck that weighs a ton. It’s impossible for some people to run a marathon. We don’t blame people at all when the difficulty reaches impossibility.

Notice that the more difficult it is, the less we blame somebody for not doing something. If it’s so difficult that they’re physically unable to do it, we don’t blame them at all. We attribute maximum blame for failing to do what would’ve been easy.

But what if we applied the same principle to psychological obstacles. Think about it. The stronger your desire to do something, the harder it is to resist the urge to do it. The harder it is to resist the urge to do something, the closer that desire is to determining your choice. If we apply the same principle to desires as we apply to physical limitations, then it would follow that the deeper your desire to do something, the less you can be blamed (or praised) for doing it. If the desire is so strong that you can’t help but give in to it, then you can neither be praised nor blamed for giving in to it. You are most culpable for your actions when they are not so much as influenced by desires, i.e. when you act out of indifference.

It follows that the deeper your love for somebody, and the deeper your desire is to do good for them, the less praiseworthy your acts of love are. And the deeper your hatred for somebody, and the deeper your desire is to harm them, the less blameworthy you are for harming them. After all, the deeper your desire to help or harm somebody, the harder it would be to resist doing so, and the closer those desires would be to determining your behavior.

But this is exactly backward. In reality, it is precisely BECAUSE your bad behavior arises out of bad motives and desires that you are blamable for them. If you shove an old lady because you hate old ladies, you are more blamable than if you shove her to save her from being hit by a bus. Your actions are blameworthy or praiseworthy to the degree that they are motivated by good or bad desires. The greater hand love plays in motivating your behavior, the more praiseworthy your actions, and the greater hand hate plays in motivating your behavior, the more blameworthy your actions. If your behavior arose spontaneously for no reason at all, then they would be accidents, in which case you can be worthy of neither praise nor blame. Since your actions are praiseworthy or blameworthy to the degree that they are influenced by your desires and motives, it follows that the greater hand your desires and motives have in bringing about your actions, the more praiseworthy or blameworthy they are. From that, it follows that you are maximally praiseworthy or blameworthy when your desires and motives have everything to do with your behavior, which happens when they are sufficient to determine your behavior.

This is all consistent with scripture. James said that it is evil desires that leads to sin (James 1:14-15). Jesus taught that our behavior is determined by the condition of our hearts (Matthew 12:33-35; Luke 6:43-45). In Matthew 7:18, Jesus went so far as to say, “A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, and a bad tree cannot bear good fruit.” In Jeremiah, it says, “Can an Ethiopian change his skin or a leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil” (Jeremiah 13:23). We are held accountable for our actions, not in spite of the fact that they are determined by the condition of our hearts, but precisely BECAUSE they are determined by the condition of our hearts.

Question 16: Tim Stratton

According to Calvinism, God does not choose the elect based upon anything about the individual, lest any man should boast (Ephesians 2:9). So those who are passed by, the damned, and those who are elect seem to be based on luck or chance. Indeed, in Calvinism, the elect seem to have won a cosmic and infinite lottery of sorts. Moreover, those who have been determined to hell, created for the sole purpose of eternal damnation, a decision made by God prior to the birth of the damned individuals, well those guys are literally the unluckiest folks in all of creation. So it seems to me that this leaves room for one to boast about how lucky they are compared to the next guy. But here’s my question. If God does not choose the elect based on anything about the person, how is their election anything but lucky?

Tim must have a strange conception of what luck and chance mean. The fact that God chooses people is the opposite of chance or luck.

In Question 4, Tim said that he was a Molinist. It seems to me that it is under Molinism that whether we are saved or not is a matter of luck or chance. In Molinism, God doesn't choose individuals. He chooses possible worlds. He may choose a possible world in which the greatest number of people get saved or the greatest ratio of saved to lost or something along those lines. Suppose there is a possible world in which Tim gets saved, but that world happens not to be a world in which the most people get saved or that has the greatest saved-to-lost ratio, so God doesn't actualize that world. Suppose the world that does have the greatest saved-to-lost ratio or the greatest number saved happens to be a world in which Tim does not get saved. It may be that God would like to have saved Tim, but darn the luck, Tim only gets saved in possible worlds where not enough people get saved for God to justify actualizing those worlds. So God has to sacrifice Tim in order to actualize a possible world in which more people get saved. It's just bad luck that the world God chose to actualize happens to be a world in which Tim doesn't get saved. After all, Tim could have been saved if God had just actualized a different world. If God does actualize a world in which Tim gets saved, Tim is just lucky that the world God chose to actualize happens to be a world in which Tim gets saved instead of a world in which he doesn't. In Molinism, God doesn't save anybody because he loves the individual. It's just a numbers game. Whether you get saved or not is a matter of luck because it depends on the counter-factuals of human freedom, which God has no control over, and the possible worlds you happen to get saved in. Election, in Molinism, is impersonal.

Question 17: Jonathan Pritchett

Why is an increasing number of Calvinists getting big mad at Dr. James White for calling out people in reformed circles in the online community for tolerating racism, for tolerating antisemitism, for tolerating holocaust denialism, and tolerating Andrew Tate fanboyism? Why all the hate against Dr. White? He’s doing the Lord’s work here.

I’m on James’ side, so this question doesn’t apply to me.

Question 18: Braxton Hunter

Does God love every individual? Does he love them all in the same sense? If not, then how does his love differ, and why do you think that?

I do think God loves everybody, but not in the same sense and not to the same degree. After all, sending somebody to hell is not an act of love. But causing the rain to fall on the just and the unjust is an act of love.

Question 19: Tim Stratton

According to the Oxford Dictionary online, a puppet is defined as a person under the control of another person. Sorry. Alright, Miriam Webster defined “puppet” this way: “one whose acts are controlled by an outside force or influence.” Cambridge defines puppet like this: “a person whose actions are controlled by someone else”. Well, we can add to these definitions. A puppet is a created thing that is fully controlled and determined by antecedent conditions, namely, the decisions of the puppeteer. Now, if exhaustive divine determination (EDD) is true, then humans are created beings who are fully controlled and determined by antecedent conditions and another personal being, God. That is to say, according to EDD, God exhaustively determines the physical and mental actions of every human all the time. So here’s my question. If a puppet, by definition, is a created thing that is fully determined by antecedent conditions, the decisions of another personal being, how is humanity anything different than a puppet if EDD is true?

Whether the term, “puppet,” applies to somebody or not depends entirely on how you define the word. I’m not that interested in an argument over semantics. If you want to define “puppet” as something that is determined, then sure, we’re all puppets. But shouldn’t the real issue be the question of whether we are, in fact, determined? Who cares what label that entails?

The puppet Tim showed us in his video was an inanimate object. That puppet does not act out of any desire. It has no mind at all. We are obviously not puppets in that sense.

People often call others puppets because they are acting on behalf of somebody else who makes all their decisions. We sometimes call politicians puppets because they’re acting out of the desires of their donors.

I readily admit that there is some sense in which we are all puppets, but who cares? I don’t care what you call me; I care whether determinism is true.

Any of us can influence another’s behavior. We do it all the time. You can just say, “Hey, look at that star,” while pointing, and your buddy will inevitably look. Does that make your buddy a puppet? It depends on how you define the word.

Consider some of the things Jesus said, and ask yourself whether any of this makes Jesus a puppet.

John 14:10 -- “The words I say to you I do not speak on my own authority. Rather, it is the Father, living in me, who is doing his work.”
John 12:49 -- “For I did not speak on my own, but the Father who sent me commanded me to say all that I have spoken.”
John 5:30 -- “By myself I can do nothing; I judge only as I hear, and my judgment is just, for I seek not to please myself but him who sent me.”
John 6:38 -- “For I have come down from heaven not to do my own will but to do the will of him who sent me.”
John 7:16 -- “My teaching is not my own. It comes from the one who sent me.”

Question 20: Braxton Hunter

Which aspect of your Calvinistic beliefs are you least confident about?

That’s a hard question to answer because there are some beliefs that are Calvinistic, but they are not exclusively Calvinistic. Sola Scriptura, for example, is a Calvinistic belief, but it’s not exclusively Calvinistic.

As far as exclusively Calvinistic beliefs, I like to call myself a one-point Calvinist. I believe in the absolute sovereignty of God in salvation. I think all of the traditional five points of Calvinism follow from that one point. Since to me there’s just one belief that captures my Calvinism, I can’t compare it to a second belief and say I’m more sure of one than of the other. I suppose I could say which of the implications of absolute sovereignty I’m least confident about. I’m not sure I can pick one, though. I explained in my blog post on one-point Calvinism how I think the five points follow, and none of them jump out at me as being less likely than all the others.

I can tell you, though, that when I was going through my conversion to Calvinism, the hardest thing for me to come around on was perseverence of the saints.

I may come back and edit this response in case something occurs to me that isn’t occurring to me right now.

Is Sola Scriptura self-refuting?

I've noticed over the last few years that a lot of issues Catholics and protestants used to debate about have kind of gone by the wayside. They don't get talked about as much. Sola Scriptura is getting all the attention. The primary argument Catholic apologists have against Sola Scriptura is that it's self-refuting.

The reason Catholics think it's self-refuting is because it's not taught in the Bible. If the Bible is the only source of theological truths, but the Bible doesn't teach sola scriptura, then sola scriptura can't be a theological truth.

I have argued elsewhere that Sola Scriptura is taught in the Bible,¹ but I want to ignore that so I can come at this objection from a different angle. Actually, I have a few things to say about it, so maybe there'll be more than one angle. For the sake of this post, I want to grant, for the sake of argument, that the Bible does not teach Sola Scriptura.

Let's start with what it means to be self-refuting. A self-refuting statement is a statement that, when assumed to be true and taken to its logical conclusion, turns out to be false. For example, the statement that "All sentences over five words long are false" is a self-refuting statement because it's over five words long. If the statement was true, then it would be false. It refutes itself.

If a statement refutes itself, then it's necessarily false. It's not even possible for it to be true. By the law of excluded middle, if a statement is false, then it's negation must be true. Since, for example, the statement that "All statements over five words long are false" is a self-refuting statement, it follows that the statement, "It is not the case that all sentences over five words long are false," is true because that's the negation of the original statement.

Now, consider the conclusion of the argument above I gave about Sola Scriptura. The conclusion was, "Sola Scriptura can't be a theological truth." That's what would follow if Sola Scriptura were self-refuting. But does that mean Sola Scriptura is false? If Sola Scriptura is self-refuting, then yes, we would have to say that it is false.

If Sola Scriptura is false, then the conclusion would have to be that the Bible is not the sole infallible rule of faith. If the Bible is not the sole infallible rule of faith, then there must be other infallible rules of faith besides the Bible. In other words, since Sola Scriptura is self-refuting, it would follow necessarily that there is another infallible source of theological truths besides the Bible.²

Think about that for a minute. We are basically drawing the conclusion that if the Bible does not state that the Bible is the sole infallible rule of faith, then necessarily, there must be another infallible rule of faith besides the Bible. But how does it follow that if the Bible does not claim to be the sole infallible rule of faith that it therefore isn't? That doesn't follow at all. There must be a mistake somewhere in the Catholic apologist's argument.

Let's suppose, hypothetically, that God inspired the Bible in such a way as to be infallible. And let's suppose there is no other infallible source of authority besides the Bible. That is not to say God couldn't inspire a prophet, a teacher, or even the Pope to make an infallible statement. We're just assuming, for the sake of argument, that he doesn't. If that were the case, then wouldn't it also be the case that the Bible is the sole infallible rule of faith? Wouldn't it be the sole infallible source of authority?

Now suppose that the above scenario is true, and that the Bible happens not to mention that it is the sole infallible source of authority or rule of faith. Well, then you'd have a situation where the Bible was the sole infallible rule of faith even though the Bible didn't say so.

This scenario seems to be perfectly coherent. Keep in mind, I'm not arguing at this point that it's true. I'm only arguing that it's a coherent scenario. It's something that's possible. It's something God could have done. But if Sola Scriptura is self-refuting, then it's not possible for the Bible to be the sole infallible rule of faith or source of authority. So here's my argument in a nut-shell.

1. If Sola Scriptura is self-refuting, then it is not possible for God to inspire the Bible in such a way as to make it infallible without inspiring something else and making it infallible as well.
2. It is possible for God to inspire the Bible in such a way as to make it infallible without inspiring something else and making it infallible as well.
3. Therefore, Sola Scriptura is not self-refuting.

If Sola Scriptura is not self-refuting, then where has the Catholic argument gone wrong? It certainly seems, on its face, to be a good argument. Here's the argument again:

If the Bible is the only source of theological truths, but the Bible doesn't teach sola scriptura, then sola scriptura can't be a theological truth.

In other words, if all theological truths are in the Bible, but Sola Scriptura is not in the Bible, then Sola Scriptura cannot be a theological truth.

There are a few possibilities of where the problem lies with this argument. It could be that Sola Scriptura is true, but it's not a theological truth. It's just a plain ole ordinary truth. It could also be that not all theological truths are recorded in the Bible.

This second option seems obviously true. What is a theological truth anyway? Isn't it a truth about God or religion? John tells us at the end of his gospel that "Jesus did many other things as well. If every one of them were written down, I suppose that even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written" (John 21:25). No doubt Jesus said and did many things that were never written down. Likewise, Paul said, "For we know in part and we prophesy in part, but when completeness comes, what is in part disappears" (1 Corinthians 13:9). The Bible does not contain an exhaustive list of truths about God. There are truths about God that nobody knows, not even the Pope. Jesus, talking about the end times, said, "But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father" (Matthew 24:36). There is a theological truth about when God is going to act in the last days that not even Jesus knew, and nobody knows today.

So it isn't the case that all theological truths are contained in the Bible. The problem with the Catholic argument may just be that it consists of a misunderstanding of what Sola Scriptura even is. Sola Scriptura is not the claim that all truths can be found in the Bible. It's not even the claim that all theological truths can be found in the Bible. Nor is it the claim that the only truths we can know are Biblical truths. After all, I know that Saturn orbits the sun, but the Bible doesn't tell me so.

Sola Scriptura is the claim that the Bible alone is an infallible authority on theological truths. There is nothing self-refuting about that. All that's required for that claim to be true is for God to inspire the Bible in such a way as to guarantee its truth, and for God not to inspire any other source of authority or truths in the same way. That is perfectly possible, and there's not a thing in the world incoherent about it.

What a Catholic could say is that Sola Scriptura cannot be an infallible doctrine unless it is taught in the scriptures. But that is perfectly fine for a protestant. To subscribe to Sola Scriptura, one need only subscribe to the claim that the Bible is the sole infallible source of authority. One need not subscribe to the additional claim that it is infallibly true that the Bible is the sole infallible source of authority. It is that additional claim that Catholics are banking on in order to show that Sola Scriptura is self-refuting, but that additional claim is not what Sola Scriptura is.

I grant that Sola Scriptura is a theological claim because it's a claim about something God did or did not do. Sola Scriptura is not the claim that you can only know theological truths that are revealed in the Bible. It's possible to know things about God through natural theology. The things you discover that way may not be infallibly true, but they could still be true anyway, and you could still be justified in believing them.

Likewise, we could discover through history, tradition (with a small 't'), or by simply recognizing the voice of our shepherd that the Bible is θεόπνευστος and therefore infallible. If we know of no other source of authority that's equally θεόπνευστος, then Sola Scriptura becomes the default position until we learn of some other infallible source. Sola Scriptura does not need to be taught explicitly in the Bible or infallibly known in order to be true or in order to be known.

What does it even mean for a statement or claim to be infallible? I take it to mean that it's a statement or claim that's guaranteed to be true because it came from an infallible source. After all, a statement is either true or false. Adding "infallible" to it doesn't make it anymore true than it already was. It's the source of the claim that's either fallible or infallible. If a source is infallible, that means the source is guaranteed to only provide true statements. If Sola Scriptura does not come from an infallible source, like the Bible, it could still be true, and it could be known to be true. It doesn't need to be an infallible truth to be true or known.

The same thing applies to the Canon.

NOTES:

1. I had a debate on debate.org with Adrian Urias titled "Sola Scriptura vs Sola Dei Verbum," but unfortunately that web page no longer exists, and the WayBack Machine doesn't appear to have it archived. Adrian, if you're reading this, did you happen to keep a copy of it? EDIT: Oh look! Watson posted a copy of the debate in the comment section. Thank you Watson!

2. It's also possible to negate Sola Scriptura by claiming that there are no infallible sources of authority at all, but that option is not open to Catholics or protestants. If we agree that there is at least one infallible rule of faith, but there's not only one, then by necessity there must be more than one. Even without this qualification, there's an obvious problem with the Catholic argument. It would follow that since Sola Scriptura is self-refuting that either (1) there is no infallible source of authority, or (2) there must be more than one infallible source of authority. But under no circumstances can there be just one infallible source of authority because that's allegedly self-refuting.

Why you should have an estate plan and file an affidavit of heirship for your deceased parents and/or grandparents

I have been a landman since 2006, and if there's one thing I've learned, it's the importance of estate planning. Estate planning is figuring out what is going to happen to your assets (and your corpse) after you die. A lot of people don't worry about it because they don't think they have any assets. But it is possible to have assets and not know it. Let me explain.

If you don't have a Will, then when you die, your assets go to your living heirs according to the laws of descent and distribution in your state. These laws differ from state to state, but they're pretty similar. If you're married and have kids, they might all go to your spouse, all to your children, or divided between them.

But suppose you don't have kids or a spouse. In that case, they go back to your parents. If your parents are dead (and they probably are by the time you die), then it goes to your brothers and sisters or to their children if they are dead.

Now, let me share a situation I've been dealing with lately to explain to you why it is important to have a Will and to file an affidavit of heirship for your deceased parents and/or grandparents. First, let me explain a little about how mineral ownership works.

Land, and the minerals that lie in and under the land (e.g. coal, oil, gas, gold, uranium, copper, etc.), can be divided into separate estates. What I mean is that it's possible to own the surface of a piece of land while somebody else owns the minerals. In fact, that's normal. In most states, only the surface owner pays taxes. If you own the oil and gas, but not the surface, and there's no well producing oil or gas, then you probably don't have to pay taxes. Again, these laws differ from state to state.

That means several generations can go by, each inheriting the oil and gas, without the descendants even knowing they own the oil and gas. If their parents owned the oil and gas, and they never leased it, paid any taxes on it, or did anything with it, they might just forget all about it and neglect to inform their children. Their children have no idea they inherited it, and their children are even less aware.

Okay, here's the situation I'm dealing with right now. I researched the title (both surface and mineral) of a piece of land in which a man back in the 1930's owned the minerals. I was able to find, through courthouse records, how he acquired his interest. But then, as I was searching for him in the indexes, he just disappeared. There was no affidavit of heirship, and there was no Will or Probate record. Where did his minerals go?

It turns out, he died in another state. He had no wife or children. You'd think his interest would go to his siblings, but oh no! It was not that simple. He was an only child. That means his interest went back to both his maternal grandparents and his paternal grandparents, then it trickled down to their remaining descendants. So all these distant cousins of the man inherited his minerals.

Do you think they knew about it? Of course not. They had no idea. And since that was so long ago, they are all deceased. Their descendants have inherited the minerals. And, of course, none of them know about it.

My job, now, is to find these descendants by looking up obituaries and whatever information I can find on Ancestry, Find-A-Grave, Family Search, or wherever else. Once I find them, I have to persuade them to help me create an affidavit of heirship to file in the courthouse in the county where these minerals are.

The problem is that most of these people have never dealt with this sort of thing before. A lot of them think I'm some Nigerian scam artist, and they don't want to talk to me. It takes a lot of persuasion and explaning to get them just to believe me.

I have managed to persuade some people that I'm legitimate, but now there's another problem. A lot of these people I'm trying to contact are the great-grandchildren or even great-great-grandchildren of the people for whom we need affidavits of heirship. An affidavit of heirship is supposed to include information about when and where the person died, whether they had a Will or probate record, and who all their heirs are. The great-grandchildren usually have no idea if their great-grandparent had a Will or whether that Will was admitted to Probate. It's nearly impossible just to create an affidavit of heirship because none of the living descendants can answer the questions I have to answer to fill out the affidavit.

That is why it's important to have an estate plan and to file an affidavit of heirship for your deceased parents or grandparents. You might own minerals in some county in a different state and not even know it. A Will removes all ambiguity about who will inherit whatever assets you own. In the absense of a Will, an affidavit of heirship can establish who your heirs are so the laws of descent and distribution can apply. Something filed in the courthouse, either where you live or where the minerals are located, can establish legal title. You may not ever do anything with your minerals, but your descendants might want to sell them, lease them, or include them in their Wills. They can't do that if they don't even know they own anything.

Moreover, if some energy company wants to mine coal or drill for oil and gas, they have to be able to find who owns the minerals so they can negotiate a lease agreement. If your grandchildren own the minerals, but they can't be found because you didn't have a Will, and nobody filed an affidavit of heirship for you, then your poor grandchildren will miss out on any lease bonuses or royalties they might've been paid. Don't do that to them.

When your parents die, you should file an affidavit of heirship even if they have a Will. Wills are not always admitted to Probate, and some states require them to be admitted to probate before title to land or minerals can be vested. You should file an affidavit of heirship at least in the county where your parents or grandparents lived. The affidavit should state when and where they died, whether they had a Will, whether that Will was admitted to Probate, who the survivors were (e.g. spouse, children, etc.), where they live, and whether they were precedeased by any spouse or children, and if so, whether there are any living grandchildren, and where they are.

If you know your parents or grandparents owned land or minerals in various counties, you should file a copy of the affidavit of heirship in the county clerk's office of every courthouse in every county in which they owned land or minerals. The affidavit should cite the Cause No. of the Probate case (if there is one) in whatever county their estate in being probated in (usually where they lived when they died). This will make everybody's life a lot easier, possibly for hundreds of years into the future.

You don't want generations to go by without anybody ever filing an affidavit of heirship because then you'll end up with the situation I'm dealing with where none of the living descendants know whether their great-grandparents had a Will, or sometimes even who all of their children were. Not everybody knows who their great-aunts and uncles were, much less where they lived. When I talk to people, I often know more than they do about their family history.

Having an estate plan will make things much easier on your heirs after you die. Everybody should have one, even if you don't think you own a lot of assets. You don't know when you're going to die. You don't even necessarily know what you own. And if you have some complicated family involving multiple marriages, step children, foster children, adopted children, or children with questionable lineage, having an estate plan simplifies things by removing ambiguity about who will inherit your stuff. You will be doing all of your heirs a favour by having an estate plan.

Besides helping your family out by having an estate plan, you'll be helping out the poor landmen who have to unravel surface and mineral title years down the road. Please, think of the landmen!